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Abstract
Over the past three decades concerns have arisen about the ability of deregulated electricity
systems such as the UK’s to deliver secure supplies. Capacity margins have drawn particular
attention, but a number of apparently secure systems have failed for unanticipated reasons. This
has led some to question whether risk-based measures fully capture the uncertainties to which
such systems are exposed, and whether the concept of “resilience” provides a framework around
which to discuss less quantitative indicators.
This work attempts to answer four questions. First, what are the characteristics of a resilient and
secure electricity system? Second, how have these characteristics evolved over the past 25 years?
Third, to what extent can these changes be attributed to privatisation & liberalisation and to the
introduction of new forms of renewable generation? Fourth, how might the UK Government’s
proposed policies aﬀect the security of electricity supply?
‘Resilience’ was found to be a multi-faceted concept, but ﬁve indicators were chosen for further
investigation: generation margins, system diversity, energy intensity, electricity prices and en-
ergy independence. It was shown that a decline in margins can probably not be attributed to
privatisation, but that renewable generation can have a positive eﬀect depending on the sup-
port mechanism. Diversity can be enhanced by both privatisation and some forms of renewable
support, the latter also seemingly reducing a country’s import dependence, but also increasing
prices.
Whilst there is some evidence that policy changes can aﬀect a system’s resilience, the suggestion
is that liberalisation has not had a strong overall impact. Furthermore, achieving ‘optimal
resilience’ may be inherently unachievable, meaning that policies will always need to ﬂexible
enough to respond to change, but constant enough to encourage the necessary investment for
the future.
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Part I
Preliminaries, Deﬁnitions and Indicator Development
1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The privatisation of the UK electricity system in the 1990s put the generation, transmission,
distribution and supply of electricity into private ownership (Helm, 2004; Surrey, 1996). This
process of privatisation was not isolated to the power sector, but was, argues David Newbery
(2001), a manifestation of the Conservative philosophy at the time that “the business of Gov-
ernment is not the government of business”. Within this broader ideological framework, it was
argued that government ownership and operation of electricity utilities was ineﬃcient, and that
economic beneﬁts could be achieved by introducing a free market for electricity (Newbery, 2001).
In fact, the decision is better understood by noting that electricity privatisation was part of a
wider ideological shift away from state ownership of a number of public services such as trans-
port, also providing the government of the time with a means of raising capital, thereby reducing
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the levels of public debt (Kay and Thompson, 1986).
Whatever the initial intentions of the Government at the time, the beneﬁts of privatisation have
been reiterated by subsequent Governments. The 2003 Energy White Paper is described as being
“based on the four pillars of the environment, energy reliability, aﬀordable energy for the poorest,
and competitive markets for our businesses, industries and households”(emphasis added) (DTI,
2003). These same pillars are described as the “four long-term goals for energy policy” in the
DTI’s 2006 Energy Review DTI (2006a):
• To put the UK on a path to cut our carbon dioxide emissions by some 60% by about 2050,
with real progress by 2020;
• To maintain reliable energy supplies;
• To promote competitive markets in the UK and beyond, helping to raise the rate of sus-
tainable economic growth and to improve our productivity; and
• To ensure that every home is adequately and aﬀordably heated.
By including competition as one of the ‘four pillars’ of energy policy, the government implic-
itly deﬁnes how the other three – low-carbon, secure and aﬀordable energy supplies – are to be
achieved. Seeing competition not as a means to an end, but as an ambition in its own right,
has, it has been argued, dictated the government’s approach to energy policy-making (Mitchell
and Connor, 2004). Delivering secure energy supplies whilst allowing the market suﬃcient free-
dom to allocate resources has been consistently recognised as a particular challenge for the UK
government’s energy policy (DTI, 2006a, 2007).
Electricity systems face some particularly problematic security challenges. Electrical energy
cannot be stored easily, meaning that it has to be generated to meet instantaneous demand (Na-
tional Grid, 2008a; Newbery, 2002). The availability of generation and the demand for power
must therefore be accurately predicted, continuously monitored, and adjusted when imbalances
occur (National Grid, 2008a). Power supplies also need to meet stringent frequency and volt-
age quality standards in order to allow sophisticated electrical equipment to function correctly
(National Grid, 2008a). The proportion of energy services delivered by the electricity system is
increasing with the growing dependence of industries, services and domestic consumers on elec-
trical appliances and information technology (National Grid, 2008a). The following chart from
the IEA illustrates the diﬀerences in electricity use between 1973 and 2006:
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Figure 1.1: UK breakdown of sectoral ﬁnal consumption by source
Over this period, industrial energy consumption has gone down by 35%, whereas the electricity
consumption has gone up by over 30%. Industrial electricity use has therefore doubled from
12% in 1973 to 24% in 2006. Consumption of energy in the residential, commercial and other
sectors has gone up over this period, but the proportion of that ﬁnal consumption coming from
electricity has climbed from 23% in 1973 to 34% in 2006. The electriﬁcation of the transport
sector remains a small proportion of total ﬁnal energy consumption, but plans to electrify more
of the UK rail network (Brand et al., 2010) and the potential electriﬁcation of road vehicles
would increase further the demands placed on the electricity system.
The term ‘energy security’, deﬁned as “a system’s ability to provide a ﬂow of energy to meet
demand in an economy in a manner and price that does not disrupt the course of the economy”
(Grubb et al., 2006), covers a wide range of system characteristics, including import dependence,
import diversity, storage levels, and generator and network reliability (Grubb et al., 2006; Olz
et al., 2007). The focus of this research, however, is the ‘resilience’ of electricity systems. A
‘resilient’ system has the necessary technical, economic and institutional characteristics to min-
imise the impact of adverse events, and to reinstate the provision of energy services both quickly
and with the minimum overall disruption. Resilience is just one component of electricity system
security, but it is a useful concept to assess for a number of reasons. Numerous attempts have
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been made to develop measures of a country’s ‘energy security’ (Blyth and Lefevre, 2004; Jansen
et al., 2004). The concept has, however, remained diﬃcult to quantify, since security of supply
has a large number of factors whose relative importance are debatable, and many of which, such
as ‘geopolitical risk’, are subject to large uncertainties (Blyth and Lefevre, 2004). The resilience
of a system can be demonstrated through its ability to maintain adequate function despite a
geopolitical risk being realised, but the resilience of the system itself is independent of the level
of geopolitical risks to which it is exposed. ‘Resilience’ can therefore be used as a way of limit-
ing the scope of the policy debate to quantiﬁable terms and, crucially, focusing on the system
attributes that fall under the jurisdiction of national policymakers.
By transferring ownership and operation of the electricity generation, transmission, distribution
and supply sectors to private companies, the government has eﬀectively limited its role in en-
suring security of supply to one of encouraging and enabling investment, discouraging market
concentration and, where natural monopolies exist, regulating those industries (Helm, 2005).
Whilst regulation has maintained many of the same security standards that applied in the na-
tionalised era, these standards may now be in tension with the need to use resources as eﬃciently
as possible (Helm, 2005; Strbac and Jenkins, 2001; Thomas and Hall, 2003). Government sees
its role as being to “strengthen the UK energy investment framework so that investors have
the conﬁdence to make timely investments in new gas and electricity infrastructure consistent
with our energy goals” (DTI, 2003). The energy regulator, Ofgem, also has a duty to ensure
that electricity network costs are as low as possible. There has been discussion in recent years
about the ability of the existing market system to deliver the “timely investments” necessary for
maintaining secure supplies and in particular the ability of the existing framework to reconcile
the potential conﬂict between operational eﬃciency and long-term supply security.
In recent years the current electricity market arrangements have come under increased scrutiny.
There is broad agreement that liberalisation has resulted in beneﬁts in terms of eﬃcient system
operation, but there are emerging concerns that the market forces alone will not be able to
deliver the rate of capacity replacement and expansion that will be required. This has led some
to ask what policy measures can be used to encourage new capacity construction, and others
to consider the possibility that a completely new regulatory approach is required to maintain
adequate levels of security (Henney, 2001; Newbery, 2006; Woo et al., 2003). The government
and regulator has begun to consult on these issues (Ofgem, 2010; DECC, 2010a) in order to
decide how best to meet the need both to expand and decarbonise the electricity system, whilst
still maintaining the levels of supply security on which industrial and domestic consumers are
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becoming increasingly reliant.
1.2 Research Outline
The structure of this PhD thesis is in three sections. The ﬁrst concerns the concept of “resilience”
itself. It reviews the ecological, sociological and ﬁnance literature to bring together the various
interpretations of the concept. Each interpretation is inevitably grounded in the discipline for
which it was conceived. The same will be true for the use of the concept within the ﬁeld of
energy security. Having explored the various aspects of system resilience, this work then assesses
whether the ideas that a resilience perspective raises are suﬃciently distinct from those already
used within the energy policy literature so as to be worth pursuing. In other words, it asks
whether policy-making that addressed resilience would be substantively diﬀerent from one that
was based on the more conventional notion of energy security. Where such concepts are deemed
useful, a set of quantitative and qualitative indicators are proposed as a basis for future policy
assessment.
The second section concerns the historic record of electricity system operation. It attempts to
analyse the impact of diﬀerent policies on the resilience indicators identiﬁed in the ﬁrst section.
The UK has now experienced over 20 years of liberalised system operation. In that time the
system has undergone a number of changes. As policymakers make decisions about the regulation
of the system in the future, it is worth considering what the true eﬀect of past policies has been
thus far. When considering the UK alone, it is diﬃcult to discern from the data alone which
policy changes were responsible for which system changes. Across the OECD, nearly all countries
have now undergone some level of privatisation or liberalisation of their electricity system, and
most have begun to implement low-carbon policies. This allows a multi-country analysis to be
conducted to identify the real impacts of policies, while controlling for sources of variation in
the time series. The timescales over which these systems have operated are just beginning to
be suﬃciently long to attempt to discern the eﬀects of diﬀerent policies on electricity system
operations. Nevertheless, the eﬀects observed remain weak because of the large underlying
variability in the data and the relatively short timescales. This should serve as a reminder
that we have, as yet, only the most scant evidence of the many policy interventions working in
practice, and perhaps that policymaking should choose policy pathways that acknowledge the
level of uncertainty inherent in the system.
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The third section concerns the current energy market reforms currently being considered. It
begins by reviewing and synthesising both the consultation documents and the associated re-
sponses relating to Ofgem’s Discovery (Ofgem, 2010) project and DECC’s more recent Energy
Market Reform proposals (DECC, 2010a). This systematic review assesses the security of supply
implications anticipated in relation to these market changes. With reference to section 1, this
section goes on to consider whether the “resilience” framework provides a diﬀerent and mean-
ingful perspective on the proposed policies changes. Further, the analysis conducted in section
2 is applied here to establish the extent to which proposed market reforms are supported by the
historical evidence.
1.3 Aims and Objectives
This thesis has two overarching aims:
1. To understand the relationship between regulatory change and the resilience of the elec-
tricity system by analysing the historic evidence;
2. To use these ﬁndings to assess the impact that the range of proposed market reforms might
have on the resilience of the UK electricity system in the future.
To this end, the work has a number of objectives:
• To conduct a literature review to understand the concept of ‘resilience’ as it has been used
in a range of diﬀerent academic disciplines;
• To use the results of the literature review to propose one or more deﬁnitions of resilience
that have a useful bearing on the electricity system;
• To understand if, and to what extent, ‘resilience’ is distinct from ‘energy security’, and
whether this distinction has any substantive implications for energy policymakers;
• To choose quantitative and qualitative indicators that describe the ‘resilience’ of an elec-
tricity system;
• To conduct an intervention analysis to understand whether, and to what extent, changes
in the regulation of electricity systems internationally have a signiﬁcant bearing on these
‘resilience indicators’;
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– Where such associations are found, to understand why such a relationship exists;
– Where no association is found, to consider whether there is insuﬃcient statistical
power to see an eﬀect, or whether the policy and the indicator do indeed have no real
association;
• To conduct a review of the most recent UK energy policy documents
• To assess the UK energy policy proposals in light, both, of the emerging ‘resilience’ concept
and the historic evidence of the relationship between regulatory design and the relevant
resilience indicators.
2
Methodology
The methods applied in this research are predominantly evidence-based, systematically reviewing
the existing literature and analysing primary data using statistical methods. The work attempts
to assess the eﬀect of policy change on the resilience of the electricity system. It does this by
drawing on the extensive data that exist on the UK electricity system and on those of other
countries (BERR, 2008b; IEA, 2008; Oxera, 2007). As will be discussed in this chapter, taking
a strictly quantitative approach can limit the range and depth of conclusions that can be drawn
by eliminating pertinent, but qualitative, evidence. Further, by deﬁning a concept such as
“resilience” in terms of quantiﬁable measures one risks focusing on indicators that do not properly
reﬂect the concept they are intended to describe.
The statistical component of this research focuses on a number of quantitative indicators of
electricity system ‘resilience’ and of privatisation and liberalisation. As will be discussed in
chapter 3, the full range of potential indicators includes a number that are more qualitative,
and not subject to numerical interrogation. Such qualitative indicators can be equally valid
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interpretations, but do not lend themselves to statistical investigation of the sort carried out in
this research. These indicators, therefore, are explored in some depth in chapter 3, are eliminated
from the cross-country times series analysis, but are reintroduced as part of the synthesising work
that forms the ﬁnal chapters in this thesis. The intention is that robust numerical analysis be
conducted to identify correlations between policy intervention and resilience indicators, but that
the importance of these qualitative indicators not be lost in that process.
As will be explored further in chapter 3 there is a particular challenge presented by attempting
to carry out a quantitative analysis on a concept such as resilience. For some authors the reason
that resilience is useful is that it provides a way of thinking about a system that allows for a
degree of ignorance on our part about system behaviour (Stirling, 1994). For others (Redman,
2008; Walker, 2008), “resilient” system design implies a degree of ineﬃciency – leaving some
slack to allow for the possibility that our understanding of system behaviour is wrong. It can
reasonably be argued that “resilience” should not be reduced only to quantitative indicators,
and that to do so would leave it devoid of the qualities for which it was ﬁrst conceived.
This chapter details the methodology used in this research; the following sections discuss the use
of:
• systematic reviews to explore existing resilience deﬁnitions, deﬁne an appropriate set of
‘resilience indicators’ and to collect associated data on a number of electricity systems in
order to make comparisons
• indicators as proxies for resilience, privatisation, liberalisation and regulation
• statistical methods (where the resilience indicators are quantiﬁable, and where the data
allow) to identify correlations between resilience indicators and the indicators related to
privatisation, liberalisation, regulation and market design
2.1 Systematic Review Methodology
For chapter 3, a conceptual analysis was conducted to explore the use of resilience and resilience-
related concepts in the wider literature. A research methodology was required that could identify
a large number of deﬁnitions from a suﬃciently broad range of sources, in order to be conﬁdent
that the breadth of the diﬀerent meanings had been identiﬁed and that the prevalence of each
was representative of the full body of literature that made use of the term.
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A systematic review methodology (Mulrow, 1994) was chosen as the most eﬀective way to identify
the diﬀerent conceptualisations of resilience in a large number of diverse sources. A computer-
based systematic review oﬀered access to a large number of papers, using research databases
and online journals. Systematic Reviews were developed in the ﬁeld of medical research to bring
together and analyse the best evidence available from a wide range of sources (Clarke, 2004).
The procedure is most commonly used to answer speciﬁc quantitative medical questions, but
has increasingly been used to synthesise qualitative data (Dixon-Woods et al., 2001). Clinical
trials literature has begun to discuss ways in which qualitative ﬁndings can be used to support
the ﬁndings of quantitative meta-analyses. More recently still, systematic review methodologies
have been applied to exclusively qualitative data. Of particular relevance to this research are the
papers that use these techniques to understand how diﬀerent concepts are deﬁned. A deﬁnitive
methodology for conducting a systematic review of deﬁnitions has yet to emerge. This review,
therefore, has been guided by these conceptual reviews which have attempted to assess the
deﬁnitions of medical concepts: namely, “anastomotic leak” (Bruce et al., 2001), “falls” (Hauer
et al., 2006), “Sedation for Symptom Relief” (Morita et al., 2002), “eHealth” (Oh et al., 2005)
and “drowning incidents” (Papa et al., 2005). More recently, it has been suggested that energy
policy research could beneﬁt from this evidence-based approach (Sorrell, 2007).
The formal Systematic Review (SR) process described, for example, by the Cochrane Collection
(Clarke, 2004) ﬁnds evidence using ﬁxed search terms in agreed databases, pre-deﬁned inclusion
criteria based on quality assessments, and synthesises the data in a ﬁxed way. None of these
procedures is entirely applicable in this research, but they are nonetheless useful as providing a
benchmark. The deﬁnition of terms and the review of literature to identify market and resilience
indicators involved a large number of sources, so could not be constrained to a predeﬁned set
of databases. Deﬁnitions of resilience and associated indicators cannot be formally synthesised,
since they are used in diﬀerent ways for diﬀerent disciplines.
Where it has been used in this research, the SR process has therefore been used only in a modiﬁed
form that attempts to adhere to its underlying intentions, namely the unbiased synthesis of a
wide range of sources (Clarke, 2004), whilst avoiding unhelpful constraints. This approach has
allowed a large number of sources to be reviewed in order to ensure that the deﬁnition and choice
of market and resilience indicators is as grounded in the existing literature as possible.
The biggest challenge for reviewing concepts is to assimilate them in a systematic way. There is
always a risk that the conceptual categories chosen will reﬂect preconceived ideas about resilience,
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rather than emerging impartially from the literature being reviewed. The eHealth paper (Oh
et al., 2005) used the “constant comparative method” to provide rigour for the categorisation
of diﬀerent deﬁnitions of eHealth. This is an iterative process in which words, sentences, or
paragraphs are labelled, compared, and grouped until no new categories emerge. A similar
approach has been used for this research, maintaining the impartiality aﬀorded by the systematic
searching methodology and minimising the opportunity for bias to enter the interpretation of
the results.
2.1.1 Research Areas
The primary objective of the research documented in chapter 3 was to provide the conceptual
context for answering the following question:
“Is resilience a useful concept for informing policy decisions on energy security?
Answering this question required breaking it down into a number of sub-questions:
1. What is meant by resilience?
2. What is meant by energy security?
3. How does resilience apply to energy policy?
4. How would an attempt to enhance resilience change current approaches to energy policy?
In order to answer these questions, the search strategy was divided into three sections:
• How is Energy Security currently conceptualised?
• How has Resilience been used to date in the context of energy security?
• What conceptualisations of Resilience exist in the non-energy literature, and can these
inform or expand the use of the term in energy policy.
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2.1.1.1 Energy Security
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the ways in which the concept of resilience is, and can
be, used to inform decisions on energy policy generally, and in particular its usefulness in the
conceptualisation of energy security. In order to understand the impact of resilience thinking on
energy security there is a need to appreciate the ways in which energy security is currently used.
This was to provide a context into which a reﬁned resilience concept can be placed.
As an indication of the prevalence of the term in the literature, a Google Scholar search of energy
security yielded 11,500 records (going up to 16,400 records if security of supply was included in
the search). Even if the search were restricted only to those articles that contain energy security
in the title, this still found 834 results (977 including security of supply). A full search of the
relevant academic database would have found even more articles, the digestion of which would
have been unmanageable and disproportionate.
As a solution to this problem, it was decided to look only at the use of energy security in policy
documents. This was intended to provide a snapshot of the use of the term as it evolved over
time. The limitation of this approach was that it would fail to capture some of the more detailed
analyses of energy security that might be found in the academic literature, and the assessments
of the physical and institutional components that collectively comprise a secure energy supply
system. However, as will be discussed in the next section, the review of the “resilience” literature,
which is the primary focus of this work, covers both the policy and the academic literature.
The catalogue was searched using the search string given below. The resulting list of references
was then manually checked, and those records that did not meet the inclusion criteria were ex-
cluded. The remaining documents were collected and each was visually searched in the following
manner:
• Check the Index (if available) for security-related terms. Read any relevant sections in full.
• Check the Contents page (if available) for security-related terms. If Contents page is not
available, check the chapter/section headings visually. Read any relevant sections in full.
• Where they exist, read the preface, introduction and abstract.
The search domain, search strings and inclusion/exclusion criteria used are detailed below:
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Search Domain
• Imperial College Library Catalogue
Search String
The string chosen was designed to identify all energy-related documents published by HMSO
(the asterisk (∗) denotes a wildcard, which can take any ending).
• Title:(energy OR power OR fuel OR electric∗OR gas OR oil)AND Words or phrase:(h.m.s.o.
OR hmso OR majesty’s OR stationery oﬃce)
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
• Only documents related to energy policy were included
• Only those results from the Environmental Reports series were included (Call Number:
Rxxxx, e.g. R1234)
• Any document that made no mention of energy security (or a variant of that term) was
excluded.
2.1.1.2 Resilience in the Energy Policy Literature
It was expected that there would not be a large number of papers on the subject of energy
policy that contained references to resilience. A Google Scholar and CSA Illumina search for
papers that contained resilience along with energy policy, energy security, or security of supply
in the title both found only one paper (Lovins & Lovins (1981)). A similar ScienceDirect search
produced no results.
It was therefore decided that all references to resilience in the body of the articles would be
searched. The limitations of the search engines did not allow a search of papers with energy
in the title and resilience anywhere. It was therefore decided to address the search in two steps:
1. Identify all the journals related to energy policy
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2. Search for resilience only within those relevant journals.
The search criteria were as follows:
Search Domain
• Imperial College Library’s ELECTRONIC JOURNALS TITLE SEARCH - Quick search
function
• Search engine of each energy-related journal (or its associated database)
Search String
• Journal Search: (energy OR power OR fuel OR electric OR gas OR oil OR coal)
• Article Search: (full text) resilience
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
• Journal Search: Journals unrelated to energy policy were removed (e.g. Journal of High
Energy Physics, e.g. Applied sOIL ecology)
• Article Search: Only articles that used resilience in the context of energy policy or energy
security were included. Furthermore, those articles that used resilience in an ambiguous
way were excluded.
2.1.1.3 Resilience in the Wider Literature
Searching for resilience in all academic ﬁelds yields a large number of hits (60,300 for Google
Scholar at the time of writing). The term has been used for a number of decades, and is a fairly
prominent concept in some academic disciplines such as ecology and psychology, so its prevalence
is unsurprising.
In order to make this search manageable, a limited number of databases were chosen that were
intended to capture the majority of natural and social science journals. Within each of these
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journals a title search was conducted for resilience. If the number of hits exceeded 500, the
search was restricted to references that contained resilience and one of the following: ecolo*
(where the ∗denotes a wildcard which can take any ending), bio∗, soci∗, enviro∗, eco∗, engine∗,
network and econo∗to restrict the search to the physical, biological, and social sciences. A
further search was then done to ﬁnd references whose title contained resilience with concept∗,
construct∗, deﬁn∗, metaphor∗, meaning and measure∗to ﬁnd articles that explicitly dealt with
deﬁnitions of resilience.
Finally, to make the amount of reading manageable, only deﬁnitions of resilience found in the
article abstract (rather than in the body of the text) were included in the analysis.
Search Domain
• CSA Illumina
• DTI Website
• Google Scholar
• ISI Web of Science
• JSTOR
• ScienceDirect
Search String
• (title only) resilience (if <500 records generated)
• (title only) resilience AND (ecolo∗OR bio∗OR soci∗OR enviro∗OR eco∗OR engine∗OR
network OR econo∗OR concept∗OR construct∗OR deﬁn∗OR metaphor∗OR meaning OR
measure∗)
Inclusion/Exclusion Criteria
• The search for deﬁnitions was restricted to the abstracts of the retrieved papers. Only
those papers that contained resilience in the abstract, therefore, were included in the ﬁnal
results list.
2.1.1.4 Resilience-Related Terms
Whilst the primary purpose of conducting a systematic review was to ﬁnd deﬁnitions of resilience,
a secondary beneﬁt was that it identiﬁed a number of concepts that were related to resilience.
2 METHODOLOGY 41
By understanding these other terms, a better understanding could be formed of the subtle
diﬀerences between interpretations of resilience. Understanding, for example, how resistance is
used in ecology could serve to clarify its distinction from resilience.
Furthermore, these secondary terms had the potential to be useful in their own right for the con-
ceptualisation of energy security. For example, the notion of a Performance-Survival Threshold,
as will be explained in chapter 3, could have oﬀered a strategy for coping with adverse events in
the energy supply chain.
The strategy for identifying these peripheral terms was less formalised than that used for ﬁnding
deﬁnitions of resilience. There were fewer references to each of the secondary concepts (given
that they were not in the primary search string), so the requirement that they be explicitly
deﬁned was relaxed. Where a potentially-relevant term was identiﬁed, the reference database
was searched for all references to that concept to ensure that all instances were captured. In some
cases a term was identiﬁed that seemed to be relevant but was unexplained in the abstract itself;
where an explanation of a deﬁnition was lacking, therefore, a further search of the literature was
conducted to provide a fuller description of the term.
2.2 The Use of Indicators
This research tests the relationship between diﬀerent forms of regulation and their eﬀect on
resilience. In order to make meaningful comparisons between disparate electricity systems and
regulatory regimes, the relevant characteristics are analysed indirectly through the use of ‘indi-
cators’. Each country, for example, will be unique in the precise way in which it implements
policies, and each electricity system will have technologies and modes of operation that are par-
ticular to that country. The careful choice of indicators allows the quantitative measure of a
relevant system characteristic and, crucially, allows the researcher to look at many diﬀerent sys-
tems simultaneously and thereby draw generalisable conclusions that can inform future policy
decisions.
The use of indicators for policy analysis is established practice in a number of diﬀerent disciplines
(Cust, 2008), and is a particularly useful approach to take when the subject of interest is not
directly quantiﬁable. Their use policy-based research in particular is widespread (Hezri and
Dovers, 2006). Indeed, the UK government has been producing data on a number of indicators
to assess its progress towards its stated energy policy goals (DECC, 2009a).
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The OECD (2001) deﬁnes an indicator as follows:
“A parameter, or a value derived from parameters, which points to, provides in-
formation about, describes the state of a phenomenon/environment/area, with a
signiﬁcance extending beyond that directly associated with a parameter value.”
Well-chosen indicators, then, have the potential to allow quantitative comparisons to be made
between diﬀerent systems, to identify trends and to make inferences about the impact of diﬀerent
interventions.
‘Resilience’ itself is a qualitative concept, in the sense that it is subjective, and comprises a
number of diﬀerent system characteristics. No single metric, therefore, will be able to describe all
the necessary dimensions of a resilient system. Similarly, ‘privatisation’ and ‘liberalisation’ can be
measured in diﬀerent ways, as can the forms and degrees of regulation that exist under privatised
electricity systems. The ﬁrst step in this research, therefore, was to provide a working deﬁnition
for each of these concepts and to choose appropriate indicators that would allow meaningful
relationships to be analysed between electricity system resilience and electricity market design.
2.3 Statistical Methods
A number of the indicators identiﬁed in chapter 3 are quantitative, and for a number of these
some relevant data are available. In such cases, a statistical analysis can be performed to test
the relationships between policies and resilience. One approach could be to take a snapshot of
diﬀerent electricity systems and to compare them at a single moment in time. For example,
one could ask whether electricity systems that have been privatised are more or less diverse in
their generation mix than those systems that have remained nationalised. This question can
be answered by placing the systems into one of two groups – privatised and non-privatised –
and using a t-test to determine whether the level of diversity (however deﬁned) is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent between them.
The approach used in this research extends this idea in two ways:
• First, rather than using data from a snapshot in time, time series data are used (where
available) to analyse how a change in ‘privatisation’ aﬀects the resilience indicator over time.
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By analysing how the resilience indicator has changed over time, rather than the absolute
levels at one time-point, the eﬀect of the policy change is more likely to be discerned.
• Second, the forms of regulation aﬀecting resilience are investigated. Rather than sim-
ply studying whether, say, privatised systems are made more diverse, this research asks
whether, for example, horizontal or vertical separation made more of an impact.
There are a number of advantages to assessing policy interventions through the use of these
statistical methods:
1. The analysis of multi-country data allows us to control for eﬀects other than the speciﬁc
intervention under investigation (i.e. privatisation).
2. A snapshot in time of diﬀerent electricity systems could reveal an association between
privatisation and a given resilience indicator; this may be due to confounding (both pri-
vatisation and the resilience indicator are aﬀected by an unseen third variable, such as
GDP). The time series approach mitigates this possibility to some extent.
3. The statistical approach provides a way of making explicit those assumptions that are
being made. If the approach fails to reveal an eﬀect of privatisation on resilience, this is
still informative, since it means that any analysis that does reveal an eﬀect will be to a
signiﬁcant extent dependent on the additional assumptions being made.
2.3.1 Intervention Analysis
Investigating the eﬀect of an event on a time-varying variable is known as an ‘intervention
analysis’ (Angeriz and Arestis, 2008; Box and Tiao, 1965, 1975; Harvey, 1996; Lewis-Beck et al.,
2004). In this research, the interventions are diﬀerent forms of privatisation, liberalisation and
regulatory intervention. For illustrative purposes, a single-instance privatisation event (T0) is
ﬁrst described below to show its eﬀect on a hypothetical resilience indicator. This scenario is
represented by Figure 2.1 below.
An Intervention Analysis (IA) can be conducted on a single time series, such as the UK’s. To
analyse the UK alone, the IA would be conducted by constructing an Auto-Regressive Integrated
Moving Average (ARIMA) model. This uses the time series data prior to the intervention to
identify the underlying structure of the series (Angeriz and Arestis, 2008) and compares it to the
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Figure 2.1: Resilience indicator change over time
behaviour after the intervention to look for evidence of a change. The question the intervention
analysis asks is whether the behaviour of the resilience indicator is diﬀerent after T0 from how it
was beforehand. The intervention analysis determines whether the act of privatisation at T0 has
a discernible eﬀect on the resilience indicator beyond that which is explained by the random (or
unexplained) variation in the data.
In the case of electricity systems, an analysis of this sort is less than satisfactory for a number
of reasons. First, indicators can have noisy signals making it unlikely that a moderate change
would be seen following the privatisation event, even if the eﬀect were real. One of the resilience
indicators chosen in Part 4 is the generation system margin, which, as Figure 2.2 shows, can vary
greatly from one year to the next.
The second reason why this analysis is inadequate is that were a change in the indicator to be
seen after the intervention occurred, it would not be possible to conclude that the intervention
caused the change. It is possible that an entirely unrelated cause happened to coincide with
the onset of privatisation, giving the impression that privatisation had an eﬀect, when in reality
its role may have been negligible or non-existent. With a system as complex as the electricity
network, such coincidences are not unlikely. For instance, the cyclical behaviour of capacity
margins that arises as a result of investment cycles has been well documented and modelled by
a number of authors (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Ford, 1999; Gross et al., 2007a; Neuhoﬀ and
De Vries, 2004; Roques et al., 2005, 2006; Visudhiphan et al., 2001). Such behaviour should be
controlled for within the analysis in order to discern the eﬀects of the regulatory intervention of
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Figure 2.2: UK Reserve Margins 1924 – 2007
interest. Without knowing the speciﬁc characteristics of this, and other such, behaviour, it is
not possible to subtract this variability from a single time series.
2.3.1.1 Panel Data Modelling
Some of the problems associated with conducting an intervention analysis on the UK alone can be
mitigated by instead treating the data from multiple electricity system simultaneously (Harvey,
1996). Statistical methods have been developed speciﬁcally to analyse multiple time series in
this way, and are well suited to conducting an intervention analysis. Intuitively, by using data
from multiple countries to ’learn’ about (and thus account for) the underlying structure of the
time series, we increase our power to separate any signal, the real eﬀect of a given regulatory
change, from the noise. It also reduces the possibility that the eﬀect of the change is disguised
by a coincidental event, making it more plausible that a post-privatisation indicator change, if
seen, is caused by privatisation.
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2.3.1.2 Studying Diﬀerent Regulatory and System Characteristics
The methodologies described above will examine the relationship between privatisation and a
given quantiﬁable resilience indicator. The analysis can, however, be extended to study the
impact of diﬀerent forms of privatisation, and to consider the extent to which pre-existing system
characteristics can change the impact that privatisation has.
1. Privatisation characteristics
The notion of ‘privatisation’ simply means the transfer of ownership from the state to private
individuals. The extent to which this transfer of ownership carries with it a transfer of operation
and planning control varies from system to system. Related to privatisation is the notion of
‘liberalisation’, which describes the extent to which ownership, both horizontally (across a level
in the electricity supply value chain) and vertically (between diﬀerent levels in the value chain),
is divided into separate companies. Rather than just asking whether the data show that privati-
sation causes a decline in a given resilience indicator, this research is extended to ask about the
impact of diﬀerent degrees and types of privatisation on those margins.
2. System characteristics
In addition to studying the eﬀect of modifying the intervention, this statistical approach can
look at the impact of diﬀerences between the electricity systems at the point of privatisation.
In the epidemiological literature, this is known as ‘eﬀect modiﬁcation’ – the extent to which
system characteristics alter the eﬀect of an intervention. By looking at such eﬀect modiﬁers, this
research attempts to identify the types of electricity system that are most amenable to a given
form of privatisation.
What are the attributes of the electricity system in question? It might be important to know
whether certain system types are more amenable to liberalisation. For example, such attributes
might include the initial diversity of the generation mix, the proportion of wind, nuclear or
hydroelectric generators in the system, the degree of national electriﬁcation, or some aspects of
the grid such as its age or its size. The state of the wider economy might also be important, in
which case characteristics such as national GDP perhaps should be considered.
With only 30 countries being sampled, these system characteristics can only be included selec-
tively in the statistical model. The decision of whether to control for a variable (such as GDP) or
instead to assume that it is not relevant to the association between liberalisation and resilience
will, as with all statistical analyses, be a matter of informed choice. The choice of these variables
2 METHODOLOGY 47
is informed by the literature identiﬁed in the systematic review process.
Data permitting, this statistical analysis allows statements of the following form to be made:
“The international experience of privatisation indicates that [regulatory intervention] alleviates
the risk that [resilience indicator] will decline, provided that the system in question has adequate
levels of [system characteristic]”.
So, by way of example, the statement might be:
“The international experience of privatisation indicates that a capacity payments scheme allevi-
ates the risk that generation system margins will decline, provided that the system in question
has adequate levels of gas-ﬁred generation”.
2.4 Methodological Problems
The proposed methodology raises a number of potential concerns. The deﬁnition of ‘resilience’
and the choice of ‘resilience indicators’ are both somewhat subjective. The relationship between
‘resilience’ and ‘energy security’ can be presented in a number of diﬀerent ways. There is a diverse
range of system behaviours that can be classiﬁed as being ‘resilient’, but this classiﬁcation is
open to interpretation and there can be no assurance that all relevant characteristics have been
included. Similarly, it may be that the chosen ‘resilience indicators’ do not encapsulate the
intended range of resilient behaviours, or that the indicator set is incomplete. These problems
are minimised by conducting a thorough systematic review of the relevant literature, but there
will nonetheless remain a possibility that the interpretations used in this research are not widely
accepted.
The quantitative analysis also presents a number of methodological problems. A statistical anal-
ysis relies on there being suﬃcient data and a suﬃciently diverse sample to identify correlations
between independent and dependent variables. There is a trade-oﬀ between the number of pri-
vatisation models tested and the ability of the data to reveal true eﬀects. In other words, the
data may be able to reveal whether privatisation has an eﬀect on resilience, but less able to
distinguish the eﬀect of diﬀerent forms of privatisation. At the extreme case, if 30 countries are
sampled and 30 diﬀerent interventions tested, the data can reveal nothing about the importance
of each intervention.
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The systematic review is therefore crucial in informing the selection of just a limited number of
intervention types. Furthermore, the interpretative aspects of this research are as important as
the numerical analysis. Reasoned arguments, closely tied to the existing energy policy literature,
are required to explain the eﬀects suggested by the data, to understand how they relate to the
UK system in particular, and to examine how the implications of these results relate to the UK’s
broader energy policy objectives.
3
Resilience Concepts and Indicators
The use of the term ‘resilience’ in ecological management was coined by Buzz Holling in 1973
to mean a “measure of the persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and
disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between populations or state variables”
(Holling, 1973). Numerous revisions of this deﬁnition have been made, but they all incorporate
some key ideas: a resilient system is persistent or sustainable despite being subjected to a
disturbance. Perhaps a useful starting point for thinking about resilient energy systems comes
from the following deﬁnition: “A resilient system, in a desirable state, has a greater capacity to
continue providing us with the services that support our quality of life while being subjected to
a variety of shocks” (Walker and Salt, 2006).
This chapter attempts both to expand on, and reﬁne, the various uses of ‘resilience’ and resilience-
related concepts in the wider literature to determine whether such a concept is useful within
energy policy analysis, and whether it oﬀers insights that might be missed my the more traditional
security-driven approaches. As a basis for this work, a systematic review was conducted according
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to the protocols described in chapter 2.
3.1 Search and Categorisation Results
The following section describes the results and analysis of the systematic review for each of four
research areas:
1. Energy Security : the search began with a review of the existing energy security literature
to understand the context in which a ‘resilience’ concept might be used;
2. Resilience in the energy policy literature: these results cover the (somewhat limited) existing
literature on resilience as it has been applied to energy policy research;
3. Resilience in the energy wider literature: the search was extended to incorporate the original
uses of the term ‘resilience’, and its use in the non-energy literature;
4. Resilience-related concepts : in order to present as full a search as possible, any concepts
explicitly linked by the academic community to ‘resilience’ or resilient systems were also
included in this review.
3.1.1 Energy Security
Applying the search string described in chapter 2 to the Imperial College Library Catalogue
yielded 138 unique results. By applying the exclusion criteria, this number was reduced: of the
138 records found, only 117 were energy policy-related documents located in the Environmental
Reports section of the library (Call number: Rxxxx), of which 71 did not mention energy security
in any way. This left 46 documents that used or deﬁned energy security, security of supply or a
similar term.
The 46 energy policy documents that referred in some way to energy security were categorised by
their use of the term. The search criteria were fairly broad (i.e. not restricted to strict deﬁnitions
of the term energy security). Descriptions of desirable characteristics of a secure system (e.g.
low price, infrequent supply interruptions), for example, were included, as were sources that
gave discussed system components or characteristics that led to system security (e.g. diversity
of sources).
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3.1.1.1 Descriptors of a Secure System
Availability
The most commonly used description of energy security in the literature referred to the avail-
ability of energy. This availability applied to all stages of the supply chain, ranging from the
availability of the primary fuels to the availability of electricity for domestic lighting. In most
cases the degree of availability was not speciﬁed in the description of energy security but some
described it as a relative term, recognising that absolutely guaranteed availability of energy sup-
plies at all times would not be achievable. For example, both the 1997 and 1998 Energy Reports
(DTI, 1997, 1998) give a measure of system security in terms of the number of interruptions per
unit time or the proportion of time for which electricity is unavailable (minutes per year). There
was no aspiration to get these numbers down to zero, but rather to ensure that they decrease
year-on-year.
Cost
As well as requiring of a secure system that its supplies be available when required, the majority
of policy documents referred to the requirement that these supplies also be aﬀordable. Under this
interpretation a system would be described as insecure if energy prices were to go over a certain
level, or if the price were to ﬂuctuate too much. The Atomic Energy Research Establishment’s
paper on renewable energy, for example, explains that the oil price ﬂuctuations of the 1970s were
a major driver of the search for more diverse, secure energy supplies (AERE, 1994).
Not only can cost be a requirement of a secure system, but it can also be a competing factor since,
in general, increasing system security costs money. The 1977 Energy Policy Review (Department
of Energy, 1977) recognises this point, saying that increased cost may have to be accepted in
order to achieve increased security of supply. At any one time an insecure system could cost less
than a secure one; for example, it costs money to ensure that there is a suﬃcient capacity margin
and adequate fuel storage. Decreased risk, therefore, comes at a price, so there is a balance to
be struck between security and cost.
Timescales
Three reports recognised that availability and aﬀordability needed not only to be delivered on a
timescale of days or even years, but that an energy system must continue to be secure for the
foreseeable future. As the DoE’s 1978 consultative document on energy policy (DoE, 1978) puts
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it: “It is not suﬃcient to concentrate on achieving a low cost and secure energy supply in the
present and immediate future. Energy policy is necessarily concerned with a long time horizon.”
This view elaborated on a similar consideration of future security needs expressed in the Energy
Review published a year earlier (DoE, 1977).
The 1997 Energy Report (DTI, 1997) goes into more detail on the nature of energy security over
diﬀerent timescales:
Short term security is about the adequacy of capacity at diﬀerent points in the system
as well as arrangements for ensuring the capacity is used in the best manner;
Medium term security may be concerned with ensuring the reliability of existing
capacity – making sure that plant is available for use when it is most needed;
Longer term security may be concerned with whether adequate supplies of particular
fuels will be available in the longer term – sometimes expressed as fears that a par-
ticular fuel will run out or will be available only at very high prices determined by
some monopoly supplier or group of suppliers.
This three-tiered structure of security highlights some of the desirable features of a secure system:
adequate capacity used eﬀectively and reliably, along with available sources of fuel both now and
in the future.
3.1.1.2 Characteristics of a Secure System
The majority of the reports reviewed did not explicitly give a deﬁnition of energy security, but
instead described the concept in terms of the system components that give rise to it.
Diversity and Flexibility
Diversity was the most commonly-cited characteristic of a secure energy system. As was noted in
a number of reports, however, diversity is a broad concept that can be applied to the fuels used,
the sources of those fuels, and their means of delivery (DTI, 1998), all of which can contribute
to energy security.
Diversity in the fuels used was seen as a good way of minimising the impact of global fuel price
shocks. This diversity was seen to be particularly eﬀective if the energy system was ﬂexible
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enough to make the switch from one fuel mix to another. A 1998 DTI report (DTI, 1998), for
example, describes a hypothetical gas shortage which is mitigated by diverting gas supplies to
domestic users while the power stations switch to running on distillate oil.
Diversity in the source of fuels was seen to be important for security as it reduced the dependence
on a single country or region. Fears about unstable political regimes in oil and gas producing
countries, combined with concerns over the activities of cartels (DTI, 1998), led to a belief that
the geographical and political sources of fuel should be as varied as possible.
The role of competition in encouraging diversity was seen as important by a number of authors.
The Seventeenth Report from the EC Communities (HoL, 1995), for example says: Most wit-
nesses from the UK energy industry argued that diversity of supply was the key to security and
that this was best guaranteed by a competitive market . Others, such as the French Ministry of
Industry, believed that ensuring security of supply was government responsibility, and that the
actions of the market should be monitored to ensure that they were delivering the required levels
of security.
The ﬁnal point on diversity worth mentioning is the DTI’s suggestion that not only does the
system need to be diverse, but that the means of providing security itself needs to be diverse
(DTI, 1998). Storing gas as the sole means of providing security against interruptions is a
less secure strategy than building a system that has gas storage, system balancing reserves and
generator fuel-switching technologies.
Fuel sources, energy media, technologies and security features all need to be as diverse and
ﬂexible as possible in order to maximise the overall security of the system.
Capacity Margin and Storage
One way of delivering security is to have more generating capacity than is required at any time.
A system margin is designed to provide a buﬀer against unexpectedly high demand combined
with unexpectedly unavailable supply (perhaps due to a generator breakdown). The 1977 Energy
Policy review (DoE, 1977) says that the high cost of a loss of load justiﬁes having more capacity
on the system than is expected to be needed.
Storage refers to retaining reserves of fuel to be ready for use should a supply route fail. The
value of stored capacity was expressed by a representative of BP’s in the EC committee report
(HoL, 1995). The primary purpose of storage is to cover short interruptions in supply, but if
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there is insuﬃcient storage to accommodate a more prolonged interruption, the EC report noted,
this capacity could provide some time to allow an alternative energy source to be found. Others
noted the high cost of energy storage, in particular with electricity, and concluded that incentives
might be necessary to ensure suﬃcient levels are maintained (DTI, 1998).
Interconnectedness
The interconnection of energy systems and the generators within that system was thought to
increase diversity. One minister cited in the EC committee report (HoL, 1995) put it as deﬁni-
tively as saying the more interconnected you are, the more security of supply you have. This
report stressed the importance of international integration, both in the market mechanisms and
in the physical infrastructure (e.g. gas pipelines). Once a truly integrated European network is
in place, security indicators such as diversity can be assessed at the community level, rather than
at the national level.
Indigenous Supplies
Many of the policy documents reviewed were produced in response to one of two issues: the oil
price shocks of the 1970s or the perceived need for non-fossil-based fuel sources. Responses to
either of these tended to drive the debate of energy security towards ﬁnding indigenous sources
of energy and minimising fuel imports.
Despite the decreased geographical diversity that comes from expanding the use of indigenous
fuels, there appears to have been a widely-held belief that insecurity is to some extent a charac-
teristic of any imported fuel (HoL, 1980), with the implication that this is less true for locally-
sourced fuels. This view was partly driven by the British coal, nuclear and renewables industries,
which had a vested interest in expanding local forms of energy and minimising competition from
other nations.
The House of Commons Energy Committee report on fast breeder reactors (HoC, 1990), looking
to the UK’s existing oil and gas reserves, said: “The UK of course has no need to work about
energy security in the short term.” The strong implication here is that indigenous fuels have no
implications for energy security whatsoever, ignoring the possibility of oil rig accidents, infras-
tructure damage or domestic political disruption. The 1977 Energy Review (DoE, 1977) took a
more balanced view, considering it imprudent in the longer term to rely on energy imports, but
also accepting that indigenous supplies are not always secure.
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3.1.2 Resilience in the Energy Policy Literature
Having explored the range of interpretations of ‘energy security’ in the policy literature, the
literature review turned to the concept of ‘resilience’ itself: ﬁrst within only the energy policy
domain, and then extending the search to include the ecology, psychology, social science and
engineering literature.
The journal search for Energy, Power, Fuel, Electric, Gas and Oil gave 55, 36, 8, 31, 53 and 37
results, respectively (which are listed in Appendix B). Following the removal of duplicates and
non-energy-related journals (e.g. High energy chemistry Journal), 112 unique energy journals
remained. Each journal was searched individually, yielding a total of 242 articles containing
resilience in their text. Each of these was searched visually and those with unrelated or ambigu-
ous usage of resilience were removed, leaving just 43 articles from energy-related journals with
informative descriptions of resilience.
The 43 relevant sources were categorised using the methodology described in section. The themes
that emerged fell into three major categories:
1. The nature of the disruption to which the system is resilient
2. The response of the system to that disruption
3. Strategies or system characteristics that aﬀect that resilient response.
The tables below describe the full range of resilience-related themes that were identiﬁed in the
sources, along with the prevalence of each. It should be noted that the absence of a theme from
a particular source should not be interpreted to mean that the author would not consider that
theme to be a characteristic of resilience; it may be just that this meaning has not been explicitly
stated in this particular case.
3.1.2.1 Disturbances
As might be expected based on the common sense deﬁnition of resilience given in the intro-
duction, the majority of references describe resilience in the context of some sort of change or
adverse event occurring to the system.
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Internal D
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Records 26 15 11 1 4 1 3 0 1
Percentage Use 60% 35% 26% 2% 9% 2% 7% 0% 2%  
Table 3.1: Characteristics of disruption to which a system should be resilient
Disturbance Predictability
In just over a third of cases, this disturbance was taken to be unexpected or surprising in some
way, rather than being a predictable or expected event.
Disturbance Magnitude
A quarter of the sources described this event as being abnormal in some way, either in terms
of its magnitude or its cumulative eﬀect. Only one source (2%) explicitly considered a system’s
resilience in terms of its capacity to deal with an uncatastrophic event.
Disturbance Origin
Those references that considered the origin of the disturbance all described it as being outside the
system (exogenous) or on the supply side. Only one author referred to demand-side disturbances
(Kahn, 1979), but this was to say that his variance model applied to either demand- or supply-
side disturbances; this was not an assertion that resilience was a measure of a system’s ability
to cope with demand-side events. Energy system disturbances, therefore, are thought of either
as occurring on the supply side of the system, or outside the system altogether. This would
exclude, for example, the shock caused by a sudden surge in energy demand.
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Disturbance Timescale
Only one author referred to the timescale of the disturbance (Nedic et al, 2006), restricting
the use of resilience to short-term supply shocks . This reference, however, does not explicitly
exclude long-term events such as price trends, and since timescales are mentioned nowhere else,
there is little evidence to suggest that the energy policy literature tends to restrict the use of
resilience to events of particular timescales.
3.1.2.2 System Responses
R
eturn / C
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R
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ic Effect
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ultiple States / Equilibrium
 / 
D
om
anins / B
oundaries / 
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A
m
ount of change caused
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Records 6 8 5 3 2 1 0 0 0
Percentage Use 14% 19% 12% 7% 5% 2% 0% 0% 0%  
Table 3.2: Resilient system response characteristics to disruption
The numbers of references using themes that describe the way the system responds to a distur-
bance were, in general, relatively low. Most references instead focussed on the disturbances to
which a system is resilient or system characteristics that lead to system resilience.
Resistance or Adaptation?
Six of the records (14%) described resilience in terms of the ability or tendency of the system
to remain in, or return to, its original state or function. An interesting distinction to be made
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between the references is that 8 (19%) described this process of return or continuation as occur-
ring through resistance, avoidance, absorption or tolerance. This can be contrasted with the 5
references (12%) that described the mechanism as being one of reorganisation or adaptation. As
will be discussed in the analysis section, this distinction between resistance and adaptation may
be signiﬁcant for the design of measures intended to increase the resilience of a system.
Rate of Recovery
Two references (5%) described resilience as the rate at which the system returns to normal or
the duration for which the system is in a disturbed state. A resilient system will recover quickly,
whereas one that is not resilient will return to normal slowly, if indeed it does so at all.
Non-linearity
Four references (9%) described the eﬀect of a disturbance as being dynamic or cascading, sug-
gesting that there may be a non-linear response to a disturbance.
Omissions
Perhaps the most interesting feature of this section is that which is omitted. The ﬁnal three
themes in the above table occur in the following section on resilience in the wider literature, but
are not mentioned in the energy literature.
Amount of Change: Resilience is not described as the amount of change (on whatever scale)
inﬂicted on a system by a disturbance. One might expect a resilient system to be deﬂected only
a small amount, whereas a system that is not resilient might be deﬂected much more. This
interpretation of resilience was not used in the energy policy literature.
Degree of Recovery : Resilience is not described as the degree of the recovery (as opposed to the
rate) from a disturbance. A system that returned to a state close to normality might be considered
more resilient than one which remained far away from its normal state. These interpretations
are not explicitly mentioned, but they may be implied in the use of terms such as resistance and
absorption .
Multiple States : The most notable omission from descriptions of resilience is the notion of mul-
tiple states and equilibria. There is no mention of the possibility that a system might be pushed
by a disturbance into a diﬀerent equilibrium position with diﬀerent processes and outputs. No
attempt is made to describe the energy system in terms of state diagrams, domains and bound-
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aries. As will be discussed in the next section, this approach to thinking about resilience is
common in other ﬁelds.
3.1.2.3 Strategies or System Characteristics for Resilience
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Records 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Percentage Use 5% 5% 5% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 0%  
Table 3.3: Strategies and characteristics of a resilient system
A combination of the broad search strategy chosen and the focus of the energy papers found a
large number of references to resilience strategies and system characteristics that make a system
more or less resilient. The thematic categorisation reﬂects the range of strategies and system
characteristics that were identiﬁed.
Diversity
The most cited system property that was considered necessary for a resilient system was diversity.
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It was argued that a system needed to be diverse in its fuels, generators and supply routes to
minimise impact of a disturbance. By having a diverse system, any single adverse event would be
unlikely to aﬀect all parts of the system in the same way. A gas price shock, for example, would
have less impact on a system for which gas is only a small contributor to the energy mix than it
would on a system that is almost exclusively dependent on gas to deliver its energy services.
Flexibility
Flexibility allows the components of a system to change quickly and easily in the face of a change
in the external environment. It may be, for example, that generators can switch from the use
of one fuel to the use of another without a large investment of time or money. Alternatively, it
may be the consumer who is ﬂexible, being able to receive his energy services via a number of
diﬀerent energy vectors.
Decentralised Generation
9% of authors suggested that decentralisation of generators would increase the resilience of the
energy system. A smaller number suggested that the size of the generators was important,
an attribute that is related to the idea of reducing the prevalence of large, centralised units.
Although not all renewable forms of energy are decentralised, some of the resilience-related
arguments in favour of renewables focussed on their tendency to be geographically dispersed.
Storage and Supply Shortages
The traditional energy security policy of retaining fuel stores and maintaining capacity margins
was reiterated in a number of papers related to resilience. Their authors argued that a system
would be more resilient if it had more fuel and generating capacity than would be needed at any
time under normal circumstances. Were there to be a sudden cut in supplies, the reserves would
be brought online to match the deﬁcit until the disturbance was rectiﬁed.
Interconnectedness
Four papers explicitly refer to the interconnection of elements of the energy system, and its
impact on resilience. The more players there are in a system, the lower the cost of maintaining
the required capacity margin for a given level of risk. If an individual consumer were to provide for
his own electricity needs using a dedicated generator, in order to protect against the possibility of
that generator failing he would require another unit in reserve. This equates to a 100% capacity
margin. Two consumers, each with their own generators, could share a single backup generator,
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since it would be very unlikely that both generators failed at the same time; this reduces the
capacity margin to 50%. This simplistic example highlights the beneﬁt of connecting as many
generators and consumers as possible, and the argument can be extended to say that a European
grid should be more resilient than a national one.
Local Generation
Three papers gave the indigenous nature of some forms of energy as a beneﬁt to the resilience of
the energy network. There is less uncertainty about the economic and political regime in one’s
own country, so sourcing and consuming energy within national borders reduces the exposure
to adverse events about which one is uncertain or ignorant (to use Stirling’s deﬁnitions of the
terms).
Redundancy
A redundant system can deliver the same output via two or more processes. An electronic circuit
may have two components performing the same function where only one might suﬃce, so that
if one fails the other can continue to deliver the required function. The most common use of
redundancy in an energy system refers to the transmission and distribution network. Wires and
pipes are laid in parallel, so that if one breaks the gas or electricity can be transmitted via an
alternative route. Total supply failure only occurs if all the parallel routes fail.
Planning and Decision Making
Three authors noted the value of scenario planning for improving the resilience of the system.
Disturbances are anticipated and responses are devised that would allow the system to recover
readily. Once a real disturbance occurs, the system controllers can make decisions based on these
plans, thus maximising the chances that the correct response is chosen. A degree of learning and
training of system controllers is implicit in this strategy. It also assumes that disturbances can
be anticipated in a useful way.
Self-Healing and Intelligent Control Systems
Three papers discussed the role of intelligent control systems in the management of resilience,
whilst one described the functioning of a self-healing system. These systems would respond
automatically to changes in their environment, adjusting in order to deliver energy services
as well as possible. In theory, they would automate the planning and decision making process
described in the previous paragraph; rather than allowing humans to plan and react, this process
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would be designed into the system itself.
3.1.3 Resilience in the Wider Literature
This section reviews the non-energy literature that focussed on the concept of ‘resilience’. After
removing duplicates and invalid records, 1506 unique references were found that contained the
word resilience in their title. Some of these came from only one database, whereas some were
found in a number of databases. The search results are summarised as follows:
Database Searched Records Found
CSA Illumina 770
Google Scholar: Eco, Soc, etc. 506
Google Scholar: Concepts 150
JSTOR 63
ScienceDirect 297
ISI Web of Science: Eco, Soc, etc. 200
ISI Web of Science: Concepts 57
Total (including duplicates) 2043
Total (after duplicates removed) 1506
Table 3.4: Number of records in databases searched
The Eco, Soc, etc. and concepts tags associated with the Google Scholar and the Web of Science
sources refer to the search terms used, as described in the Methodology section of this report.
Of these 1506 unique results, 238 did not have abstracts available, either because the articles had
no abstract, or because the journal from which they came was not accessible from the Imperial
College network. This left 1268 references with abstracts that could be searched for resilience
deﬁnitions.
178 references were found to contain a deﬁnition of resilience in their abstracts. These are
given in full in Appendix C. The decision whether to include or exclude a reference was open
to a certain amount of subjectivity. Some abstracts had clear deﬁnitions (e.g. . . . resilience
was deﬁned as. . . ) whereas others treated resilience as a synonym of another concept, such as
resistance or persistence (e.g. . . . functional similarity. . .may be equally important in ensuring
persistence (resilience) of ecosystem function. . . ). All the uses of the term, ranging from the
synonyms to the explicit deﬁnitions, were included in the conceptual analysis.
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3.1.3.1 Academic Disciplines Reviewed
The literature search was very broad, and was not restricted to a few academic disciplines. Table
3.5 summarises the academic ﬁelds from which the deﬁnitions of resilience have been drawn.
Where a reference refers to two or more ﬁelds (e.g. socio-ecological, or ecological & economic)
both are counted.
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Table 3.5: Record count by discipline
3.1.3.2 Thematic Categorisation
The deﬁnitions of resilience found within the various academic ﬁelds were compared and cate-
gorised. These themes fell into one of two categories:
• the nature of the adverse event experienced
• the response of the system/individual to that adverse event
Before analysing the prevalence of themes in the resilience literature it should again be noted
that the search criteria for this section and the energy-speciﬁc resilience search were not the same
as each other. In particular, given the number of resilience-related papers available in the full
body of literature, the search was restricted to those articles that actually deﬁned resilience in
their abstract or introduction. The themes that emerged were therefore less broad than those
for the energy-literature search; the latter included, for example, papers that described how to
improve resilience, but that did not actually deﬁne it.
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Table 3.6: Summary of the prevalence of themes in the resilience literature
3.1.3.3 Adverse Events
Three-quarters of the references surveyed deﬁned resilience in terms of an adverse event or
change, consistent with the use of the term in the energy literature. In the majority of these
cases, the event was external to the individual or system. External events included natural
disasters impacting on ecosystems, violence being inﬂicted on individuals, and stresses being
applied to materials. Only 8 (4%) deﬁned resilience in terms of the system’s or individual’s
ability to respond to an endogenous event.
A larger proportion (19%) deﬁned resilience in terms of explicitly abnormal events, rather than
in terms of small variations in environmental conditions. This is consistent with the approach
taken by resilience references from the energy literature.
3.1.3.4 System/Individual Response
Over half of the references deﬁned resilience as the return to, or continuation of, the original
state or function. This recovery was described in a number of diﬀerent ways.
Resistance and Adaptation
There are two general ways in which the system or individual brings about that return/continuation:
resistance (19%) or adaptation (18%). The resisting process involves attempting to continue in
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exactly the same way despite the disturbance experienced, whereas the adapting process is an
active response to a disturbance in which the primary system function is maintained, but the
underlying processes are altered to accommodate the changed environment.
Rate of Return
As with the energy-related literature, some references (13%) deﬁned resilience as a rate of recov-
ery. A resilient system or individual returns to its original state quickly following a disturbance,
whereas an unresilient system does not.
Amount of Change and Degree of Recovery
Three references deﬁne resilience as the degree of recovery a system can achieve, and one deﬁnes
it as the amount of change a given disturbance can cause a system to undergo. Neither of these
interpretations was found in the energy literature.
Multiple Equilibria
The most notable theme that emerged from the wider literature that was not present in the
energy literature was that of multiple equilibria. 27 of the deﬁnitions (15%) deﬁned resilience by
using the visual representation of a phase diagram. Some deﬁned resilience as the ability of the
system to stay in one domain of attraction in the face of a disturbance, some deﬁned it as the
time taken to return to an equilibrium point, while others deﬁned it as the ability of a system to
stay in, or revert to, a useful equilibrium, even if this is not necessarily the original equilibrium.
3.1.4 Resilience-related Concepts
As was explained in the methodology section, concepts that were thought to be relevant to a
discussion on resilience were recorded. This section describes each of these terms, and how the
authors used them.
3.1.4.1 Adaptability and Adaptive Capacity
According to Walker (Walker et al, 2004), adaptability is the capacity of actors in the system
to inﬂuence resilience. Gunderson provides a similar deﬁnition of the term: adaptive capacity is
introduced to describe the processes that modify ecological resilience (Gunderson, 2000). Used
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in this way, adaptability is not a property of a resilient system, but rather a property of a system
that allows it to change its own resilience. A system may not be resilient at one time, but
because of its high adaptability, it may be able to make itself more resilient to disturbances. The
Resilience Alliance provides a more comprehensive deﬁnition:
Adaptability is the capacity of a social-ecological system (SES) to manage resilience
in relation to alternate regimes (sometimes called adaptive capacity). It involves
either or both of two abilities:
1. The ability to determine the trajectory of the system state – the position within
its current basin of attraction;
2. The ability to alter the shape of the basins, that is move the positions of thresh-
olds or make the system more or less resistant to perturbation (Resilience Al-
liance, 2007)
Again, adaptability can change system resilience, but it is not necessarily a component of a
resilient system. Rather it is a property that allows a system to change the size and shape of its
domain of attraction to make itself resilient.
The deﬁnition of adaptation given by Chaplin et al. (2006) is similar to that of adaptability
given above, but subtly diﬀerent: adaptation is developing new socioecological conﬁgurations
that function eﬀectively under new conditions. The implication of this deﬁnition is that an
adaptable system can respond to a disturbance or a change that has just occurred, whereas
the previous deﬁnition of adaptability says that adaptable system can change to prepare for an
unknown change, thus increasing its resilience.
3.1.4.2 Amplitude
Amplitude is Westman’s second component of resilience (see also elasticity, malleability, and
damping) (Westman & O’Leary, 1986), deﬁned as the threshold of disturbance beyond which
recovery to the original state no longer occurs . This is the systems equivalent of the elastic limit
used in materials science. By implication, this deﬁnition applies to those systems with more than
one equilibrium position.
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3.1.4.3 Cascading Thresholds
Kinzig (2006) describes cascading thresholds as the tendency of the crossing of one threshold
to induce the crossing of other thresholds . He goes on to explain that these events often lead
to very resilient, although often less desirable, alternative states . Linked to the notion of non-
linearity, this concept addresses the possibility that the ﬁnal equilibrium position following a
regime shift may not be the one expected. On a network level, a disturbance that causes one
region to become unstable can destabilise regions that might not be expected to be aﬀected. This
makes the calculation of risk assessments for responses of this sort very diﬃcult to calculate.
As an aside, the explanation of this concept provides one of the few references that recognises
that a system state may be very resilient but undesirable. Resilience is therefore only desirable
if the conﬁguration that it is attributed to is itself desirable.
3.1.4.4 Damping
Damping is Westman’s fourth component of resilience, deﬁned as the extent and duration of
oscillation in an ecosystem parameter following disturbance (Westman & O’Leary, 1986). This
deﬁnition has parallels with those papers that deﬁne resilience as a rate of return to normality
or the deviation from normality caused by a disturbance. Resilience might therefore be treated
as a weighted combination of diﬀerent damping values for each of the system parameters.
3.1.4.5 Disturbances
The range of possible disturbances has to some extent been covered in the discussion of resilience
deﬁnitions in the sections. In addition, it is worth mentioning Bengtsson’s description of distur-
bances as it highlights the distinction between disturbances of diﬀerent timescales, and between
disturbances of diﬀerent origins (whether they are endogenous or exogenous):
There are basically three types of disturbances:
1. pulse disturbances that are parts of ecosystem dynamics and to which most organisms are
adapted
2. large infrequent disturbances, and
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3. press disturbances, which are usually anthropogenic and to which organisms are seldom
pre-adapted (Bengtsson, 2002)
An ecological disturbance might be a natural disaster or a chemical or biological pollutant (pro-
duced either exogenously or endogenously). An energy system disturbance, by analogy, might
be a physical malfunction of the network, the collapse of an energy supply company, or a shift
in the political regime of an oil-producing company.
3.1.4.6 Elasticity
Elasticity is given byWestman as the ﬁrst component of resilience (see also amplitude, malleability
and damping), deﬁned as the rate of recovery following disturbance Westman & O’Leary (1986).
Related to damping, this system property describes resilience in terms the duration for which a
system is outside its bounds of normal operation.
3.1.4.7 Inertia
Inertia is a word used by Westman to describe the resistance of an ecosystem property to change
under stress Westman (1986). There is a further discussion of resistance below.
3.1.4.8 Stability Landscape
A stability landscape is a metaphor used by Walker et al (2004) to portray what they see as
the four components of resilience: latitude, resistance, precariousness and panarchy. They go on
to deﬁne the concept as the various basins that a system may occupy, and the boundaries that
separate them . In other words, the stability landscape deﬁnes the shape and size of the domains
of attraction in a multi-equilibrium system.
3.1.4.9 Latitude
One of the four components of resilience described by Walker et al. (2004), latitude is the max-
imum amount a system can be changed before losing its ability to recover (before crossing a
threshold which, if breached, makes recovery diﬃcult or impossible).
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3.1.4.10 Malleability
Westman’s third component of resilience (see also elasticity, amplitude and damping), malleabil-
ity is deﬁned as the extent of alteration of the new stable-state from the original (Westman and
O’Leary, 1986).
3.1.4.11 Memory
Bengtsson et al. 2003 say that for ecosystems to reorganize after large-scale natural and human-
induced disturbances, spatial resilience in the form of ecological memory is a prerequisite. The
ecological memory is composed of the species, interactions and structures that make ecosystem
reorganization possible . Peterson (2002) provides a deﬁnition of ecological memory: “the degree
to which an ecological process is shaped by its past modiﬁcations of a landscape.” To clarify, he
gives an example: “if the location of tree-fall gaps is inﬂuenced by where past tree falls occurred
or if ﬁre spread is inﬂuenced by previous ﬁres, then memory is shaping their dynamics.”
3.1.4.12 Panarchy
Panarchy is a term coined to describe the interactions between the diﬀerent scales of structures
and processes in an ecological system:
No system can be understood or managed by focusing on it at a single scale. All sys-
tems (and SESs especially) exist and function at multiple scales of space, time and
social organization, and the interactions across scales are fundamentally important in
determining the dynamics of the system at any particular focal scale. This interact-
ing set of hierarchically structured scales has been termed a panarchy (ResAlliance,
2009a).
3.1.4.13 Performance-Survival Threshold (PST)
The PST is the level of disturbance beyond which a system’s actors switch from performance
strategies to survival strategies (Bradley and Grainger, 2004). In other words, the system shifts
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from a state in which it delivers its required output in the optimal way, into a state in which it
operates sub-optimally in order to survive.
3.1.4.14 Persistence
Beddington et al. use persistence simply to mean the ability of an individual or population to
continue to exist in the face of disturbances: The persistence of populations in the real world
depends on their ability to withstand perturbations imposed by either exogenous or endogenous
factors (Beddington et al., 1976).
3.1.4.15 Precariousness
One of the components of resilience identiﬁed in a paper by Walker et al. (2004), describing how
close the current state of the system is to a limit or ‘threshold.’
3.1.4.16 Protective Factors
Protective factors are speciﬁc competencies that are necessary for the process of resilience to
occur (Dyer and McGuinness, 1996).
3.1.4.17 Quality
Quality can be used to describe the ability of an entity or system to deliver the services required
of it: The term soil quality refers to the soil’s capacity to perform its three principal functions e.g.
economic productivity, environment regulation, and aesthetic and cultural values (Lal, 1993).
3.1.4.18 Reliability
Reliability, vulnerability, and resilience provide measures of the frequency, magnitude, and du-
ration of the failure of water resources systems, respectively (Maier et al., 2001).
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This description suggests that reliability measures the frequency of failure of a system. This
concurs with the use of the term in Safety and Reliability Engineering, which deﬁnes the reliability
of a component as the probability that it will continue to deliver the required function for the
speciﬁed period. Overall system reliability is then calculated by combining the reliabilities of the
respective components. The method of combination depends on the relationship between the
components. For example, if two resistors, A and B, are both required for a system to work, their
reliabilities are combined multiplicatively; if the system can work with either A or B (i.e. the
system has redundancy) the respective reliabilities are combined additively. The overall system
reliability is therefore a function of the reliability of its components and the way in which those
components are conﬁgured.
3.1.4.19 Resistance
Resistance is used by a number of authors as a generic term meaning tolerance of change. Others
use it in a way that makes it indistinguishable from some interpretations of resilience: “ . . . it is
important to determine factors which prevent the ecosystem from assuming a new organizational
state following disturbance (ecosystem resistance). . . ” (Waide, 1988).
Another interpretation of resistance is that it is a measure of the initial response of the sys-
tem, whereas resilience is a measure of the long-term response. For example, Cole (1995) uses
resistance in the following way: Resistance and tolerance are determined from the vegetation
surviving 2 weeks and 1 year after trampling, respectively. Resistance, therefore, describes the
initial response of the system to a disturbance.
Perhaps the most useful conceptualisation of resistance is as a preventative measure, as opposed
to a coping mechanism: “Resistance strategies aim at ﬂood prevention, while resilience strategies
aim at minimising ﬂood impacts and enhancing the recovery from those impacts.” (de Bruijn,
2004). Resilience strategies, therefore, would not attempt to prevent disruptions from occurring,
but would focus on mitigating their eﬀects. De Bruijn goes on to say that a resilience strategy is
supposed to be able to better cope with uncertainties than a resistance strategy. It is not feasible
to try to shield the energy system from all disruptions, and it may make more sense to attempt
to minimise the impacts and enhance the subsequent recovery when the unexpected happens.
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3.1.4.20 Services
Ecological services are the products of an ecosystem that are of value to humans. Examples
include the conversion of solar energy into food, the provision of clean water, the balance of gas
mixes in the atmosphere and even the aesthetic value of, say, a woodland area. Energy services
by analogy include the provision of light, warmth, transport, cleaning services, communication
and entertainment. The link between ecosystem and energy services is particularly strong if
one takes an entirely anthropocentric view of ecological systems, treating their products and
functions solely as a means of sustaining and enhancing human existence.
An energy service, rather than energy itself, is what matters to a consumer. A requirement of
a resilient system, therefore, might be that it continues to deliver the required energy services
(regardless of the energy source used) in the face of a disturbance.
3.1.4.21 Social Learning
Social learning is used by Folke (2006), Moench (2005), Thompkins and Adger (2004) in the
context of resource management. Social learning theory, propounded by Bandura (1977), says
that learning only happens in a social context, through the observation, imitation and modelling
of the actions of others.
Whatever the precise relevance of this type of learning to resilience, what is interesting is that the
sentient actors in a system are considered by some authors to be important for ensuring a resilient
system: this is seen both in this concept of learning and, by others, in the concept of memory.
It is not suﬃcient to build a robust physical infrastructure, or even to have strong economic and
political measures in place to respond to disturbances. The management of resilience in a system
is a process that relies on the continual exchange of experiences between the system actors, and
the ongoing eﬀort to learn from these experiences to make the system more able to respond to
unknown future events.
3.1.4.22 Stability
Stability, like resilience, is a term that is used in a number of diﬀerent ways. A number of authors
use these two terms interchangeably, using stability almost as a synonym of resilience.
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It might be more useful to use stability in a way that is distinguishable from resilience. Westman
deﬁnes stability as “the pattern of natural ﬂuctuation in ecosystem properties in the absence of
major exogenous disturbance” (Westman, 1986). Notable in this deﬁnition is that it excludes
the system response to large external disturbances.
Gunderson (2000) provides a clear distinction between stability and resilience. Stability of a sys-
tem, he says, is characterised by the time taken to return to equilibrium following a disturbance,
whereas resilience is the amount of disturbance that a system can absorb without changing state.
Stability is concerned with the system response close to the equilibrium, whereas resilience is
concerned with the system far away from equilibrium, near the boundaries of the domain of
attraction.
A system may be stable (quickly returning to equilibrium) but not resilient (a relatively small
disturbance will push the system into a new equilibrium) or vice versa. The analogy with
materials science would be a material that was very stiﬀ (did not deform much under stress) but
was also very brittle (once it is taken past a certain level of strain it fails irreversibly).
3.1.4.23 Stable States
The state of a system at any time is deﬁned by the values (amounts) of the variables that
constitute the system (Resilience Alliance, 2007). For example, an ecological system might have
two stable states: one that has 80% of Species A and 20% of Species B, and one that has 30% of
Species A, 40% of Species B and 30% of Species C. These proportions would deﬁne each state,
and would remain at these levels (allowing for random ﬂuctuations) in the absence of external
disturbances. An energy system’s stable state might be deﬁned by the proportion of its fuels, of
its power stations, or by the energy services it provides.
3.1.4.24 Transformability
Transformability is related to adaptability, but the degree of change is more substantial. Walker
deﬁnes the term as the capacity to create a fundamentally new system when ecological, eco-
nomic, or social structures make the existing system untenable (Walker and Meyers, 2004). The
Resilience Alliance uses the concept in a similar way:
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In cases where a system is already in an undesirable regime and eﬀorts to get it back
into a desirable regime are no longer possible (or worse, make the undesirable basin
larger), one option for resolving the predicament is transformation to a diﬀerent kind
of system – new variables, new ways of making a living, diﬀerent scales – a diﬀerent
panarchy (Resilience Alliance, 2007).
Whereas adaptability is the ability of the system to alter its processes enough to be able to
continue delivering a similar output, transformability is the ability to change into an entirely
new system, delivering an entirely diﬀerent set of services. To use a managed ecosystem as an
example of this distinction, an adaptation may be the shift from one crop to another because of a
rapid change in the local climate. A transformation might be shifting from agricultural farming
to, say, cattle rearing. The line between adaptation and transformation is clearly not ﬁxed, but
the distinction between the two concepts might be useful.
From an energy perspective it is unclear what sort of change would constitute a transformation. It
may be that it applies more to the individual actors in an energy system: for example, an energy
supplier might decide that telecommunication is a more viable industry, and apply resources to
that end instead. A transformation of the energy system as a whole is harder to imagine.
3.1.4.25 Vulnerability
Most deﬁnitions appear to use vulnerability as a measure of a response to a disturbance: either
in terms of the magnitude of the failure caused (Maier et al, 2001), or the shortfall in system
output as compared with normal performance (Moy et al, 1986).
Perhaps the most comprehensive deﬁnition of this term found in the literature review comes from
Adger’s article, Vulnerability :
Vulnerability is the state of susceptibility to harm from exposure to stresses associated
with environmental and social change and from the absence of capacity to adapt
(Adger, 2006)
The inability of vulnerable systems to adapt was also identiﬁed in the IPCC report:
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. . . a highly vulnerable system would be a system that is very sensitive to modest
changes in climate, where the sensitivity includes the potential for substantial harmful
eﬀects, and for which the ability to adapt is severely constrained. (IPCC, 2001)
Vulnerability, therefore, is the sensitivity of a system to change – although the magnitude of that
change is not agreed – and the inability to respond positively when such a change occurs. As
regards its relation to resilience, the IPCC report goes on to say:
Resilience is the ﬂip side of vulnerability—a resilient system or population is not
sensitive to climate variability and change and has the capacity to adapt.
The value of the vulnerability concept, therefore, appears to be that it provides a description of
a system that lacks the quality of resilience.
3.2 Analysis and Discussion
The purpose of this analysis is to bring together the concepts of energy security and resilience
found in the academic and policy literature in order to understand the meaning and value of
resilience to an energy system. The results section identiﬁed energy security and resilience
themes in the energy literature and in the wider academic literature. This section develops some
of these themes further, focusing on those that appear to be the most relevant to resilience in
the context of energy security.
3.2.1 The System
A detailed description of the system to which the concept of resilience can be applied was
somewhat lacking in the majority of the papers reviewed. Such a description is crucial for
deﬁning resilience, and for developing strategies to manage it. The system is described by its
geographical and political boundaries, and the elements contained within it.
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3.2.1.1 System Scale
Most of the papers reviewed described a resilient system as one that responds positively to a
disturbance. Almost none suggested that a resilient system would prevent the disturbance from
happening at all; perhaps the term resistance discussed in paragraph would be more appropriate
for this type of disturbance avoidance. A policy devoted to energy security more widely may
indeed attempt to prevent disturbances (e.g. attempting to prevent oil supply disruptions through
diplomatic intervention) but resilience is an intrinsic property of the system that allows it to
deal with shocks but has nothing to do with preventing their occurrence.
A system’s resilience, therefore, is independent of events and circumstances outside the inﬂuence
of the system itself. This assessment is largely in agreement with the working paper produced by
Skea (2007) in which he says the energy system is eﬀectively bounded by what is in the sphere
of inﬂuence of UK institutions . As he notes, the sphere of inﬂuence over energy infrastructures
and policies does not have well-deﬁned edges. The UK has some inﬂuence over European energy
policies, for example, through its role in the EC, but much less than the inﬂuence exerted within
its own national boundaries. Deciding how to quantify this partial control is a challenge in itself,
but it is suﬃcient for the purposes of this discussion to say that a boundary exists, and that UK
resilience-building strategies apply to those parts of the energy system under some degree of UK
control.
3.2.1.2 System Elements
As well as deﬁning the scale of the resilient system, one also needs to specify its components.
The House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee report (2004), Resilience of the National
Electricity Network suggests that resilience is brought about by strengthening the physical energy
infrastructure. While the physical network is certainly important, it is not the only component
of resilience. As well as the wires and pipes, the type and quality of the generators have an
impact on resilience, as do any storage systems, designed to smooth out mismatches between
supply and demand.
But the energy system consists of more than just physical components; it also includes economic
and political mechanisms. Two systems could have the exact same physical conﬁguration, but
because of a diﬀerence in the way that their fuels are traded, one could be more resilient than
the other. For example, one could purchase a year’s worth of fuel in advance and over a period of
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time to protect against price shocks, whereas the other could buy its fuel ‘just in time’ to meet
the current demand, exposing it to price rises but also reaping the beneﬁts of dips in the market.
An example of a political diﬀerence between the two systems might be the government’s attitude
towards nuclear power or CO2 emissions. Both systems might have a number nuclear generators
and a large proportion of coal-ﬁred power stations on standby, but because of the political climate
in one scenario, its ability to ramp-up its coal-ﬁred generation may be restricted.
The third component of the energy system consists of the human decision-makers. For a given
physical system, with given economic and political mechanisms in place, the ability of human
actors to communicate with each other, respond to crises and learn from prior experience may
be extremely important for the resilience of an energy system.
The supply side of an energy system should not be overlooked in a resilience management strat-
egy. Resilience aﬀects consumers, but the actions of consumers can also aﬀect the resilience of
the system. There currently exist contracts between electricity suppliers and large electricity
consumers (such as aluminium smelters) to switch oﬀ during periods in which demand threat-
ens to outstrip supply. Such a strategy could, in theory, be extended to incorporate individual
domestic appliances. Let us imagine a situation in which electricity demand exceeds the ability
of the system to supply electricity. The system is designed in such a way that the lights in 1000
houses dim to 80% of their normal brightness. There are two ways of categorising this event.
The ﬁrst is to argue that this is an example of a failure to supply, and is therefore indicative of
a system that is not suﬃciently resilient. The other view of this event is that the loss of 20%
of brightness was a mechanism by which the system was able to act in a resilient manner. The
energy consumers would probably have been largely unaﬀected by the dimming, and it allowed
more critical appliances to continue operating.
The domestic lighting scenario is only a hypothetical scenario, and does not explain how these
diﬀerent priority levels would be assigned to individual appliances, but it serves as a reminder that
a resilience strategy needs to consider both supply and demand. Large negative load suppliers
already add to the resilience of the system, and an argument can be made for including examples
such as the brown out scenario as a last-resort resilience mechanism by which the critical parts of
an energy system can survive. This way of thinking could lead to the development of technologies
and domestic supply contracts that take full advantage of the ability of some appliances to operate
at sub-optimal levels (e.g. light bulbs) or switch oﬀ for a period of time (e.g. refrigerators,
immersion heaters) in order to ensure that more sensitive appliances such as computers and
televisions can be supplied with power more reliably.
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3.2.1.3 System Summary
An energy system extends as far as its actors exert political or corporate inﬂuence over its oper-
ation. Within those boundaries, the system includes the entire physical infrastructure (including
wires, pipes, generators, storage units and end-user loads), the economic and political infras-
tructure, and the actions of the human players in the system, either as generators, suppliers or
consumers. To fail to recognise any of these system elements is to risk missing an opportunity
to improve the resilience of the system.
3.2.2 Disturbances
Resilience is mostly considered in terms of the response of a system to an adverse event. In order
to assess the resilience of a system, therefore, it is necessary to decide what it needs to be resilient
to. These disturbances, as will be discussed, tend to be unpredicted, or even unpredictable. As
a result, it is not possible to construct a comprehensive list of all the adverse events that might
befall an energy system. As the 2006 incident involving the contamination of petrol by silicone
(Smithers and Adam, 2007) demonstrated, no energy security model can hope to anticipate every
eventuality.
Instead of deﬁning resilience in terms of a list of exemplar disturbances (which can never comprise
the full list of possible events), it makes more sense to deﬁne it in terms of a range of disturbance
characteristics. For example, one can say whether a resilient system needs to deal with only
unexpected events beyond the control of traditional energy security measures, or whether it
should also respond to statistically predictable risks. Alternatively, one might ask whether
resilience applies only to potentially catastrophic events, or whether minor variations should be
included. The following sections discuss each of these disturbance characteristics in turn.
3.2.2.1 Disturbance Predictability
The adverse events to which a system should be resilient can diﬀer in their predictability. This
predictability has been categorized by Stirling (1998), placing future events into one of three
categories: risk, uncertainty and ignorance.
A risk is an adverse event which can be anticipated and has a known probability of occurring.
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Each of the engineered components of the electrical network, for example, will have a number of
known failure modes, each of which will have a certain estimable chance of occurring, based on
testing or observation of similar components in operation.
An uncertain event is one which can be anticipated but not with a particular probability of
occurring. It may be that the event has never happened before, or it could be that the exist-
ing circumstances have suﬃciently altered since the last time the event occurred, so that past
instances are a poor predictor of future instances. A changing climate, for example, may place
certain extreme weather events into this uncertain category.
An event about which one is ignorant is one that cannot be anticipated at all, and certainly
not with any meaningful probability. By the nature of these events it is diﬃcult to suggest
examples, as to do so would be to anticipate them. It is possible, however, to reﬂect on past
events and to ascertain whether a resilient system would have been more able to cope with them.
The silicone-contamination of petrol incident, for example, was not anticipated, and could be
reasonably described as an event about which we were ignorant. Nonetheless, one can still say
that one sort of transport network would have been more able to cope than another, by nature
of its fuel diversity (e.g. through the use of ﬂex-fuel vehicles), or the ability of travellers to use
alternative modes of transport.
There is no reason to exclude any of these types of incertitude from a deﬁnition of resilience. The
more predictable disturbances will, however, already be managed by more traditional forms of
energy security provisions. Engineering risks, for example, are already well understood, and are
minimised through system design approaches outlined in the reliability engineering literature:
building redundancy into critical systems, having suﬃcient margins to minimise risks of overload,
deliberately stressing components prior to installation to minimise the risks of infant mortality,
staggered monitoring and replacement of system elements, and the implementation of strict
quality control measures in the design of system components.
Resilience management can inform these existing approaches to maintaining system reliability,
but it will be most useful in dealing with the less predictable disturbances, which may not be
encompassed by risk-based measures.
3 RESILIENCE CONCEPTS AND INDICATORS 80
3.2.2.2 Disturbance Magnitude and Timescale
Related to the predictability of adverse events is their magnitude. Large adverse events tend
to occur less frequently and be less predictable than more minor system variations. Resilience
has tended to be used to describe the system’s ability to respond to these abnormally large
disturbances. Like the disturbance predictability described above, however, there seems to be
little reason why resilience should not be concerned with smaller-scale variations as well as large
disturbances.
The approach to managing the small changes may be rather diﬀerent from the approach to
managing the more catastrophic events. It this proves to be the case, a resilience management
strategy would probably be more concerned with the system’s response to the larger events.
Stability management could instead be the concept used to describe steps taken to minimise
these smaller variations, leaving resilience management to cope with the system’s response to
larger, less frequent, disturbances.
3.2.2.3 Disturbance Timescale
The timescale of the disturbance can have a strong eﬀect on the ability of the system to recover.
A system can be disrupted by a slowly-developing event, whose impact can be larger then a
short-lived large disturbance. An ecological system, for example, can be disturbed by a single
ﬂooding event, but the cumulative eﬀect of wetter weather brought about by climate change may
be more destructive for the system overall. An energy system may be disturbed by a short-lived
fuel price shock, but it also needs to be able to cope with a gradual, but sustained, increase in
the price of fuel over the long-term.
A system, therefore, needs to be able to resilient to disturbances ranging from the very short
timescales to the very long. The approach to delivering this resilient response may be diﬀerent
in each case, but they are all important for maintaining the integrity of the system both now
and in the future.
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3.2.2.4 Disturbance Type
Disturbances can be categorised into diﬀerent types, such as physical, economic or political.
Physical disturbances include weather-related events and the breakdown of generators or cabling.
Economic disturbances include price shocks and the collapse of energy companies. Political
disturbances are those related to political decisions or regime changes. Any of these can aﬀect
the integrity of an energy system, so a resilience model will have to consider all these disturbance
types separately, as well as combining them is a meaningful way to create an overall picture of
the resilience of a system.
3.2.2.5 Disturbance Origin (External or Internal)
Should a resilient system be able to respond to endogenous disturbances, exogenous disturbances
or both? Those authors who addressed this point mostly considered only exogenous disturbances,
that is to say those disturbances that occur outside the sphere of inﬂuence of the aﬀected system.
This would exclude those events which the system itself has caused; a domestic fuel blockade
and the simultaneous collapse of a number of large UK power stations are both events that are
endogenous to the UK energy system. A direct carry-over of deﬁnitions from the wider resilience
literature would suggest that a resilient system need not be designed to respond to such events,
the logic perhaps being that they would be dealt with via a mechanism other than resilience
management.
Determination of the origin of the disturbance is reliant on the deﬁnition of the system scale
discussed above (paragraph ). The energy system extends as far as its actors can exert inﬂuence
over the decisions made. For the sake of consistency, an exogenous disturbance must have a
similarly gradual transition; an adverse event that occurs in Europe is partially exogenous to the
UK, as it occurs in a region over which the UK has partial inﬂuence.
Despite the conviction in the wider resilience literature that resilience is the ability of the system
to respond only to external events, it does not seem to be a particularly useful restriction to make
on the use of the concept. From the point of view of the system, there is little diﬀerence between
an exogenous and an endogenous disturbance. Let us imagine two large transmission lines: one
running from the north to the south of Britain, and the other running from France to the UK.
Any elements of the UK energy system that rely on these lines will experience the same eﬀect
regardless of which one breaks. Designs that help the system to respond positively to one of these
3 RESILIENCE CONCEPTS AND INDICATORS 82
events will inevitably be protecting against the other. The intuitive interpretation of resilience
would suggest that a resilient system should respond positively in either scenario.
3.2.3 System Response
The generally agreed deﬁnition of a resilient system was that it had the ability to maintain or
recover its original processes in the face of a disturbance. However, the means by which this
process occurs, and the precise nature of the recovery, is open to discussion.
3.2.3.1 Resistance or Adaptation?
One of the most striking diﬀerences found in the resilience literature is the distinction between
systems that resist change and those that adapt to it. A system that resists a disturbance will
have components that are individually and collectively resistant to change. A resistant system
will not only maintain the same outputs following a disturbance, but will also maintain all its
underlying processes. A system that is resilient by means of its adaptability will continue to
deliver the same outputs following a disturbance, but not necessarily through the continuation
of the same underlying processes.
A related term to resistance is stability which can be described as the invariance of a system. A
system that is stable will tend to keep the same conﬁguration regardless of changes in its external
environment. This, however, is not necessarily synonymous with resilience, since a system can
be unstable, in the sense that it varies considerably around an equilibrium conﬁguration, but
resilient, in the sense that it is very unlikely to change into a diﬀerent equilibrium that has
undesirable outputs. Holling (1973) even goes so far as to say that instability is a mechanism by
which a system can enhance its resilience:
. . . a system can be very resilient and still ﬂuctuate greatly, i.e. have low stability. I
have touched above on examples like the spruce budworm forest community in which
the very fact of low stability seems to introduce high resilience. . . This statistical
analysis shows that in those areas subjected to extreme climatic conditions the pop-
ulations ﬂuctuate widely but have a high capability of absorbing periodic extremes of
ﬂuctuation. They are, therefore, unstable using the restricted deﬁnition above, but
highly resilient. In more benign, less variable climatic regions the populations are
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much less able to absorb chance climatic extremes even though the populations tend
to be more constant. These situations show a high degree of stability and a lower
resilience.
Holling’s argument is that ecosystems that face regular disturbance may have large ﬂuctuations
in population, but they have evolved to persist in the face of larger disturbances. By analogy,
attempting to optimise the stability of the energy system could have a negative eﬀect on its
resilience.
Managing resistance might involve protecting generators and suppliers from ﬂuctuations in en-
ergy prices or subsidising large fuel depots to allow the incumbent generators to continue deliv-
ering energy to the consumer in times of crisis. Conversely, managing adaptability might involve
exposing generators and suppliers to market ﬂuctuations and encouraging fast transitions be-
tween diﬀerent supply routes and generating options.
Stability itself may be desirable, in order, say, to protect poor consumers against unstable energy
prices, but it should be realised that there can be consequences for the ability of the system to
respond to recover from larger disturbances. Consumers and generators might suﬀer in the
short-term from an unstable energy system, but this might be acceptable given the longer-term
beneﬁts of resilience. Whatever the relationship between resilience and stability, it would seem
sensible to treat these two policy objectives separately.
3.2.3.2 Energy Services
In order to understand the most appropriate conceptualisation of resilience in the context of
energy security one must consider what it is that we want from an energy system. One of the
closest analogies to the energy system is the ecological system. Both have a number of interacting
components that are constantly changing and are subject to external disturbances. A number
of authors refer speciﬁcally to the maintenance of ecological services as the goal of resilience
management. In other words, one can think of ecological systems as networks of components
and interactions that serve to deliver humans with some sort of beneﬁt. Examples of such beneﬁt
include food, oxygen and clean water supplies.
This anthropocentric view of nature provides the closest analogy with energy system resilience.
Purely as end users of energy we have little interest in the form or source of that energy or
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how it arrives at the point of use. What interests us as consumers is the function that the
energy provides. These energy services include lighting, heating and communication, and are
analogous with the concept of ecological services. An energy system, then, is resilient in the face
of disturbances if it can continue to deliver these energy services to the consumers, regardless of
the means by which this is achieved.
The idea of quality discussed in the section might be useful as an umbrella term to measure the
ability of an energy system to deliver energy services. Resilience could then be deﬁned in terms
of the change in system quality that occurs following a range of possible disturbances.
The focus on energy services could be considered too narrow a way of thinking about system
resilience as it ignores the needs of those employed in the delivery of energy services. Just
as an anthropocentric view of nature might only consider species in the context of their role
in delivering ecological services, so a consumer-centric view of energy systems only looks at
individual generators and suppliers in the context of the delivery of energy services. To broaden
the focus, one might also want to consider, for example, the plight of coal mining communities
in the dash for gas period. Rather than just thinking about the impact on resilience of the shift
from coal ﬁred to gas ﬁred power stations (say, the eﬀect of a loss of indigenous supply options),
one might want to take the protection of these mining communities as a social policy in its own
right.
While it is important to consider the needs of energy workers, there does not appear to be a
compelling reason why this needs to be integrated into a resilience strategy. The interests of the
generators and suppliers can still be met, as can those of CO2 reductions or the eradication of
fuel poverty, in conjunction with resilience policies. There may be some overlap between these
objectives and that of resilience, but it should be possible to analyse them separately and apply
them collectively when developing national energy policies. Resilience management, then, can
then be thought of solely in terms of the ability of the energy system to deliver energy services
to the end users.
3.2.3.3 System Equilibria
There is a large discrepancy between the representations of resilient systems used in the energy
policy literature and in other ﬁelds such as ecology. Ecological representations of resilience
often describe a system in terms of stable states with multiple equilibrium positions and domain
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boundaries. This provides a framework for discussing how a system reacts when it is close either
to an equilibrium point or a tipping point, and allows comparisons to be made between systems
with diﬀerent conﬁgurations. None of the energy papers described an energy system in these
terms, and did not oﬀer a similar framework for the analysis of system properties.
These graphical representations of a resilient system nearly exclusively came from the ecological
literature. This can partly be explained because of the maturity of the concept of resilience
in this ﬁeld, resulting in sophisticated techniques for analysing the concept in a quantitative
way. However, the use of resilience in materials science is probably even older and this graphical
representation is not used here. The deﬁnitions of resilience most commonly used in materials
science and engineering tend to be scalar quantities, such as the amount of energy stored in
a body when it is stressed or the speed at which the body returns to its original shape after
deformation. Both of these deal with entities that only have one equilibrium position – the
resting state.
Ecology, however, is a discipline concerned with treating nature as a system. A system is made
up of a number of components interacting in a complicated set of processes. These components
and processes can be conﬁgured in a number of diﬀerent ways, a number of which might be called
stable . This is also true for an energy system: it can have a number of diﬀerent conﬁgurations,
characterised by, say, the ratios of its fuels, generators and energy services. Some of these
conﬁgurations will be in equilibrium, some will not. Of the equilibrium conﬁgurations, some
will be desirable (that is to say, meeting energy service requirements of the consumers without
conﬂicting with wider policy objectives) and some will be undesirable.
There may be cases in which thinking about the energy system as having a single equilibrium is
preferable. The system response to small-scale disturbances, for example, might best be modelled
by considering the restoring force on the system components. If the system is near a tipping
point, or the disturbance is particularly large, however, these assumptions may not hold true.
As Holling argues, an equilibrium-centred view is essentially static and provides little insight
into the transient behaviour of systems that are not near the equilibrium. (Holling (1973)). The
energy system is dynamic and changing, so an accurate representation of its resilience will need
to include the notion of multiple equilibria, and to diﬀerentiate between system behaviour both
near these equilibria and far away from them.
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3.2.4 Characteristics of a Resilient System
The majority of the energy policy literature dealt with the concept of resilience with reference to
qualities of the system that brought it about (such as diversity and ﬂexibility) the technologies
that aﬀected it, or strategies that could enhance it.
It is notable that the main resilience-related themes that emerged in the review had been iden-
tiﬁed in the energy security literature; the themes of diversity, ﬂexibility, storage, interconnect-
edness and indigenous supplies all occur in both resilience- and energy security-related papers.
3.2.4.1 Diversity and Flexibility
Diversity and ﬂexibility were given most often as characteristics of a resilient system. In theory,
ﬂexibility is independent of diversity. A system could have the minimum diversity (only one fuel
and one type of generator) but the maximum ﬂexibility (the incumbent fuel and generator tech-
nology can be changed instantly for zero cost). In practicality, however, diversity and ﬂexibility
are linked, as it is a prerequisite for a ﬂexible system that alternatives are readily available to
allow a switch to occur. It is much easier to ramp up use of a small fuel source than it is to
create it from absolutely nothing. A system that is ﬂexible, therefore, will also probably have a
good level of diversity.
Diversity can apply to all stages in the supply chain: in the fuel routes from the fuel-producing
countries, in the commercial organisations that reﬁne and distribute the energy to the end user,
and in the technologies used to conduct these operations. The most diverse energy system,
therefore, would use a number of diﬀerent primary fuels from a number of diﬀerent countries in a
number of diﬀerent regions; they would be imported (or extracted indigenously) by a number of
diﬀerent companies using diﬀerent technologies and processes, and the energy would be supplied
to the end user in a number of diﬀerent forms via a number of diﬀerent supply routes.
Diversity is not a straightforward property to measure. Stirling (1998) breaks it into three
components: variety, balance and disparity. Variety is a measure of the number of diﬀerent
system components (e.g. the number of diﬀerent fuels), balance is a measure of how equally
those components are spread (a 90:10 split is less balanced than a 50:50 fuel mix) and disparity
is a measure of the degree of diﬀerence between them. A very diverse energy system will have
a large number of fuels and generating options (variety), each taking an equal share of the mix
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(balance), and each of vary independently of each other (disparity).
One advantage of diversity from the point of view of resilience is that it protects the system
against the more unpredictable events. Risks can be minimized by using high quality components
and through the use of backup generators to a level that is deemed to be appropriate for the
probability of failure. Unpredictable events (about which we are uncertain or ignorant) cannot
be handled in this probabilistic way, as their nature and magnitude are completely unknown.
Diversity can protect against all disturbances, and as such is useful for minimizing the impact
of unforeseeable events.
Where it does not conﬂict with other policy objectives, then, diversity should be encouraged at
all stages of the supply chain. The portfolio of fuels should be diverse, as should the technologies
used to deliver them in useful forms to the point at which they are required. Even diversity of
energy options in the home can add resilience to the energy system; a consumer who has a gas
hob with an electric oven can still cook in the event of a gas or electricity interruption, whereas
a gas-only or electric-only home is fully reliant on one source of energy and is thus much more
vulnerable should that supply fail.
3.2.4.2 Decentralisation
Decentralisation might be thought of as a subset of diversity in that it can increase the number
and range of generator locations, physical environments and commercial organisations involved
in the production of useful energy. By increasing the number of generators (and thus decreasing
the average size for a given system) the chance of a large failure is decreased. More small failures
will occur since there are more components to the system, but these will be more manageable
than the infrequent but catastrophic failures characterised by highly centralised systems.
This argument relies on the assumption that the smaller, decentralised generating units fail
independently of each other; this assumption may not be valid for a number of reasons. For
example, if the types of technology used are not diverse enough, they may all be subject to the
same failure modes. Faults would be likely to occur at approximately the same stage of the
components’ life cycles, invalidating the assumption of independent failure events.
The most signiﬁcant reason why decentralised units are not independent, however, is that they
are all connected to a single system, and are thus commonly aﬀected by system-wide events.
A sudden surge or dip in the voltage of the electricity network could aﬀect all generators at
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the same time, and it could be that a smaller number of larger generators would have been
more able to adapt to the sudden change. The existing rules for grid-connected decentralised
generators highlight another problem: if the grid goes down in one region, the decentralised
generators have to be switched oﬀ in order to protect the engineers who would need to ﬁx the
grid. Such a restriction diminishes the potential resilience beneﬁts that could emerge from having
grid-independent supplies available.
Decentralisation, therefore, may have beneﬁts for the resilience of the energy system by reducing
the dependence on large generators that present the risk of single large failures. This beneﬁt,
however, is not guaranteed, and requires good communication between the generators and grid
operators, diversity in the technologies used by the diﬀerent generators, and the implementation
of appropriate legislation to take full advantage of the beneﬁts of local generation and to minimise
any additional system risks it poses.
3.2.4.3 Indigenous v. Interconnected Energy Systems
Two strategies emerged that might individually promote resilience: increasing the use of indige-
nous sources of energy and increasing the spread and range of fuel sources. These appear to
conﬂict with one another, since an increased reliance on the fuels and networks of other energy
systems would be at the expense of local forms of energy production.
It is true that one can be uncertain, perhaps even ignorant, about the reliability of fuel supply
from foreign countries – certainly more so than about fuels from within one’s national borders. A
government has a degree of control over its national fuel strategy that allows it to avoid some risks
that might be present when relying on others. It is also true that having a number of properly-
functioning links to other energy systems provides security against local supply interruptions by
taking advantage of a shared capacity margin and the redundancy of supply routes.
In order to establish which of these two strategies should be implemented, or where the balance
lies between the two, it might be informative to consider as an analogy the combination of errors
in the measurement of physical quantities. Consider the situation in which a physical value (say,
the speed of a moving vehicle) is measured simultaneously using three diﬀerent techniques. Two
methods are very accurate, and give a value of 41mph and 43mph, respectively. The third is
known to be inaccurate, and gives a value of 51mph. One might argue that only the ﬁrst two
measures should be used, as they are known to be more accurate than the third. Alternatively,
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it could be argued that the inaccurate measure should be included since it still provides some
information about the speed of the vehicle, albeit information that is relatively imprecise.
It can be shown statistically that the latter method tends to provide a better estimate for the true
value if the measures are each given their appropriate weighting (the inverse of their variance)
that reﬂects the relative precision of each method. In other words, one should consider all the
data available, but give more weight to the data that is thought to be more accurate. The
analogy is only for illustration, but it does suggest that an energy supplier whose reliability
is thought to be poor should still be integrated into the larger network, but that individual
operators’ dependence on that supplier should be proportional to their conﬁdence in that supply
route.
The optimal balance from the point of view of resilience lies with widespread interconnection,
but with most energy coming from sources about which one is conﬁdent.
3.2.4.4 The Human Dimension
The wider literature included learning as a mechanism by which a system can become resilient.
This was not explicitly mentioned in any of the energy papers, but it was implied by the authors
who noted the importance of planning for diﬀerent scenarios, and practising decision-making
under adverse conditions.
Berkes & Sexias (2005) describe the importance of nurturing ecological memory to maintain
resilience. The concept of ecological memory might have a useful analogy in energy systems; one
interpretation is that in order for an energy system to respond in a resilient manner, it must be
able to revert to a previous, more suitable, conﬁguration. For example, the extended inactivity
of the British coal industry, or the long period since a nuclear generator has been constructed,
might be an example of a loss in system memory; the longer this fallow period is, the harder
it is restart these activities should the economic or political situation make coal or new nuclear
builds once again desirable.
Whether learning and memory are thought to be useful concepts for an energy system, it seems
clear that the human elements of the system are just as important for resilience as the physical
elements. There is a tendency to think of the energy system as a series of physical structures and
machines that transport and convert energy; resilience would then come about by choosing the
best technologies and conﬁguring them in the optimal way. To form a full picture of resilience,
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however, one must also consider the actions of all the components of a system that aﬀect its
function, including the human actors who play a large role in choosing fuels, managing the
infrastructure, and planning for the future. Even the political structure needs to be thought of
as part of the energy system, as the decisions of policy makers can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the way
in which a system responds to a disturbance.
3.3 The Resilience of a Generic System
The nominal purpose of this systematic review was to ﬁnd a deﬁnition of resilience that was
applicable to the energy system in order to inform energy policy. From looking at the use of
the term in energy policy and in the wider literature it is apparent that a number of diﬀerent
deﬁnitions could apply. The system itself can be described in a number of diﬀerent ways, as can
the disturbances that might befall it.
A detailed, undisputable, deﬁnition of resilience is probably not achievable. A system has to be
resilient to a wide range of possible disturbances, and it can respond in a number of diﬀerent
ways. Even if one imagines that a well-deﬁned quantity, resilience, exists, two systems with the
same amount may still respond diﬀerently to diﬀerent disturbances. Therein lies the problem of
ﬁnding a single deﬁnition of the term that is meaningful. We want a system to be resilient, but
we cannot be sure what it needs to be resilient to. We can categorise disturbances according to
their type, their duration, their predictability or their magnitude, but these categories will never
be able to fully characterise any future disturbance. Two disturbances with exactly the same
scores in each of our pre-assigned categories could still cause a system to respond in two very
diﬀerent ways. The non-linearity of system responses cited by some authors, combined with the
large uncertainties about future disturbances, mean that resilience will never be an undisputable
physical quantity like, for example, mass or length.
Nonetheless, by considering what might go into a deﬁnition of resilience, one is forced to consider
the range of disturbances and system responses that we might want to include as part of a resilient
system; this exercise has some value in itself, even if it does not result in a single unequivocal
deﬁnition. A deﬁnition of a resilient system can be thought of in three parts:
1. What is the system to which the label resilient is being assigned?
2. What does the system do that identiﬁes it as being resilient?
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3. How does it achieve this resilient response?
3.3.1 A Resilient System: What it is
What is the energy system, which is being described as resilient? The energy system can be
deﬁned in a number of diﬀerent ways, but the most useful depiction of an energy system is
one that includes all the elements that aﬀect its functioning. These include all the physical
elements (fuels, generators, wires, pipes, etc.), all the human elements (investors, miners, oper-
ators, consumers, etc.), all the economic and political elements (primary fuel prices, electricity
prices, taxes, incentives, contractual agreements, etc.) and the institutions that bring together
all these constituent parts (corporations, unions, political organisations, etc.). These elements
can all aﬀect the ability of the system to function, so they all need to be included in an analysis
of system security.
The other dimension that should be considered is the domain of the energy system. Again, this
can be interpreted in a number of ways: for example, the UK energy system could be deﬁned
as the collection of elements situated within the UK’s national boundaries. This turns out to
be a rather arbitrary choice, and it makes more sense to consider the system in terms of the
inﬂuence its actors have over it. The energy system then becomes the collection of system
elements over which the UK has control. Rather than seeing the UK energy system in terms of
strict boundaries, it has smooth edges deﬁned by the degree of inﬂuence over which the UK can
exert its inﬂuence. This brings us to the following deﬁnition of the UK energy system (but it
can be applied to any nation or international body):
The UK energy system is the collection of physical, human, economic and political
entities over which the UK has a degree of control.
3.3.2 A Resilient System: What it does
Having established what an energy system is, we need to be able to establish whether it is
resilient or not; in other words, we need to understand what resilient means. How can we say
when an energy system is acting resiliently, and how can we compare the resilience of diﬀerent
systems?
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A deﬁnition of resilience must be founded on the provision of energy services. These services, not
the energy itself, are what we as consumers experience and demand. If exactly the same energy
service can be delivered via a diﬀerent energy carrier, this choice has little or no impact on the
consumer. This point is crucial for conceptualisations of resilience as it recognises the ability of
an energy system to reconﬁgure its fuels, supply routes and generating options in a variety of
diﬀerent ways, provided the continued supply of energy services is maintained.
The deﬁnition of resilience must also recognise that it is a system characteristic that is only
visible when the system is under some sort of stress; an undisturbed system cannot exhibit
resilient tendencies.
The combination of the concepts of energy services, disturbances, and the system response is
suﬃcient to construct the following deﬁnition:
Resilience is the ability of a system to respond to a disturbance in such a way that it
can continue to deliver the energy services required of it
One might want to reﬁne this deﬁnition by incorporating more detailed descriptions of the
disturbances that the system is resilient to. The disturbances, as have been discussed, tend to
be unpredictable and large, can be either endogenous or exogenous to the system itself, and can
occur over a range of timescales. Incorporating these variables results in the following deﬁnition:
Resilience is the ability of a system to respond to large, unpredictable, exogenous or
endogenous disturbances occurring on timescales from the very short- to the very
long-term, in such a way that it can continue to deliver the energy services required
of it
One might also want to reﬁne the deﬁnition of the energy services, including for example the
requirement that they are aﬀordable and that they are in adequate supply, leading to this deﬁ-
nition:
Resilience is the ability of a system to respond to large, unpredictable, exogenous or
endogenous disturbances occurring on timescales from the very short- to the very
long-term, in such a way that it can continue to deliver the required quantity of
energy services at a cost acceptable to the consumer
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A full description of a resilient response requires a consideration of the manner in which the
system acts resiliently; this is described in the next section.
3.3.3 A Resilient System: How it does it
A system can be resilient by means of a number of diﬀerent mechanisms, and a number of system
attributes can increase or decrease this resilience. It is just as important to understand these
mechanisms and attributes as is it is to understand what resilience actually means.
A resilient response may be characterised by the time taken to return to a desirable equilibrium.
Alternatively, it can be described by the amount of deﬂection from an equilibrium position that
a system experiences. The return to equilibrium may be brought about through the resistance
of the individual system components, or it may be a result of their capacity to adapt in order to
maintain the overall service provision.
All of these interpretations have potential use for deﬁning resilience. Depending on the existing
conﬁguration of the system, and its reaction to a disturbance, one response characterisation
may be more useful than another. Smaller disturbances that occur while the system is near an
equilibrium conﬁguration may be best characterised by the rate of return to that conﬁguration,
whereas a system that is already near a tipping point may be best characterised by its ability
to avoid shifting into a new equilibrium or by its ability to reorganise into a new, desirable,
equilibrium.
Similarly, system attributes that can bring about a resilient response are varied, and need to
be considered in conjunction with each other. The diversity and ﬂexibility of system elements
can be pursued simultaneously, although their impact on other policy objectives needs to be
considered. Indigenous supplies and international integration, however, are not complementary
objectives, and may need to be traded oﬀ with each other to ﬁnd the optimal balance from the
point of view of resilience.
Rather than attempting to combine these various system responses and characteristics into a
single deﬁnition of resilience, it is more useful simply to recognise that the variety exists. This
complexity need not be seen as a barrier to enhancing system resilience. Rather, it can be seen
as an opportunity to consider a number of diﬀerent resilience strategies. Some may be more
appropriate for one system than another, and some may be more compatible with wider political
objectives. The crucial point is to recognise that a strategy based on one system attribute will
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inevitably impact on others. It is likely, for example, that policies to enhance energy system
resistance are not the same as those to enhance system adaptability. Attempting to design a
resistant system that recovers quickly from small disturbances, for example, could well have
negative implications for the ability of that system to reconﬁgure when required by the onset of
a larger disturbance. Policies must recognise such relationships and be sympathetic to them.
• Resilience can only be understood in terms of the ability of an energy system to deliver
energy services; the delivery of energy itself is only a means to an end. When assessing the
impact of a policy on resilience, therefore, one needs to ask how it aﬀects the ability of a
system to provide consumers with what they want. Asking the question in this form opens
up a range of measures that can improve the resilience of a system without necessarily
improving the reliability of energy supplies. Improving the thermal eﬃciency of buildings,
for example, has no impact on the reliability of energy supply, but it greatly improves the
resilience of consumers to supply interruptions, since they can remain reasonably warm.
• In order to understand the resilience of an energy system it is necessary to consider all the
system elements that can aﬀect it. This includes more than just the physical entities such
as the fuels, pipes and wires. It also includes the human elements, the economic structures
and the political decisions that can signiﬁcantly aﬀect the ability of the system to respond
to and recover from adverse events.
• It is important to recognise that a resilient response can be resistive or adaptive, and
that strategies that enhance one may degrade the other. This may be appropriate in
some situations, but the most likely depiction of a resilient energy system will incorporate
elements of both rigidity and adaptability. The challenge is to develop a system that is
strong but not brittle, and that is ﬂexible but not chaotic.
3.4 Applying Resilience thinking to the energy system
Although the idea of making a system ‘resilient’, rather than ‘secure’, is relatively new in the
energy policy literature, a variety of interpretations have been used for a number of decades in
the wider literature, all of which centre around the idea that a resilient system can ‘cope’ with a
disturbance (Benes, 2007; DTI, 2006b; Farrell et al., 2004; Lovins and Lovins, 1981; ResAlliance,
2009a). Before attempting to deﬁne ‘resilience’ for use within an energy policy analysis, this
chapter reviews the concept as it employed in these other disciplines.
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3.4.1 The Transition between Multiple Equilibria
The analogies between ecosystem resilience and energy system resilience are potentially enlight-
ening, but should not be over-stretched. One of the central features of ‘ecological resilience’
is that systems can ﬂuctuate considerably around an equilibrium position, but that a resilient
system will tend to remain in that stability domain. Conversely, a non-resilient ecosystem will be
able to cross over a tipping point, placing the system in a new equilibrium delivering a diﬀerent
set of ecosystem services. This concept is predicated on the notion that ecological systems have
multiple ‘zones of attraction’ with many equilibria. It is diﬃcult to see how this would extend to
an electricity system, which only has one primary service to provide – the provision of electricity
to consumers.
Although an electricity system may not have multiple stable states, the notion of a tipping point
may still be a useful one. As will be discussed later, there are at least two states of an electricity
system: functioning and non-functioning. The message from the ecological resilience literature
says that in order to understand how systems undergo sudden and catastrophic changes, we need
to look not at the behaviour of the system at equilibrium (i.e. under ‘normal’ conditions), but at
the behaviour of the system far away from equilibrium – close to the point beyond which recovery
is automatic. For the electricity system, then, its vulnerability to catastrophic failure can only be
understood by considering its behaviour near these tipping points, trying to understand where
in relation to these points the system is, and what conditions could push it over the edge.
3.4.2 Eﬃciency vs Resilience
A related message from the ecological resilience literature is that resilience is potentially in direct
conﬂict with eﬃciency, in the sense that certain eﬃciency gains inevitably lead to a reduction
in the resilience of the system. Talking about the management of agricultural systems, Brian
Walker is critical of the perceived need to optimise farming methods to maximise eﬃciency,
arguing that such approaches only work when the future state of the world is ﬁxed:
Who would argue...that eﬃciency is a good thing? Of course it is, but you have
to think very carefully about that because in many ways the pursuit of eﬃciency,
in natural resource management and in economics . . . is reducing resilience. ‘Just-in-
time’ marketing is a very eﬃcient way of going as long as nothing changes and as long
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as the supply chains don’t break it’s more eﬃcient. This drive for squeezing the next
buck out of the system is what has pushed the world into a very non-resilient state
and so what we’ve got to try to accept now is that it’s better to be in an acceptable
state, albeit not the maximum productivity state, but a resilient state no matter
what happens (Walker, 2008).
Charles Redman has been applying the concepts of ecological resilience to the study of cities.
He takes a similar view to that of Walker’s, arguing that striving for eﬃciency provides little
protection against unforeseen events:
We are moving into a world . . . of increased . . . eﬃciency. We try to minimise inven-
tory..., to make the streets just wide enough to hold traﬃc, to distribute the electricity
just so it works; we’re wringing the last ineﬃciency . . . out of the systems. All that’s
great until a Hurricane Katrina happens then all of a sudden this all comes apart
. . . and it doesn’t even have to be that dramatic. We’re doing a ﬁne-tuned world, but
what we need to do is to build resilience, or a cushion, into it. How much is society
willing to invest . . . in the resilience ‘insurance policy’ versus maximum eﬃciency?
(Redman, 2008)
The pursuit of low-cost electricity supplies have tended to depress the levels of the ‘cushion’
built into the system. As will be discussed, privatisation in particular has created an incentive
to reduce margins in the generation sector, and the obligations put on the energy regulator,
Ofgem, have driven the electricity network to be operated with increased eﬃciency. It needs to
be determined at what point the optimisation of the electricity system ceases to be of net beneﬁt
to consumers and, rather, begins to decrease the resilience of the system to unacceptable levels.
3.4.3 Adaptive Capacity
The term ‘adaptive capacity’, again from the ecological resilience literature, refers to the extent
to which a system has within itself the necessary tools to react to an unexpected change.
With reference to ecological systems, Carl Folke (Folke et al. 2002) describe four system charac-
teristics necessary to cope in the face of a changing environment (Resilience Alliance, 2009):
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• learning to live with change and uncertainty;
• nurturing diversity for resilience;
• combining diﬀerent types of knowledge for learning;
• creating opportunity for self-organization towards social-ecological sustainability.
The concept of adaptive capacity can be applied to electricity systems in a number of diﬀerent
ways:
• Response Ability : This concerns the behaviour of the system immediately after a dis-
turbance, and relates to the ability of the entities within that system, both technical and
human, to respond appropriately to mitigate the impact of that disturbance. This response
ability includes the availability of ancillary services to minimise system disruption and to
recover following a failure. It also concerns the ability of the human actors to communicate
with each other both within their operational units and between these operational units –
this is an issue that has been raised in particular as a result of the vertical unbundling of
the electricity utilities.
• Learning and Reconﬁguration: This concerns learning over a longer timescale. A resilient
electricity system will be able to learn from past adverse events and change its components,
conﬁguration and operational processes to reduce the risk of such an occurrence being
repeated.
• Diversity : The third aspect of system resilience to emerge from the notion of adaptive
capacity is that of ‘diversity’. This concept has direct analogies with ecological resilience.
Brian Walker’s objections to modern agricultural practices included the increasing preva-
lence of monocrop farming methods; these, he argues, emerge from a short-termist view,
and make food production far less resilient to unexpected environmental changes. Similarly
with the electricity system, a diversity of fuels and generating technologies provides some
protection against an uncertain future, minimising the impact of individual failures when
they do occur and allowing more capacity for the system to adapt over the longer-term to
more slowly-changing external conditions.
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3.5 Applying Ecological Resilience Concepts to the Electricity System
A ‘secure’ electricity system is able to provide consumers with a high level of electricity availability
at an acceptable price level (IEA, 2007). If we set aside the price component and focus only on the
availability aspect, ‘energy security’ can be deﬁned as the probability that a given unavailability
will not be exceeded over a given period of time. For the purposes of this research, the concept
of ‘security’ is described as having three distinct components: reliability, reliance and resilience.
1. Reliability is the probability that a component within a system will fail within a speciﬁed
time period. A classic measure of reliability is the Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF),
which deﬁnes the expected lifetime of a component under a set of operating conditions
(Todinov, 2005).
2. Reliance is a measure of the extent to which a system is dependent on external inputs, and
the expected availability of those inputs. A system can have low reliance by being self-
suﬃcient, by being dependent only on reliable external systems, or by diversifying import
routes to minimise uncertainty.
3. Resilience is a measure of a system’s ability to continue to deliver services despite the
occurrence of a reliability- or reliance-type event. A resilient system will minimise the
impact of an adverse event and will allow the system to recover as fully and as quickly as
possible.
This research focuses on the resilience of the electricity system, where its resilience is independent
of the reliance risks associated with each of its inputs, and is distinct from the reliability of its
constituent components. If we consider the value chain of electricity provision, there are three
areas of supply that can be aﬀected by a disruption (Collins et al., 2009).
1. A disruption in the supply chain causes insuﬃcient fuel for generators to meet the demand
for electrical energy.
2. Technical or human disruption makes a generator unavailable, meaning that the available
fuel cannot be transformed into electrical energy.
3. Network disruption (transmission or distribution) means that the available electrical energy
cannot be conveyed to consumers.
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To determine the resilience of the electricity system, therefore, we need to understand its capacity
to cope with reliability- and reliance-type shocks that concern fuelling, generation, transmission
and distribution.
3.6 Conceptual Clariﬁcation
The reliability-reliance-resilience scheme goes some way towards distinguishing resilience from
other energy security-related concepts, but there remains some discrepancy in the use of the term
in the existing literature. The following sections attempt to resolve some of these diﬀerences by:
1. Examining the importance of deﬁning the system boundaries explicitly.
2. Deﬁning the extent to which energy eﬃciency improves resilience.
3. Deﬁning the relationship between resilience and the size of a system shock.
4. Distinguishing between resilient response and reactive intervention.
3.6.1 Resilience and System Boundaries
One way of distinguishing between reliability and resilience is by using reliability to describe the
probability or frequency of a single fault occurring and using resilience to describe the subsequent
system response. These deﬁnitions are consistent with those used in some of the wider resilience
literature. For example:
Reliability, vulnerability, and resilience provide measures of the frequency, magnitude,
and duration of the failure of water resources systems, respectively (Maier et al.,
2001).
Maier et al. (2001) suggest that reliability measures the frequency of failure of a system; this
agrees with the use of the term in reliability engineering, where the reliability of a component
or system is deﬁned in terms of its Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF). The use of resilience
in the deﬁnition above describes the system’s reaction to a disturbance—in this case, the time
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Figure 3.1: Representation of two aspects of system security
it takes to recover. In an energy system, therefore, reliability and resilience can be said to
correspond to the frequency of failures and the time taken to recover, as illustrated in Figure 5.
The above distinction between the frequency and recovery is useful, but we will see that the
distinction between reliability- and resilience-related events also depends on how we deﬁne the
boundaries of the system under analysis. The need to choose appropriate system boundaries
and the importance of ‘scale’ has been articulated in the ecological and engineering resilience
literature, which argues that the boundary choice can aﬀect the perceived purpose of the system
(Dalziell and McManus, 2004), the choice of indicators and the apparent performance of a system
against those indicators (Campbell et al., 2001).
The reliability of a component, such as a capacitor, is deﬁned as the probability that it will,
under a set of given operating conditions, fail during a given time period (Todinov, 2005, p.1).
This deﬁnition can also be applied to the reliability of a subsystem, expressing how likely it is
to fail. The relationship between the reliability of a subsystem and its constituent components
will depend on their relative importance to subsystem function and the level of redundancy in
the design. This same logic can be applied to the relationship between the reliabilities of whole
systems and their constituent subsystems.
As the systems we describe become larger and more complicated, design features and human
behaviours are introduced that can be described as resilient, thus confusing the distinction be-
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tween resilience and reliability. To use an example, a nuclear generator is both a system in its
own right and a subsystem within the wider electricity network. Within the generator system,
failures can occur as a result of the failure of one or more of its constituent parts – a reliability
failure. Once this failure has occurred, human operators or automated processes can respond
resiliently, minimising the magnitude and duration of the loss in system function – namely, the
production of electrical energy.
If this response is perfectly resilient, there may be no reduction in electrical output, in which case,
from the perspective of the grid operator, there has been no incident at all. If the generator’s
resilience is not perfect, power output will be reduced by some degree as a result of the initial
failure. In this case, the grid operator sees this power reduction as a reduction in the availability
of power to the system. If the generator is perceived as a system component, this reduction in
availability is a reliability-type failure; if, however, the generator is perceived as an input to the
grid system, it is the grid’s reliance that is cause for concern. In either case, the measures the
grid operator puts in place to cope with such a failure contribute to the resilience of the wider
system.
A single scenario can, therefore, be viewed in diﬀerent ways by diﬀerent actors within the energy
system. The Resilience Alliance (ResAlliance, 2009b) makes a similar point:
There is no perfect way to set the boundaries of a system. Initial assessments may
need to be changed as the understanding of the problem changes.
We can deﬁne a system in any number of ways: the UK electricity grid is physically connected to
the European Grid (National Grid, 2008b); both are reliant on the domestic and EU gas network
(National Grid, 2007), which require the electricity, communication and transportation systems
to function (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Rinaldi, 2004). These systems, therefore, are interdependent and
can alternatively be viewed as a single system (Dalziell and McManus, 2004). We partition these
systems not because the partitions are in any sense ‘correct’, or indeed ﬁxed, but because they
make their analysis feasible, and, crucially, because operational and strategic decisions about the
system are made in terms of those same partitions (Campbell et al., 2001; Medema et al., 2008).
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3.6.2 Resilience of the Wider Electricity-Based Economy
Following on from this point about resilient behaviour being dependent on the boundary of the
system under investigation, we should distinguish between the resilience of the electricity system
and the resilience of the electricity-based economy. An important area of discussion in the energy
security debate concerns the dependence of the UK economy and wider society on the electricity
system. This dependence makes us vulnerable to the failure of the electricity system. Our society
could therefore increase its resilience to such a failure by ﬁnding non-electrical alternatives to
delivering its required energy services. At the domestic level, the use of both gas and electric
cooking appliances delivers resilience by allowing hot food to be prepared in the event of either
a gas or an electricity failure.
Without wanting to dwell on what is excluded from this research, it is important to stress
that this wider sense of ‘energy resilience’ is not discussed here. This research focuses on the
resilience of the electricity system, not on society’s resilience to failures of the electricity system.
The policies and strategies that aﬀect these two distinct ideas are not mutually exclusive. A
single demand reduction measures, for example, can be used to improve societal resilience to
electricity disruptions as well and improving the resilience of the electricity system itself.
3.6.3 Resilience and Shock Size
A source of confusion surrounding deﬁnitions of resilience concerns the size, or abnormal na-
ture, of the disturbance to which a system needs to be resilient. A number of authors deﬁne
resilience as the ability to cope with large, abnormal or unexpected disturbances (Holling and
Gunderson, 2002; Kirschen et al., 2004; Lachs and Sutanto, 1992; Owen, 2004). However, the
reliability-reliance-resilience scheme established above makes no such distinction between regular
and irregular events, suggesting, rather, that a system’s resilience characterised by its ability to
cope with any disturbance regardless of size, abnormality or unexpectedness.
Steve Epstein’s paper on resilience and ‘unexampled events’ (Epstein, 2006) oﬀers a way of
reconciling these two viewpoints. Epstein argues that resilient behaviour is only observed after
a disturbance has occurred, but that once it has occurred, this behaviour is “institutionalised”.
In other words, once an organisation has coped with an event, that coping mechanism is codiﬁed
into a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).
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Figure 3.2: Representation of Resilience as Standard Operating Procedure
Resilience, then, is the ability to cope with a disturbance of any size; the reason that there
is a tendency to talk about the concept in terms of rare events is that resilience for common
events is already standard for most systems. Strategies for resilient behaviour and design are
therefore likely to be suﬃciently developed to cope with ‘normal’ disturbances, but may be less
well developed for unexpected disturbances.
Once we have framed ‘resilience’ in this way, it becomes clear that any system will display
some resilient characteristics, even if they are only able to cope with the most mundane of
disturbances. In the case of modern electricity systems, resilient designs and operating procedures
are widespread, which is unsurprising given the time-critical nature of electricity provision and
the importance of electricity supplies to a modern economy. These resilient practices include
the maintenance of system margins (National Grid, 2008a), the use of interruptible contracts
(National Grid, 2009c), plans for rota disconnections (BERR, 2006), and redundancy in the
design of electricity networks (n-1 and n-2 criteria) (National Grid, 2008a).
The focus of this research, therefore, is not to propose a raft of resilient designs and behaviours
that should implemented. Rather, it is to ask whether the existing approaches to resilience
are, and will remain, adequate given the technical, economic and policy pressures the electricity
system is under.
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3.6.4 Resilience vs Reactive Response
If we look at the use of ‘resilience’ in the ecological literature, systems that exhibit this property
are said to be able to self-organise following a disturbance in order to maintain essential functions
(Allen et al., 2005; Berkes, 2007; Carpenter et al., 2001; Carreras et al., 2000; Carreras, 2002;
Carreras et al., 2004; Clar et al., 1999; Dobson et al., 2007; Drossel, 1996; Hui et al., 2008). In
a non-human system, such as an ecosystem, it is clear how to distinguish between automatic
response and active intervention, since the latter is a conscious decision made by a human actor
(by, say, cutting down trees to prevent a ﬁre from spreading) and the former is not (e.g. small
ﬁres increase tree spacing and, as a result, minimise the risk of larger ﬁres). Conscious decisions
after a shock should not be seen as resilient responses, since they are not an inherent part of
the system, whereas the system that evolves into a state that minimises the risk of wildﬁres is
clearly exhibiting resilience.
In a human system such as the electricity network, it is less clear which responses are as a
result of ‘resilience’ (i.e. internal to the system’s design) and which are interventions that come
‘after-the-fact’, since by deﬁnition a human system is designed and a product of active decisions.
We can illustrate this distinction using an extreme case: the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 and 2009. We
have seen that the UK’s ﬁnancial system was not resilient (Eijﬃnger, 2008) and this fact is not
changed by any restorative measures subsequently put in place. It may be that these measures
are successful in speeding the recovery of the ﬁnancial system, but since these measures are
purely reactive they cannot be called ‘resilient’.
Using the ﬁnancial system as an example, we can identify a number of system characteristics
that would have made it resilient. It would have been more resilient if:
1. Early warning signals were given, and heeded by the regulators
2. The system was insulated from the failure of any single bank
3. There were no credible risks to which all the banks were exposed
4. The expected impact on any market participant was proportional to the perceived risk
being taken by that participant
5. It was designed in such a way that a collapse could be recovered easily
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Applying these ideas to the electricity system, then, we see that the resilience of the system de-
pends on there being procedures and designs in place in advance of a disturbance event that allow
the change to be managed and for any restorative action to occur eﬀectively (Folke, 2006). This
involves not only having Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for foreseeable disturbances,
but also having more general strategies for coping with unforeseeable events. A study carried
out for BERR (Collins and Gross, 2008), showed that the countries most able to implement
short-term demand reductions were those that had already established public communication
systems and had appropriate ﬁscal measures in place, which allowed mitigation to occur quickly
and eﬀectively (ESMAP, 2005; IEA, 2005a).
3.7 Categories of Resilience
The previous section distinguished between a system’s resilience, reliability and reliance, and
clariﬁed some of the discrepancies that have emerged in the ‘resilience’ literature. The term
can also be deconstructed to describe the diﬀerent behaviours required of a ‘resilient’ system.
Whether originating from inside or outside the system, a disturbance will ultimately manifest
itself as a loss of power on one section of the grid. The test of a system’s resilience is its ability
to cope with, and respond to, this power loss, which it can do in a number of ways:
1. Recovery Resilience: It must recover quickly and automatically from a failure, or at least
fail in such a way that manual recovery can be performed quickly and easily (Adger, 2000;
Carpenter et al., 2001; Gunderson, 2000; Holling, 1996; Pimm, 1991).
2. ENS Resilience: The expected amount of Energy Not Served (ENS) should be as low as
possible following any given disturbance. ENS resilience simply means that for two systems
experiencing identical disturbances, all other things being equal, the more resilient of the
two systems will be expected to have a lower amount of energy not served to its consumers
as a result of that disturbance (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004; Nedic et al., 2006).
3. Cascade Resilience:It must not allow the failure to initiate other failures, and certainly
must avoid large-scale blackouts by limiting the spread of a fault to the area in which it
occurred (Ash and Newth, 2007; Leu and Namatame, 2009; Nedic et al., 2006).
4. Selective Failure: If it has to fail, a resilient system will fail in such a way that the ENS
has the lowest possible cost to society. Such a system can prioritise loads in terms of the
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social value of the energy consumed, or the Value of Lost Load (VOLL) ensuring that
any disturbance does not adversely aﬀect essential services such as hospitals, emergency
services and critical infrastructure. Other loads might be further prioritised according to
some measure of willingness-to-pay or willingness-to-accept, allowing some loads to pay for
local network upgrades and providing the means for others to face temporarily reduced
service provision at the request of the system operator (de Nooij et al., 2007, 2008).
A system that has high ENS resilience does not necessarily have high cascade resilience, since it
may expect to cope well with normal disturbances but be brittle to the extent that an abnormal
disturbance may be more likely cause a cascading failure than it would in a system that experi-
enced more regular, smaller failures (Carreras et al., 2003; Dobson et al., 2007, 2002). It may also
be that a high degree of Selective Failure, by restricting the range of responses available, impedes
the ability of system operators to manage a cascading failure properly, thereby increasing the
probability of total system collapse.
An increase in any one of these system attributes, all other things being equal, will increase
the system’s overall resilience. In practice, however, these attributes cannot be managed inde-
pendently of each other. A resilience policy may therefore have to improve one dimension of
resilience at the expense of another.
These aspects of resilience may not be directly measurable. Adverse events that test the limits
of an electricity system’s resilience are rare, and so oﬀer little statistical power for understanding
underlying system attributes. Furthermore, in order to be meaningful predictors of a system’s
future behaviour, these measures require that the magnitude of the initiating disturbance be
known in each case. For example, the UK’s electricity system may experience a blackout; if the
initiating event was very small, this would indicate that the system was far less resilient than it
would if the initiating failure had been catastrophic. The data collected on such system failures
tends to keep, at best, only qualitative records of the nature of the initiating event (National
Grid, 2009a), so a quantitative comparison of shocks and subsequent blackouts is not likely to
be possible.
These resilience attributes, therefore, should not be viewed as quantities that might be measured
directly from an electricity system’s operational data. Rather, they allow us to elucidate the key
features we require of a resilient system. Nonetheless, exploring these dimensions of resilience
allows us to identify resilience indicators that can provide a proxy measure of system resilience.
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3.8 Quantitative Electricity System Indicators
Research concerning the concept of ‘resilience’ is particularly suited to the ‘indicator’ approach.
‘Resilience’, like its parent concept of ‘energy security’, is not universally deﬁned, and has a
number of attributes. Attempting to talk in general terms about ‘resilience’ without disentan-
gling these attributes runs the risk of introducing unnecessary ambiguities. In particular, policy
decisions may increase a system’s resilience in one dimension while decreasing it in another; by
assessing each of these dimensions individually, such conﬂicting policy outcomes can more readily
be seen.
Whilst all the interpretations of ‘resilience’ discussed in this chapter should be considered when
deciding how to change the operation and regulation of an electricity system, it is also useful to
select a subset of these that can be deﬁned quantitatively.
The resilience indicators that have been considered for this research can be divided into two
categories, which draw on the wider resilience literature cited in chapter 3. The indicators
provide either:
(a) passive resilience: providing a buﬀer against a disturbance
(b) active resilience: enabling the system to respond to a disturbance
Figure 3.3 summarises these indicators and shows how they ﬁt into the passive and active re-
silience groupings. Each of these indicators is discussed below, but as an explanatory point it
should be noted that system diversity is shown as both a passive and an active resilience at-
tribute. Diversity minimises the risk of common-mode failures, thereby building in some passive
resilience, but it also increases the range of options available to mitigate a disturbance actively.
It acts both as a buﬀer and a response mechanism and therefore can be thought of as belonging
in both categories.
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Figure 3.3: Active and Passive Resilience Indicators
The following sections introduce the four quantitative indicators that are to be investigated
more fully in Part II, namely generation system margins, generator diversity, energy intensity
and energy independence. As the discussion from this chapter illustrates, there are many diﬀerent
aspects of ‘resilience’ that should be considered when assessing an energy system. These have
the advantage of being quantitative, measurable and widely recorded in a number of countries
over a number of years. They also encapsulate not only the more traditional measures of energy
security, but also the less risk-based measures that emerge from considering the resilience of the
system to unforeseen changes.
3.8.1 Generation System Margin
‘Generation system margin’ is the level of generation capacity available on the system in addition
to that required to meet the expected peak power demand in a given year (Gross et al., 2006).
An electricity system with an expected peak demand of 60 GW and an installed capacity of 75
GW would therefore have a system margin of 25%.
The requirement for system margin can be assessed statistically, taking into account factors such
as generation plant reliability and demand prediction error (Gross et al., 2006; Ilex Consulting,
2002). A common measure of reliability is the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP), which expresses
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how likely it is that a load will need to be shed (forced to disconnect from the system) because
insuﬃcient generation is present (Gross et al., 2006). LOLP can be thought of as having two
components:
• The reliability of the generators on the system
• The generating margin available if a generator fails
Thinking about LOLP in this way shows that the expected availability of electricity for the
end-consumer is a function of both the probability of a reliability-type failure and the ability
of the other generators to respond to such a failure, or to respond ‘resiliently’. Increasing the
system margin (all other things being equal) increases the resilience of the electricity system, as
it decreases the impact of a given amount of generation being disconnected unexpectedly from
the system.
At any one time, the power being generated will be matched to the instantaneous demand;
the spare capacity, therefore, only improves system resilience if it is able to be brought online
quickly enough to mitigate the deﬁcit without there being energy unserved on the system. An
instantaneous resilience indicator, therefore, is the operating margin, which is a measure of the
additional capacity available over a seconds-to-minutes timescale. This operating margin, how-
ever, is a function of the longer-term system margin, along with the economic incentives on the
diﬀerent generators to produce electricity at any given moment.
3.8.2 Generator Diversity
One indicator of resilience has been shown to be diversity, which, according to Grubb et al.
(2006), provides resilience against risk, uncertainty and ignorance. Diversity can be subdivided
into properties of variety, balance and disparity (Jansen et al., 2004) referring, respectively, to
the number of diﬀerent elements in a system, their relative contribution and a measure of how
diﬀerent they are from each other. Variety and balance have been widely adopted as measures
of diversity, and indices, such as the Shannon-Weiner index (Stirling, 1998), have been devised
to compare the diversity of diﬀerent systems.
A system with a large number of disparate technologies makes a system resilient for a number of
reasons. First, if the generation mix runs on a number of diﬀerent fuels, an adverse event cutting
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oﬀ the supply of one of these fuels is unlikely to aﬀect all generators. Second, any adverse-event
that is technology-speciﬁc (such as droughts forcing certain generators to shut down as a result
of a lack of coolant) is minimised if the aﬀected technology represents only a small proportion of
the overall technology mix.
3.8.3 Energy Intensity
It is not immediately apparent that energy intensity should be considered a direct indicator of
resilience, whether considered in terms of kWh/GDP/year or kWh/capita/year. The impact
of a change of energy intensity on the electricity system depends to a signiﬁcant extent on the
response of the supply side to that change. The initial impact of a reduction in the demand for
electricity, as has been seen since the recent recession, is to increase the margin on the system.
This eﬀect, however, is already captured by the system margin indicator. What is less clear is how
future supply investment would respond to this change. If investment dropped in anticipation
of future demand reductions, the net eﬀect on resilience in the medium term could be neutral or
even detrimental.
There are three reasons in favour of the inclusion of some measure of energy demand or energy
intensity in the deﬁnition of a resilient system.
1. Regardless of the impact of the indicator on the resilience of the electricity system itself,
the resilience of the wider economy to a disruption in electricity supply is aﬀected by
the reliance that economy has on electricity use. As a UKERC working paper puts it,
“. . .measures to reduce vulnerability include reducing energy demand to minimise the
economic impacts of supply interruption or price ﬂuctuations” (Chaudry et al., 2009)
2. Similarly, if we think of resilience in terms of energy services, rather than electricity provi-
sion, there are grounds for including this indicator. Switching from tungsten bulbs to CFLs,
say, does not change our demand for energy services. If all the technology currently in use
were to be given an energy eﬃciency overhaul overnight, the economic value of the energy
service (lighting, communication, computation, etc.) remains unchanged. So if there were a
power cut, the economic impact would be the same in both the high eﬃciency and low eﬃ-
ciency scenarios. Improving the energy eﬃciency of electrical technologies would, however,
reduce the running costs. Designing commercial buildings to maximise natural lighting,
for instance, improves the resilience of the lighting system, as some economic productivity
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could continue in the event of a power cut. An analogous example in space heating would
be installing cavity wall insulation. If there is an interruption to gas supply in the middle
of winter, a well-insulated home will emit heat at a lower rate, providing the occupants
with acceptable warmth for longer than in a poorly insulated home (perhaps to the extent
that they dont even notice the supply interruption).
3. The third reason for including some measure of demand reduction is because of the demon-
strable link between long-term conservation eﬀorts and the short-term Demand Side Man-
agement (DSM) eﬀorts that a number of countries have had to employ to cope with capacity
or fuel shortages. The Energy Market Reform report DECC (2010a) explicitly discusses
the need to make full use of such measures. If the international experience provides ev-
idence that DSM eﬀectiveness is associated with general conversation eﬀorts, this should
be included as an indicator.
3.8.4 Energy Independence
One of the advantages about discussing resilience rather than energy security is that the latter
(depending on one’s deﬁnition) often focuses on the geopolitical risks associated with importing
fuel. A resilience analysis, by contrast, makes no attempt to quantify such risks, as it is concerned
with the response of the domestic system response to a disturbance, regardless of the source from
which that disturbance originated.
Nonetheless, the systematic review showed a strong link between concepts of resilience and those
of ‘self-suﬃciency’. It is argues that a system with little reliance on events outside its sphere of
inﬂuence is more secure. The increasing globalisation of energy makes this assessment somewhat
crude. The interconnection of electricity supplies between Great Britain, Ireland and mainland
Europe, for example, provides beneﬁts to the security of the UK electricity system. The domestic
generation of renewable energy, by contrast, would reduce the impact of consumers of a rapid
increase in global gas or coal prices.
The relationship between energy independence and resilience, therefore, is not a simple one.
Rather than amalgamating diﬀerent aspects of self-suﬃciency into a single indicator, therefore,
this chapter keeps these measures separate:
• Interconnection of the electricity grid between countries provides a means of sharing spare
capacity, and, depending on the trading arrangements in place, can be treated as such.
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• Reliance of the generating mix on non-indigenous fuels can be a problem for an electricity
system. In terms of ﬁnding an appropriate indicator for this, such a measure needs to
account for the reliance on a given fuel and the proportion of that fuel that needs to be
imported into a country. The self-suﬃciency indicator chosen to show this relationship is
as follows:
IDI =
1
T
(
CgIg
Pg + Ig
+
CcIc
Pc + Ic
+
CoIo
Po + Io
)
(3.8.1)
where C is the installed capacity, I is the imported fuel and P is the amount of fuel
produced indigenously; g, c and o refer to gas, coal and oil, respectively, and T is the total
installed capacity in a given country.
Part II
Evidence Gathering and Analysis
4
Implementing the statistical analysis
This part of the thesis (chapters 4–8) is concerned with the impact of privatisation, liberalisation
and regulatory change on each of the resilience indicators described in chapter 3. Speciﬁcally,
it details the collection and analysis of the data relating to these resilience indicators. For
each indicator, the method of obtaining and cleaning the data is described and justiﬁed. The
statistical analysis laid out in chapter 2 is described for each indicator, and the results obtained
are described.
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4.1 The data
The data used in these analyses come from three sources; the ﬁrst two providing explanatory
variables and the third providing outcome variables:
1. OECD International Regulation Database (OECD, 2009). This contains annual data from
1960 onwards for 30 OECD countries (namely, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States). It records each country’s response to the following questions;
• How are the terms and conditions of third party access (TPA) to the electricity trans-
mission grid determined?
• Is there a liberalised wholesale market for electricity (a wholesale pool)?
• What is the minimum consumption threshold that consumers must exceed in order
to be able to choose their electricity supplier?
• What is the ownership structure of the largest companies in the generation, transmis-
sion, distribution, and supply segments of the electricity industry?
• What is the degree of vertical separation between the transmission and generation
segments of the electricity industry?
• What is the overall degree of vertical integration in the electricity industry?
2. Eurostat database of annual data from 2000 for 28 EU nations, giving the market share of
largest electricity generator
3. IEA Databases on Energy via the Economic and Social Data Service (ESDS), which con-
tains the following time-series data on the same OECD countries:
• Macro-economic data: GDP, population
• Annual electricity consumption: total, per unit and per capita
• Electricity capacity: total and disaggregated by fuel type
• Peak load and capacity-at-peak
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• Price data: electricity price for industry and households; gas and coal prices for
electricity generators
In the following chapters, the impacts of diﬀerent aspects of liberalisation and regulation are
studied with respect to their eﬀects on diﬀerent resilience indicators. By way of an example,
the method is described in detail for the example of generation diversity (as measured by the
Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index, or HHI).
In order to understand the relationship between the outcome variables and the diﬀerent aspects
of privatisation, liberalisation and regulation, a number of diﬀerent statistical approaches can be
taken. In order to explain the rationale behind the statistical method adopted for this analysis,
we begin by looking at the relationship between HHI and a binary variable that deﬁnes whether
or not, in a given year, a country has established a wholesale market, or electricity pool. This
explanatory variable comes from the OECD International Regulation database, and records a
‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the following question:
Is there a liberalised wholesale market for electricity (a wholesale pool)?
As an illustration, the HHI series for each country can be shown on a single plot, as shown in
Figure 4.1, which represents the HHI for the 30 OECD countries between 1960 and 2007. HHI
before privatisation is represented by a solid line and after privatisation by a dashed line. The
yellow line representing data from the U.K. is identiﬁed. A more detailed plot for each country’s
resilience indicators is provided within each of the relevant chapters (4-8).
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of HHI by country
4.2 A simple approach: a separate between-country analysis for each year
The simplest approach to analysing these data is to take each year separately (or to choose one
particular year of interest) and perform a two-sample t-test comparing the mean of HHI in the
countries that have a wholesale market / electricity pool (by that year) versus those that have
not. This gives us an estimate of the diﬀerence in means (post – pre), with a positive diﬀerence
indicating a higher mean HHI among countries with a pool. Clearly, this comparison can only
be made in years when at least one country has established an electricity pool, and thus this
analysis ignores all data before 1990 (when the UK’s pool was established).
The standard two-sample t-test gives a two-sided p-value for the hypothesis that the true un-
derlying diﬀerence in HHI between the two groups is zero, based on the assumption that HHI
is normally distributed, and that the variance of HHI is the same in both groups. Under these
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assumptions, the lower the p-value, the greater the evidence against this hypothesis. A high
p-value can arise either when the hypothesis of no diﬀerence is true, or when the analysis lacks
the necessary power to detect the diﬀerence; the smaller the sample size, and the smaller the
true (absolute) magnitude of the diﬀerence, the lower the power.
As well as obtaining the p-value, we can estimate the standard error of the diﬀerence in the two
means, and thus a 95% conﬁdence interval for this diﬀerence.
4.2.1 Results
The diﬀerence in mean HHI between the groups with and without the wholesale market and
the corresponding p-values, obtained from the two-sample t-tests, are shown in Table 4.1. Note
the numbers of countries in each group for each year shown in the 2nd and 3rd columns. For
example, the comparison in 1990 involves only one privatised country (the UK) versus 26 others.
We also note that none of the p-values is less than 0.1, and thus there is insuﬃcient evidence
from this analysis to conclude that there is a diﬀerence in mean HHI between the two groups in
any of the 18 years considered. The diﬀerences and their 95% CIs are shown in Figure 4.2; we
note that there appears to be a slight downward trend in this diﬀerence over time.
4.2.2 Limitations of this approach
In terms of this particular application of this approach, there are clearly limitations, particularly
towards the beginning and end of the 18-year period considered, due to the small number of
countries in one or other of the groups. Indeed, a maximum total N of 28 is in any case too
low for these tests to have suﬃcient power to detect a diﬀerence of realistic magnitude. More
generally, however, even if we had data on more countries, the approach remains highly limited.
First, there is the problem of how to interpret the p-values when 18 separate tests have been
carried out. Furthermore, even if we were able to interpret the results and make a reliable
statement about the comparison of the mean HHI in the two groups over the 18 years in question,
this statement would shed very little light on our question of interest. We are interested in
whether or not establishing a wholesale market causes a change in a country’s HHI, and a na¨ıve
analysis of the crude diﬀerences between privatised and non-privatised countries in any given
year cannot plausibly address this. We expect countries to have characteristics that mean that
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Table 4.1: Two-sided p-values from a series of two-sample t-tests, comparing the mean HHI in privatised and
unprivatised countries for each year from 1990 to 2007.
No. of countries Diﬀerence
Year post- pre- in means p-values
privatisation privatisation (post – pre)
1990 1 26 −0.115 0.638
1991 2 25 0.240 0.166
1992 2 25 0.230 0.188
1993 2 25 0.209 0.240
1994 2 26 0.223 0.204
1995 2 26 0.221 0.210
1996 5 23 0.060 0.621
1997 5 23 0.043 0.721
1998 6 22 0.008 0.940
1999 9 18 −0.024 0.811
2000 11 15 −0.034 0.734
2001 12 15 −0.060 0.540
2002 12 13 −0.025 0.784
2003 13 11 −0.031 0.744
2004 15 10 −0.066 0.471
2005 17 8 −0.041 0.662
2006 16 8 −0.031 0.745
2007 17 6 −0.122 0.243
their HHI diﬀers from that of other countries, irrespective of privatisation or liberalisation. This
is evident from Figure 4.1, where countries start and tend to remain at diﬀerent levels, with
relatively few lines “crossing”. Thus, by making comparisons across countries in this simple
approach, we are likely to fall into the trap of “comparing apples with oranges”. If, in 2007, we
could conclude that mean HHI is lower for privatised countries, this would not necessarily be
due to the eﬀect of privatisation; it could be that the two groups are inherently diﬀerent in other
ways, with these diﬀerences aﬀecting both the propensity to privatise and the mean HHI.
Also, the comparison pertains to diﬀerent countries at diﬀerent times. Thus, the apparent
downward trend seen in Figure 4.2 is – rather than indicating that the eﬀect of privatisation on
HHI changes over time – just as compatible with the explanation that, over time, more of the
countries with a relatively low HHI are becoming privatised. Indeed, it can be seen in Figure
4.1, that one of the countries with a very high HHI throughout forms an electricity pool early
(in 1991). This country is Norway. If we repeat this simple approach excluding Norway, we see
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quite a diﬀerent picture, as is shown in Figure 4.3. When an analysis is clearly highly inﬂuenced
by one country, it is unwise to draw any ﬁrm conclusions.
Figure 4.2: The diﬀerence in mean HHI between the two groups (privatised and unprivatised), and its 95%
conﬁdence interval, calculated separately for each year.
A between-country analysis such as this one is highly limited given that the causal question of
interest looks inherently within-country. In other words, the causal eﬀect of privatisation on HHI
is concerned with what would have happened to HHI in the UK, say, if, contrary to fact, the UK
had not privatised in 1990; and similarly for the other countries. There is an implicit assumption
here that “all other factors (not aﬀected by privatisation) should remain constant” across the
two worlds that we wish to compare (the world in which the UK privatises in 1990, and the world
in which it doesn’t). Comparing diﬀerent countries constitutes a very poor attempt at keeping
“all other factors constant”. Given that we have data on countries before and after privatisation,
the obvious next step would be to incorporate this feature into the analysis.
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Figure 4.3: Identical to Figure 4.2, but excluding Norway.
4.3 Another simple approach: looking within countries at the point of
privatisation
The simplest approach to comparing HHI in countries before and after privatisation is to discard
all data except for those arising immediately before and immediately after privatisation. Then, a
paired t-test comparing HHI pre- and post-privatisation can be made. This comparison is based
entirely on the within-country diﬀerences in HHI before and after privatisation, and thus does
not suﬀer from the “comparing apples and oranges” problem described above.
4.3.1 Results
Table 4.2 shows the 20 countries contributing to this analysis, together with the HHI directly
before and after privatisation for these countries. A paired t-test gave a mean diﬀerence (post –
pre) of -0.006, with a two-sided p-value of 0.129. Again, this provides little evidence against the
null hypothesis of no diﬀerence.
4 IMPLEMENTING THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 122
4.3.2 Limitations of this approach
In carrying out this particular within-country analysis, we have used less than 5% of the collected
data on HHI, and thus we are clearly not using the data to their full capacity. Also, we have
looked only for a step change in HHI at the point of privatisation, and this is unlikely to capture
the more complex and long-term nature of any potential impact of privatisation.
Table 4.2: The data for the countries contributing to this analysis.
HHI
Country Pre-privatisation Post-privatisation
Australia 0.456 0.459
Austria 0.499 0.49
Czech Republic 0.545 0.546
Denmark 0.434 0.358
Finland 0.202 0.202
Germany 0.166 0.153
Greece 0.271 0.257
Hungary 0.328 0.32
Ireland 0.169 0.168
Italy 0.195 0.198
Japan 0.177 0.172
Luxembourg 0.632 0.632
Netherlands 0.344 0.35
New Zealand 0.501 0.508
Norway 0.993 0.993
Portugal 0.29 0.286
Spain 0.243 0.236
Turkey 0.302 0.287
United Kingdom 0.323 0.324
United States 0.217 0.223
4.4 A more sophisticated approach: panel data analysis
4.4.1 Fixed eﬀects model
We now turn to an approach which has been advocated for use in this and other similar settings
(Allison, 2005), which is somewhat more principled than the approaches discussed thus far and
4 IMPLEMENTING THE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 123
uses all collected data on HHI.
Let Yij be the value of HHI in country i in year j and let Xij be a dummy indicator taking the
value 1 if country i’s electricity system is privatised in year j and 0 otherwise. We propose the
following model:
Yij = αi + βj + γXij + εij (4.4.1)
where {αi : i = 1, . . . , 30}, {βj : j = 1961, . . . , 2007} and γ are ﬁxed parameters to be estimated,
β1960 is set to 0, and {εij : i = 1, . . . , 30; j = 1960, . . . , 2007} are independent identically dis-
tributed normal random variables with mean 0 and variance σ2, where σ2 is also a ﬁxed parameter
to be estimated.
γ is our parameter of interest, since it represents the eﬀect of privatisation on HHI, controlling
for country and year. The fact that a separate parameter is ﬁtted for each year (as opposed to,
say, one parameter for the intercept and one for the slope) means that no assumption is being
made about the way HHI evolves over time. However, the fact that the model does not include a
diﬀerent parameter for each country in each year (ie there is no interaction between country and
year in our model) means that we assume that (apart from the eﬀect of privatisation and random
ﬂuctuation), the evolution of HHI over time is the same in each country. Indeed, if we speciﬁed
a separate parameter for each country in each year, this model would ﬁt the data perfectly and
there would be no way of estimating the parameter of interest, γ.
Results
This analysis gives an estimate for γ of -0.029, and the p-value from a Wald test for the null
hypothesis that γ=0 (i.e. no eﬀect of privatisation) is < 0.001. That is, this analysis points
towards there being strong evidence against the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence due to privatisa-
tion, with privatisation leading to to an average drop of 0.029 in HHI. First, of course, we note
that -0.029, irrespective of its statistical signiﬁcance, is not a substantively large change in HHI.
Furthermore, there are strong reasons to believe that the assumptions made by this analysis are
not plausible, as we discuss in the next section.
Are the assumptions made by this model plausible?
One way of assessing the plausibility of the assumptions made is to compare the observed values
of HHI with the corresponding ﬁtted ones (i.e. those predicted by the model). A country with a
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reasonably good ﬁt, is Poland (shown in Figure 4.4), whereas the ﬁt for Denmark is particularly
bad (see Figure 4.5).
Figure 4.4: The observed and ﬁtted proﬁles for Poland (which remained nationalised throughout).
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Figure 4.5: The observed and ﬁtted proﬁles for Denmark (which privatised in 1996).
The ﬁrst issue raised by these plots is clearly the plausibility of the assumption that there is no
year-by-country interaction, i.e. that the yearly changes in HHI are the same across countries.
In other words, it seems as if the shape of the trajectory for Denmark is quite diﬀerent from
Poland’s, and that this diﬀerence in shape is not explained by a diﬀerence in privatisation
indicator. Furthermore, even for Poland, where the ﬁt is good (i.e. where the ﬁtted trajectory
is close to the observed trajectory), the assumption that the residuals (i.e. the deviations of the
actual trajectory from the ﬁtted trajectory) are independent does not seem to be satisﬁed. As
we would expect, there is strong correlation in time, with residuals close together in time more
similar than those further apart (this is often called auto-correlation). To conﬁrm that this is
the case, we looked at the pairwise correlations between estimated residuals. Table 4.3 gives
these for the years 1990-1995. If the assumption of independent residuals were true, we would
expect to see correlations close to zero for all oﬀ-diagonal elements of this matrix. Clearly, this
assumption is seriously violated by these data. This is often the case in longitudinal data such
as these, and a method that acknowledges this auto-correlation is needed.
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Table 4.3: The pairwise correlations between the estimated residuals in the years 1990-1995.
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
1990 1 0.98 0.96 0.86 0.79 0.61
1991 0.98 1 0.98 0.88 0.82 0.67
1992 0.96 0.98 1 0.92 0.87 0.73
1993 0.86 0.88 0.92 1 0.94 0.83
1994 0.79 0.82 0.87 0.94 1 0.95
1995 0.61 0.67 0.73 0.83 0.95 1
4.4.2 Mixed eﬀects model
Our next aim is to relax the assumption that the residuals, εij, in equation 4.4.1 are independent.
In order to do so, and in order for the model parameters to remain identiﬁable, we must make
one additional assumption, that the country-level parameters {αi : i = 1, . . . , 30} in equation
4.4.1 come from a normal distribution with some mean and variance to be estimated from the
data. The country eﬀect is then called a random eﬀect and the model is now a mixed eﬀects
model since it includes both ﬁxed and random eﬀects. The plausibility of this assumption will be
considered later, but the advantage of making such an assumption is that information can now
be shared across countries, gaining statistical power. The mixed eﬀects model can be thought of
as the principled way of combining between- and within-country comparisons (Rabe-Hesketh and
Skrondal, 2008). It also allows us to ﬁt a diﬀerent structure to the residuals (εij), and the one we
consider is auto-regressive level 1. This assumes that the correlation between εij and εij is given
by ρ|j−k|, where ρ is to be estimated from the data. This means that the correlation between
two observations from the same country decreases as the time between those two observations
increases.
Results
This analysis gives an estimate for γ of -0.0009, and the p-value from a Wald test for the null
hypothesis that γ=0 (i.e. no eﬀect of privatisation) is 0.867. That is, this analysis points towards
there being very little evidence against the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence due to privatisation, in
contrast with what was found from the ﬁxed eﬀects model. This is consistent with the violation
of the independence assumption discussed for the ﬁxed eﬀects model. If observations are assumed
to be independent when they are not, this results in an overestimation of precision (i.e. it is as if
we pretend to have more information than we really have) and this leads to exaggerated claims
of statistical signiﬁcance. When the dependence in the data is acknowledged, we expect the
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signiﬁcance to decrease. However, there are still plausibility issues concerning the assumptions
made by this model, as we discuss in the next section.
Are the assumptions made by this model plausible?
First, although we have relaxed the assumption that the residuals are independent, we are still
making the assumption that the trajectories diﬀer only by a constant between countries. Ideally,
we would relax this assumption by allowing the {βj : j = 1961, . . . , 2007} parameters to diﬀer by
country, using further random eﬀects. However, we have insuﬃcient data for such a model to be
identiﬁable using these limited data.
We must also assess the plausibility of the normal assumption for the random country eﬀects.
This can be done using a quantile plot, in which the quantiles of the observed distribution of
the random eﬀect is plotted against the quantiles of the normal distribution with the same mean
and variance. If the normality assumption holds, the plot should be a straight line at 45 degrees.
This plot is shown in Figure 4.6. The plot shows some departure from the normality assumption,
with the “cup” shape indicating some skewness in the distribution of the random eﬀects.
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Figure 4.6: The Qnorm plot for the country-level random eﬀects
Finally, we should assess the plausibility of our auto-regressive level 1 (AR1) assumption for
the correlation structure of the residuals. A likelihood ratio test comparing this model with
one in which an AR2 structure is instead ﬁtted shows borderline improvement (p=0.05) in the
ﬁt of AR2 compared with AR1, suggesting that this should be considered as a superior model.
However, there was very little change in the estimate of γ nor the associated p-value between
the two models.
5
Generation System Margins
This chapter addresses the ﬁrst of the resilience indicators described above: ‘generation system
margins’. ‘System margin’ is the level of generation capacity available on the system in addition
to that required to meet the expected peak power demand in a given year. The purpose of this
chapter is to review the evidence available on the UK electricity system margin, to ask what
level of margin is ‘acceptable’ for resilient system function, and to understand the diﬃculties
associated with forecasting system evolution under the UK market structure.
The requirement for system margin can be assessed statistically, taking into account factors such
as generation plant reliability and demand prediction error (Gross et al., 2006; Ilex Consulting,
2002). A common measure of reliability is the Loss of Load Probability (LOLP), which “expresses
how likely it is that a load will need to be shed (forced to disconnect from the system) because
insuﬃcient generation is present. This is expressed as a percentage that is the number of years per
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century in which load shedding will occur.” Historically, under the pre-privatisation centrally
planned system, the UK’s LOLP was planned to remain below 9%, which corresponded to a
system margin of around 20%. Post-privatisation, no explicit LOLP target is set, so the market
is expected to ﬁnd the appropriate level of system security. An indicative system margin of 20%
is, however, still used by the British TSO, National Grid (Gross et al., 2007b).
If there is insuﬃcient generation capacity installed or operational on an electricity system, the
occurrence of an adverse event is more likely to result in electricity demand not being met.
Capacity shortages can occur as a result of under-investment in new generation capacity, un-
expectedly high demand for electricity, or unexpectedly high levels of plant unavailability, for
example as a result of a ‘common mode’ fault aﬀecting several power stations simultaneously.
A number of authors have expressed concern that in the coming decade the system margin will
erode to such a level that electricity supply system will be at risk of being unable to meet de-
mand in the event of a demand surge or a generator failure (Brinckerhoﬀ, 2007; BWEA, 2007;
Lodge, 2008; Logica, 2006). Such concerns have been driven largely by the expected closure of
a number of coal-ﬁred and nuclear power stations (BERR, 2007b), and uncertainty surrounding
the eﬀectiveness of the UK’s liberalised market in delivering timely investment (BERR, 2007b;
Redpoint, 2007). Such warnings form the basis of claims, respectively, for increased government
action, for reduced government meddling, and both for and against the construction of a new
generation of nuclear power stations (BERR, 2007a; EDF Energy, 2007; Greenpeace, 2008b,a;
Scott and Watson, 2006; WWF, 2006). The UK Government has frequently re-stated its position
that it is for the market to decide when to build new generating capacity (DTI, 2007). Notwith-
standing this, due to the strategic importance of energy supply, some argue that irrespective of
ownership arrangements, the ﬁnal responsibility for the provision of electricity ultimately lies
with the Government. As Walt Patterson puts it, “if the lights go out, the government is in the
front line, no matter who else may be nominally responsible” (Patterson, 2007).
Supply shortages have occurred on a number of occasions internationally, either as a result of
environmental or technical problems, or because of regulatory changes. For example, Norway’s
high dependence on hydroelectricity made it highly susceptible to the drought that occurred
in 2002 (IEA, 2005a); Tokyo suﬀered a capacity shortage in 2003 as security concerns resulted
in the closure of a number of nuclear power stations (ESMAP, 2005); California suﬀered high
electricity prices and blackouts as a result of a number of factors, including the impacts of partial
liberalisation, unexpected generator unavailability, a drought and a gas shortage (ESMAP, 2005;
IEA, 2005a). Such cases demonstrate the range of adverse events that can lead to a shortage of
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electricity provision.
The eﬀect of the liberalisation of energy markets on supply security has been subject of a wide
range of analyses (de Bruijne and van Eeten, 2007; DTI, 2006a; PIU, 2002; Select Committee
on EU, 2002). The House of Lords Select Committee on European Union concluded in 2002
that some risks can be identiﬁed and managed directly, but that “more commonly, the nature
and scale of the risks will be uncertain” (Select Committee on EU, 2002). To protect against
such uncertainty, the report suggests that “the main tools should be diversity, ﬂexibility and
availability of backup”. It expands on these terms as follows:
1. “diversity: of fuels, of the sources of those fuels, and of the transit routes, to avoid over-
dependence on any particular source;
2. ﬂexibility: so that the system can respond quickly to any disruption;
3. back-up: via the existence of stocks, alternative sources which can be expanded in an
emergency, and so on.” (Select Committee on EU, 2002)
5.1 Capacity Gap
A ‘capacity gap’ would arise if installed electricity generation capacity were not large enough
to meet peak electricity demands reliably. The terminology can diﬀer, but here the ‘installed
capacity’ refers to the sum total of the rated capacities of each operational generator that is
connected to the electricity grid (Gross et al., 2006). Power system engineers refer to the need
for a ‘system margin’ on an electricity system in order to ensure that standards of reliability can
be met. ‘System margin’ is the level of generation capacity available on the system in addition
to that required to meet the expected peak power demand in a given year (Gross et al., 2006).
The larger the system margin, the more able a system is to cope with a demand- or supply-side
shock. More accurately, the ability of a system to cope with short-term shocks is dependent on
its ‘operating margin’, which is a function of both the system margin and the proportion of that
spare capacity that can be brought online at the moment of the shock and within the required
timescale. This second component of resilient response depends on the contractual arrangements
for ancillary service provision, which is discussed elsewhere.
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5.1.1 Historic Trends
This research aims to determine the eﬀect of the UK’s liberalisation on the resilience of its
electricity system. The approach to be taken to answer this question relies on analysing the
historic time series data, such as that shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: UK Reserve Margins 1924 – 2007
As discussed in the Methodology section (Section 2), the above time series data is to be analysed
using multivariate statistical methods, drawing on the time series data from a number of diﬀerent
countries concurrently to maximise the probability of seeing any real eﬀect of liberalisation
on resilience. This will be conducted in a later chapter, but this statistical approach can be
supported by a review and synthesis of modelling work done for the UK electricity system that
attempts to predict future trends. In particular, much of this work has been done to investigate
the possibility of the UK experiencing a ‘capacity gap’, in which generation capacity becomes
inadequate to meet the future demand for electricity.
Crucially, the notion of an emerging ‘capacity gap’, and the associated decline in system resilience,
is inherently prospective, and is therefore subject to the potentially large uncertainty associated
with forecasting. In order to anticipate a capacity gap in a given period we need to be able to
estimate the expected peak electricity demand and the expected installed capacity available in
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that period. The following questions are addressed in the next three sections:
1. What is the expected change in demand between now and the period in question?
2. What is the expected closure of generation capacity between now and the period in question?
3. What is the expected level of new capacity construction between now and the period in
question?
5.1.2 Expected Change in Demand
National Grid’s Seven Year Statement for 2008 estimates that peak demand for electricity could
rise from 61 GW in 2007/08 to 67 GW by 2014/15 (National Grid, 2008a). Analysis by in-
dependent consultants (Redpoint, 2007), which informed the UK Government’s 2007 Energy
White Paper, anticipates demand for electricity to be between 69 GW (“base case”) and 73
GW (“challenging case”) in 2015. By 2020 this is forecast to increase to 73 GW and 77 GW,
respectively. The use of such projections in scenario building disguises to some extent the degree
of uncertainty involved. A distribution of possible future demand levels is given by the BERR
Energy Markets Outlook report (BERR, 2007b), shown in Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.2: Forecast of future peak demand on the UK electricity system
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Figure 5.2 is consistent with both National Grid and Redpoint estimates, but it indicates that
future demand is uncertain, and that projections lie within a considerable range. Crucially, the
Energy Market Outlook notes that the highest levels of demand shown would only occur if all the
relevant factors (e.g. low fuel prices, high energy intensity, low uptake of eﬃcient technologies)
converged to drive demand up and nothing was serving to suppress demand. “In practice,” the
report argues, “these variables are not mutually exclusive and it is unlikely that they would all
combine to push electricity demand in one direction” (BERR, 2007b). Short-term trends should
only be used tentatively to make long-term forecasts. For example the economic downturn
that began in 2008 is not factored into any of the above forecasts and economic factors have a
signiﬁcant impact on demand growth. Similarly, any new policies developed in response to the
proposed EU Climate and Energy Directive (Commission of the European Communities, 2008)
have yet to be factored into the above projections.
The forecasts provided by National Grid are “unrestricted”, “[taking] no account of demand
response/management by customers” (National Grid, 2008a). This conservative forecasting
method is adopted because “demand response/management by customers cannot be fully re-
lied upon to be enacted at peak times” (National Grid, 2008a). Currently, only very large
energy consumers hold contracts with the National Grid for demand-side management (DSM).
Control and communication technologies are beginning to emerge, however, that could make
DSM technically and economically feasible for smaller-scale consumers, perhaps even down to
the level of individual households. For example, smart meters, in their most sophisticated form,
could be used to disconnect certain domestic appliances at times of constrained supply; this has
been proposed in South Africa (Department of Minerals and Energy, 2008).
5.1.3 Expected Generator Closure
A number of power stations are set to close in the coming decade. The majority of these are
either nuclear power stations that have come to the end of their working life, or fossil ﬁred
power stations (coal and oil) that will not comply with the provisions of the latest phase of the
European Union Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) (National Grid, 2008a).
Non-LCPD-compliant coal- and oil-ﬁred power stations will have to shut down by the end of
2015, or after 20,000 hours of operation from 1st January 2008, whichever is sooner (BERR,
2007b). Nine power stations, totalling 12 GW of capacity, have opted out of the LCPD and
will have to close by 2015 (BERR, 2007b). This represents a reduction of 15% of the current
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generation capacity. A number of these plants may close prior to 2015. BERR estimates that 2
GW of capacity will have shut down by 2012, and a total of 6 GW may have left the system by
the end of 2013 (BERR, 2007b).
A number of nuclear power stations are scheduled to close as they reach the end of their operating
lives. The Energy Markets Outlook report estimates that 6.3 GW of nuclear capacity will be
retired by 2014, rising to 7.4 GW by 2020 (BERR, 2007b). However, in December 2007 British
Energy announced that it would be extending the lives of their Hinkley Point B and Hunterston
B power stations by ﬁve years (British Energy, 2007). This would defer the loss of 2.5 GW
of nuclear capacity from 2011 to 2016. The largest loss to be expected from nuclear closures
by 2015 is therefore 3.8 GW. British Energy also says it is planning to consider applying for
extensions for its other nuclear power stations, and may extend the lives of Hinkley Point B
and Hunterston B beyond 2016 if further studies show that it is feasible on technical, safety and
economic grounds (British Energy, 2007). A high price of electricity would encourage further
applications for lifetime extensions provided that any technical and safety requirement could be
met. This would suggest that 3.8 GW is a realistic estimate of an upper limit for 2015, and that
the reduction in nuclear capacity could be lower if further lifetime extensions are secured.
Other than the old nuclear and non-LCPD-compliant thermal plants, the rate of plant closure
is uncertain, and depends on a number of factors. National Grid notes that six months’ notice
must be given before a power plant can decommission (National Grid, 2008a). It also says that
such notices are not irreversible. Over the next ten years, therefore, generators can either be
decommissioned or mothballed, allowing for reversal should the economic or political incentives
change. These decisions will be based on the price of electricity, the price of fuel, the price of
carbon and constraints imposed by policy decisions.
5.1.4 Expected Capacity Additions
The uncertainty surrounding the addition of new capacity following the closure of old or non-
LCPD-compliant plant is central to the question of how the UK’s liberalisation is expected
to aﬀect capacity margins. In a system where generation capacity is constructed in response
to market forces, a reduction in capacity system margins (whether actual or anticipated) may
be necessary to provide the price signals that lead investors to build more generators. In a
perfectly-functioning market, these oscillations in capacity would be small. In reality, however,
larger oscillations are typical because a variety of market imperfections lead investors to delay
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investment, and indeed encourage periods when new plants are built in large numbers (Gross
et al., 2007a; White, 2006). The ‘lumpiness’ of investment in electricity generation is one reason
for this, contributing to more extreme oscillations than would be the case if new plant could be
provided in smaller units. Even if such oscillations in capacity construction are ‘natural’ under
market driven conditions, the periods of constrained margins that have the potential to emerge
from these conditions are at the heart of concerns about a ‘capacity gap’.
BERR states that fourteen new conventional power stations amounting to 14 GW of capacity have
been announced, the majority of which are Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) generators
(BERR, 2007b). Of this 14 GW, 7.5 GW has received Section 36 approval, and 4.5 GW of this is
at, or near, the construction phase.∗ Of the remainder, some might not go to completion due to
local opposition or because of restrictions imposed by the grid operator. Because the decision to
build new capacity is based on expectations about generators’ future proﬁtability, which in turn
depends on a number of uncertain factors (e.g. supply-demand balance, capital costs, fuel costs,
government policy), the “type and total amount of new build could outturn higher or lower”
(BERR, 2007b).
The National Grid forecast includes all types of large-scale generation, and oﬀers a range of
values under diﬀerent assumptions. Including only those units that currently exist or are under
construction, National Grid estimates that 5.2 GW of new capacity would be built by 2014/15. If
it uses as a guide those plants that have consent, this forecast rises to 6.5 GW by 2014/15. These
estimates ignore the likely addition of new generation that has yet to apply for grid connection.
It does, however, also ignore the possibility that plants under construction or holding planning
and connection permission may not go to completion.
There is an important point of interpretation here: the Seven Year Statement (SYS) provided
by National Grid is not a prediction of the future. The company states that “none of the plant
margins presented. . . is intended to represent our forecast or prediction of the future position.”
Rather, the SYS is intended to provide a signal to the market to facilitate investment in new
generation. Crucially, it makes no assumptions about the ability of the market to deliver this
new generation in a timely manner.
One signiﬁcant source of uncertainty surrounding the UK electricity generation mix is the contri-
bution that nuclear power could make. A range of estimates exist for the length of time required
∗Section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 is the legislative provision under which the Secretary of State grants
development consents for generating stations above 50 MW, and is used by National Grid as one indicator of new
capacity additions.
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to build a new nuclear power station (BERR, 2007a). The UK government has expressed its
support for new nuclear, and has introduced provisions intended to facilitate the process for
investors (House of Lords, 2008). Even so, the government does not expect construction of
new nuclear power stations to begin until 2013 at the earliest, with the ﬁrst plant becoming
operational between 2017 and 2020 (BERR, 2007a).
The cost of a new nuclear programme is similarly faced with a large amount of uncertainty, and
in particular the cost of construction and decommissioning. The government has stated that it
will not oﬀer ﬁnancial support (BERR, 2008a), so a new nuclear programme must be wholly
privately funded. There have been suggestions that a number of power companies are willing to
make such an investment (British Energy, 2008), but to date no new nuclear projects have been
announced
Interconnectors may be able to provide the UK with power that complements indigenous gen-
eration during peak periods. The England-France Interconnector has a capacity of 2,000 MW
and has had an availability of 97%. The Moyle interconnector has a capacity of 500 MW, but
is mainly used to export electricity from Scotland to Northern Ireland, and is therefore unlikely
to contribute to meeting peak electricity demand on the British mainland (BERR, 2007b). In
addition to these, two more interconnectors are planned: the EirGrid 500 MW Britain-Ireland
interconnector has planning permission and grid access rights, and is expected to be operational
by 2012 (EirGrid, 2008); the BritNed interconnector between Britain and the Netherlands will
have a capacity of 1000 MW and is expected to be operational by 2010 (National Grid, 2008b).
These interconnectors are not strictly deﬁned as generation, but they nonetheless have the po-
tential to deliver up to 3.5 GW of electrical power during peak periods, provided other European
transmission operators are able and willing to export electricity to the UK at that time.
5.1.5 Forecasting a ‘Capacity Gap’
The uncertainties surrounding estimates of future demand, plant closure rates, and the rate at
which new capacity will be added to the system result in a range of projected system margins. UK
peak demand in 2007 was 61 GW and forecasts for 2015 range from 57 GW (4 GW reduction)
to 73 GW (12 GW increase). 12 GW of coal plant is expected to close by 2015, as well as
approximately 4 GW of nuclear plant (depending on life extension plans). The combined eﬀect
of changing demand and plant closures puts the new capacity required to maintain existing
margins between 12 GW and 28 GW. This large range demonstrates the diﬃculty in making
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such forecasts.
The forecast for capacity additions is similarly uncertain. The range for additions runs from
around 7 GW, if the new interconnectors are built but only those power stations currently under
construction are ultimately built, to around 15 GW if the new interconnectors are built and
all existing power station applications result in completed projects. The range could be larger,
since construction projects can be halted, and additional power stations could be applied for,
approved and constructed by 2015.
However, using the ranges given above, the current system margin of 19 GW could drop to minus
2 GW, or it could rise to 22 GW. It is important to stress that the margin is unlikely to reach
either of these outermost values. As the 2007 Energy Markets Outlook report observes, “the
theoretical range of possible future eﬀective capacity margins is very wide [but] we are unlikely
to see such a wide range. . . because the supply of and demand for electricity. . . are related to
each other through price” (BERR, 2007b).
It is of limited value, therefore, to look at forecasts of demand, plant closures and capacity
additions in isolation. Instead, an integrated approach is needed, that can take into account the
eﬀect of these factors on each other. It is important to note that scenarios are not forecasts,
rather they are self-consistent descriptions of the future that allow the implications of diﬀerent
assumptions about factors such as fuel prices, electricity prices, carbon prices, incentives and
political constraints to be assessed (Hughes, 2003). At least some of the scenarios developed by,
or for, the British government represent the analysts ‘best guess’ about what the future is likely
to hold. Others seek to represent a ‘worse case’ or to present an ‘optimistic’ view of the future.
Scenarios are decision making tools that allow policymakers to test the implications of diﬀerent
policy choices and assess the range of risks attached to policy.
5.2 Recent Scenarios
This section examines seven scenarios, three of which come from BERR’s 2007 Energy Markets
Outlook (EMO) report (BERR, 2007b), and four of which were developed for the UK government
by electricity market analysts (Redpoint, 2007). The range of values that emerges from these
scenarios illustrates the challenge of making reliable projections of system margins.
Redpoint’s scenarios assume that Britain’s electricity market is either “well-functioning” or “im-
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perfect”, and for each of these produces a “base case” and a “challenging case” projection. The
assumptions underlying the three EMO scenarios vary according to the future carbon price,
which is assumed to aﬀect both consumption levels and the future generating mix; these scenar-
ios are classiﬁed as “Tough Carbon” in which the carbon price is high, “Easy Carbon” in which
the price is low, and a “Central” case. These seven scenarios are collated in Figure 5.3.†
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Figure 5.3: Forecasts of the future UK system margin
The speciﬁc features of each scenario are discussed in detail in their respective sources (BERR,
2007b; Redpoint, 2007), but some broad observations can be made that are of relevance here.
First, the range of future system margins presented by these scenarios is wide, even projecting
only out to 2010. By 2015 and 2020 this range has widened further still. These scenarios are
not predictions of the future, but they do highlight the sensitivity of trends in system margins
to underlying assumptions, each of which is diﬃcult to predict.
Second, each of the scenarios in Figure 5.3 shows system margins that vary over time, resulting in
† Note: the Energy Markets Outlook report presented the “eﬀective capacity margin”, which reduced the
installed capacity margin according to the expected availability of each generator type. In order to quote these
ﬁgures in terms of the installed capacity margin, Figure 5.3 uses the raw demand and installed capacity projections,
which can be found at www.berr.gov.uk/ﬁles/ﬁle41824.xls
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peaks and troughs of diﬀerent sizes. This is particularly distinctive in Redpoint’s two “imperfect
market” cases, which is to be expected as investors delay construction of new generating plant
until they are conﬁdent that a proﬁt can be made. These cycles of investment are a feature
of any market. The diﬃculty for regulators and policymakers is in distinguishing between an
investment-driving dip in the system margin, and the beginnings of an inexorable decline.
Third, and perhaps most important for this discussion, is the fundamental diﬀerence between
the Redpoint and the EMO scenarios. All three EMO scenarios exhibit a sharp decline in system
margins at some point between 2012 and 2015: these correspond to the closure of nuclear power
stations and non-LCPD-compliant thermal plant. The Redpoint scenarios also account for the
closure of these generators, but the system margins do not exhibit a corresponding decline.
This discrepancy arises because the Redpoint analysis assumes that there will be some investor
response to capacity scarcity, whereas the EMO report makes its forecasts “in the absence of any
new investment” (BERR, 2007b).
5.3 UK Liberalisation and Capacity Margins
The creation of scenarios illustrates the range of uncertainty associated with forecasting a change
in an electricity system’s capacity margin. The largest source of uncertainty comes from a lack
of understanding of the way in which investors will behave in the liberalised market. The initial
impact of the LCPD is fairly clearly deﬁned, and the closure of the older nuclear power stations,
while not entirely ﬁxed in time, is reasonably well understood. The fundamental question for
policymakers is whether or not the UK market is functioning suﬃciently well to respond to
these planned closures in a timely manner. As the Redpoint report observes, the UK market is
relatively new, and its behaviour in response to plant closures has yet to be observed:
In the absence of a clear cost advantage of new technologies over existing technologies,
new investment must be driven largely by investors’ expectations of future scarcity.
The dynamics of the market have not been tested under these conditions until now
(Redpoint, 2007).
The Redpoint report, which provides the only analysis of those discussed above that considers
the eﬀect of scarcity on investor behaviour, provides scenarios under diﬀering assumptions but
does not posit which of those is likely to materialise. The impact of regulatory interventions
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such as the LCPD undoubtedly have an impact on future levels of capacity margins, but the
trajectory of those margins ultimately depends on the decisions of investors and the market
context in which those decisions are made. Further analysis is therefore required to determine
under what regulatory regimes forced capacity closures can and cannot be adequately oﬀset by
new plant construction.
5.4 Panel Data Analysis
This section describes the outcome of conducting a panel data analysis using mixed eﬀects mod-
elling. As described in chapter 4, this chapter uses the historic data from 30 diﬀerent countries
to determine what, if any, evidence exists to suggest that liberalisation and the subsequent
regulation that occurred has had an eﬀect on the level of system margin.
The explanatory variables of interest here can be placed into one of two categories:
1. Liberalisation indicators: These indicators describe diﬀerent aspects of electricity liberali-
sation and privatisation
• overall lib:What is the overall level of liberalisation (this is a function of the following
six indicators)
• tpa :How are the terms and conditions of third party access (TPA) to the electricity
transmission grid determined?
• liberalisedpool :Is there a liberalised wholesale market for electricity (a wholesale
pool)? liberalised is a binary variable generated from liberalisedpool .
• supplychoice :What is the minimum consumption threshold that consumers must
exceed in order to be able to choose their electricity supplier?
• ownercode :What is the ownership structure of the largest companies in the gen-
eration, transmission, distribution, and supply segments of the electricity industry?
privatised is a binary variable generated from ownercode .
• transgensep:What is the degree of vertical separation between the transmission and
generation segments of the electricity industry? transgen unbundling is a binary
variable generated from transgensep.
5 GENERATION SYSTEM MARGINS 142
• vertsepoverall :What is the overall degree of vertical separation in the electricity
industry? overall unbundling is a binary variable generated from vertsepoverall .
2. Low-carbon policies: These explanatory variables indicate the type of policies put in place
by governments to encourage the increased contribution of new renewables to the electricity
mix
• renew support binary :Is there any form of renewables policy in place?
• newrenewable proportion :What proportion of installed capacity is made up of new
renewable technologies?
• ﬁt , tgc, tender , tax : Is there a Feed-In Tariﬀ, Tradeable Green Certiﬁcate, Tender-
ing or Tax/Incentive scheme in place for renewable generation?
The margins used for this analysis are calculated using the IEA Electricity Data. These data
provide installed capacities and peak load values for two diﬀerent generator categories (OECD,
2010):
• Main activity producers generate electricity for sale to third parties as their primary
activity.
• Autoproducers generate electricity wholly or partly for their own use as an activity which
supports their primary activity.
The BERR margin data that gave rise to Figure 5.4 uses the “Main activity producers” data, as
can be seen by comparing ﬁgures 5.4 and 5.5.
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Figure 5.4: UK Reserve Margins 1924 – 2007
Figure 5.5: Generation system margin of the UK, excluding autoproducers
In the case of the UK, none of the new renewables capacity is included in these data. Prior to
1989 almost no new renewable generation was installed in the UK, so this omission would have
made a negligible diﬀerence to the calculation of system margin. As the levels of renewables
increases their contribution to the system margin becomes signiﬁcant.
Internationally, the classiﬁcation of renewable generation is inconsistent. For example, in the
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United States the declared “autoproducer” wind capacity was 1,690MWe in 1998 but by the
following year it had gone down to just 1MWe. In the same period the “main activity” wind
went from 9MWe to 2,251MWe. This results from a redesignation of existing wind farms, but
there is no rationale for saying that the resilience oﬀered by the margin has changed as a result.
An alternative to using the “main activity” values would be to use the total of the main and
autoproducer capacities. This approach would show a noticeably diﬀerent trend for the UK
margin (Figure 5.6). The decline in margin shown in Figure 5.5 is markedly less pronounced in
Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6: Total generation system margin of the UK
For low levels of renewables penetration, “margin” provides a consistent indicator of system
security. Renewables are, by their nature, non-dispatchable and intermittent. As the National
Grid Winter Outlook report shows in Figure 5.7, the ratio of expected output to nameplate ca-
pacity for renewable energy technologies such as wind are lower than for dispatchable generation
technologies.
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Figure 5.7: Generation Availability Assumptions Made For Winter 2009/10
As well as making a smaller contribution to electricity supply for each unit of installed capacity,
renewables are intermittent in nature (UKERC, 2006). To accommodate this additional variabil-
ity, some additional conventional plant needs to be added to the system to maintain a constant
Loss of Load Probability (LOLP). The amount of additional conventional plant required depends
on the variability of the renewable resource (wind, sun, tide, etc.), the geographic spread of those
technologies (the more dispersed across the country wind farms are, the less their variability is
correlated), and the degree of correlation between renewable technologies (e.g. wind speeds and
insolation levels are negatively correlated (Sinden, 2006)).
To describe the amount of demand that is displaced by a unit of renewable capacity, the notion
of a ‘capacity credit’ has been conceived (UKERC, 2006). If 1GW of wind has a 30% capacity
credit, it can displace 300MW of conventional generation without changing the LOLP. The
capacity credit of a given renewable technology is a function of the resource variability and the
geographic spread. Most important, however, is that the capacity credit is a function of the level
of penetration of the intermittent generating technology. For example, National Grid (2009b)
has made some planning estimates that show how the capacity credit of wind is expected to
decrease as the amount of wind on the system increases (see Figure 5.8).
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Figure 5.8: Forward Operational Energy Planning Wind Capacity Credit
The relationship between capacity credit and renewables penetration is part of ongoing research
in literature and will, once deﬁned, diﬀer from region to region depending on the pre-existing
generation mix, local climate and the geographical dispersion of renewable generators. For the
purposes of this thesis, a simpliﬁed approach is needed to be able to conduct a comparative
analysis between countries and over time. In order to do this, the work of Voorspools and
D’haeseleer (2006) has been used. In their paper, “An analytical formula for the capacity credit
of wind power”, they propose an equation to calculate the capacity credit, CC, of wind as a
function of penetration, x, the capacity factor of wind, CFwind, the reliability of conventional
plant, Rsystem, and the coeﬃcient of wind dispersion, δ.
CC =
U
V + δ
CFwind
Rsystem
{
1 +Wδe−Y (V+δ)(x−1)
}
for x >1% (5.4.1)
CC =
U
V + δ
· CFwind
Rsystem
(1 +W ) for x <1% (5.4.2)
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where U , V , W and Y equal 32.8, 0.306, 3.26 and 0.1077, respectively.
By replacing the installed capacity of renewable generation with this concept of a ‘capacity
credit’, the traditional measure of ‘system margin’ is converted into a ‘derated margin’.
Whereas the system margin, M is deﬁned as:
M =
Total Capacity− Peak Load
Peak Load
(5.4.3)
Derated margin, DM , is deﬁned as:
DM =
CI − CR + CRCC − LP
LP
(5.4.4)
where CI is the total installed capacity, CR is the renewable capacity, CC is the Capacity Credit
for those renewables and LP is the peak load.
Some additional assumptions are made. First, whereas the Voorspools and D’haeseleer (2006)
analysis is concerned with wind, this analysis assumes that it is reasonable to extended the
formula to cover solar, wave and tidal generation. Second, the availability of conventional plant
is assumed to be 85% in line with the National Grid data; the exact ﬁgure will depend on
the generation mix and speciﬁcs of the generation technology within each country (such as
generator age and system operation). Third, the dispersion coeﬃcient, δ is assumed to be equal
to 0.8, where 0 would mean the renewable generators were entirely uncorrelated and 1 would
mean perfect correlation. The value of 0.8 produces a relationship between capacity credit and
renewables penetration similar in form to that produced by the National Grid, as shown in Figure
5.9.
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Figure 5.9: Capacity Credit vs Renewables Penetration using Voorspools (2005) formula
In the remainder of this chapter, the focus will be on the derated margin as this is the best
reﬂection of the security of the system in terms of the associated Loss of Load Probability
(LOLP). The derated margin across the OECD countries is shown in Figure 5.10.
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Figure 5.10: Derated margin for the OECD countries
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5.4.1 Liberalisation Indicators
This section asks whether diﬀerent liberalisation measures are causally associated with a change
in the derated system margin.
5.4.1.1 The eﬀect of overall liberalisation on the derated system margin
As Figure 5.11 shows, there is a correlation between increasing liberalisation and decreasing
derated margin. The eﬀect, however is neither strong nor consistent. This representation of the
data simply plots the margin against the overall level of liberalisation for all country-years, and
does not reveal whether this trend occurs as a result of diﬀerences between countries or whether
those diﬀerences arise within countries over time.
Figure 5.11: Derated margin (all county-years) vs
overall liberalisation
Figure 5.12: Lagged eﬀect of overall liberalisation on
derated margin
The question of interest is whether an increase in overall liberalisation is associated with a change
in the margin. The panel data analysis described above was used to test this question, looking
for a relationship between a change in overall liberalisation and a change in derated margin from
between zero and 5 years into the future.
Figure 5.12 shows the results of this analysis. There is little support for the notion that a change
in the overall level of liberalisation has an eﬀect on the derated margin. There is a negative eﬀect
of 0.12, which is signiﬁcant at the 5% conﬁdence level. If this eﬀect were real, and held over
all ranges of the explanatory variable, this would mean that a shift from a system fully owned
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by a nationalised monopoly to one that was fully privatised and liberalised, the margin would
decrease by 12% after three years.
Again, this ﬁnding is not supported at any other time lag, so it seems more reasonable to conclude
that this particular result is an artefact of the limited number of data, rather than an underlying
eﬀect. This conclusion is discussed further in the following sections, which look at some of the
underlying liberalisation indicators that constitute the “overall liberalisation” measure.
5.4.1.2 The eﬀect of the creation of a liberalised pool on derated margin
The measure of overall liberalisation (overall lib) is a composite of a number of diﬀerent liberali-
sation indicators deﬁned by the OECD. One of these is a binary indicator that measures whether
there is a liberalised pool in operation. As with all the indicator variables used in this research,
this has been coded to take a value of 1 if the liberalised pool exists and 0 if it does not.
As can be seen from Figure 5.13, the derated margins in countries that have a liberalised elec-
tricity pool tend to be slightly lower than those that do not. This diﬀerence, however, is well
within the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
Figure 5.13: Overall mean derated margin with and
without a liberalised pool
Figure 5.14: Mean derated margin by year, with and
without a liberalised pool
The relationship is better shown by looking at individual years. Figure 5.14 illustrates this,
and reveals that from 1990-2001 the countries with liberalised pools tended to have a lower
margin than those without. As more countries liberalised this diﬀerence narrowed and eventually
reversed, so that the countries that remain without a liberalised pool now have a slightly lower
5 GENERATION SYSTEM MARGINS 152
mean derated margin than those that have liberalised. In all years the diﬀerence between the
means is much less than the conﬁdence intervals.
Again, the causal question is whether creating a liberalised pool caused a change in the level
of the derated margin. Figure 5.15 shows the result of this analysis. At all lags there is no
statistically-signiﬁcant eﬀect.
Figure 5.15: Eﬀect of the creation of a liberalised pool on generation margin
5.4.1.3 The eﬀect of the ownership arrangements on generation margin
The ownership arrangements variables describe the extent to which the largest generation, trans-
mission, distribution and supply companies have been privatised in a given country. The ‘own-
ercode’ variable takes a value of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 or 1 depending on whether a country’s main
electricity companies are, respectively, ‘public’, ‘mostly public’, ‘mixed’, ‘mostly private’ or ‘pri-
vate’. Further, a binary variable ‘privatised’ has been generated from the ownercode and takes
a value of 1 if a country’s system is privatised or mostly privatised, and takes 0 otherwise.
A plot of the mean derated margin against ownercode (Figure 5.16) reveals no real trend, and
any variation is within the 95% conﬁdence intervals.
The mixed eﬀects model shows an eﬀect of -0.17 (p=0.001) at a lag of three years (Figure 5.17),
which is similar to that observed in the overall liberalisation variable, of which ownercode is
a component. Using ownercode in this way assumes that it exhibits a linear eﬀect on derated
margin. A change from 0 to 1 would, therefore, have twice the eﬀect of a change from 0 to 0.5.
This assumption is probably false, since the eﬀect could in principle take a number of forms.
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Figure 5.16: Derated margin (all county-years)
against the degree of private ownership
Figure 5.17: Eﬀect of the ownership arrangements on
the derated margin
An alternative would be to treat ownercode as a categorical variable. This would make no
assumption about the shape of the eﬀect. The disadvantage would be that it would assume,
for example, that ‘privatised’ was no more similar to ‘mostly privatised’ than it was to ’mostly
public’. This is an unreasonably assumption and is likely to seriously reduce the power of the
analysis.
Instead, a binary variable was created, ‘privatised’. This pooled the ownercode variable so that
‘privatised’ and ‘mostly privatised’ were considered as one category and ‘mixed’, ‘mostly public’
and ‘public’ were categorised as another. This approach loses the power to discern the eﬀect of
a change within these new categories.
This variable indicates that that have undergone privatisation have a smaller derated margin
than those that have not, but that this diﬀerence is within the standard error (Figure 5.18).
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Figure 5.18: Mean derated margin by whether priva-
tised
Figure 5.19: Mean derated margin by whether priva-
tised and by year
Breaking this analysis down into separate years reveals the relationship shown in Figure 5.19. The
early privatising countries tended to have lower derated margins. This remains true, although
the diﬀerence between the two groups has narrowed considerably.
In terms of the actual eﬀect that the act of transferring the electricity generation assets from
public to private hands, Figure 5.20 shows that there is no association to be found from the data.
Figure 5.20: Lagged eﬀect of undergoing privatisation on derated margin
There is certainly a diﬀerence between the margins of those countries that choose to undergo
privatisation and those that do not. What this analysis shows, however, is that whatever the
causal pathway may be, it is unlikely that the act of privatisation itself is a cause of a change in
system margins.
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5.4.1.4 Vertical Separation
Vertical separation is indicated by two variables: the degree of vertical separation between the
transmission and generation segments of the electricity industry (transgensep, where 0=In-
tegrated, 0.5=Accounting Separation and 1=Separate Companies) and the overall degree of
vertical separation (vertsepoverall, where 0=Integrated, 0.5=Mixed and 1=Unbundled). As
before, two corresponding binary variables were created. These are transgen unbundling and
overall unbundling, and take a value of 0 if the system is fully vertically integrated and 1
otherwise.
Figures 5.21 and 5.22 show that systems with more separation between generation and trans-
mission ownership have lower mean derated margins. The standard errors, however, are large in
relation to the observed diﬀerences.
Figure 5.21: Derated margin (all county-years)
against the degree of transmission-generation separation
Figure 5.22: Derated margin (all county-years)
against whether transmission and generation un-
bundling has begun
The mixed eﬀect model shows no signiﬁcant eﬀect of separating generation from transmission
(Figures 5.23 and 5.24). The only exception to this can be seen in the Figure 5.24, which
corresponds to the binary transgen unbundling variable, where at a lag of 4 years there is an
eﬀect that appears to be signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Given this marginal nature of this ﬁnding,
and the lack of an overall trend in these data, this eﬀect is likely to have occurred by chance.
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Figure 5.23: Eﬀect of degree of transmission-
generation separation on the derated margin
Figure 5.24: Eﬀect of separating generation from
transmission on the derated margin
By looking at the annual data (Figure 5.25), it is apparent that countries that have separated
their generation and transmission sectors have, on average, lower derated margins.
Figure 5.25: Derated margin by year against whether transmission and generation are integrated (0) or not (1)
These ﬁndings are similarly reﬂected in the analysis of overall vertical separation. As with the
particular case of transmission-generation separation, those countries that have increased the
degree of vertical separation across the generation, transmission, distribution and supply sectors
tend to have lower margins (Figure 5.26) but there is no evidence of a causal relationship between
the two, as shown by Figure 5.27.
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Figure 5.26: Derated margin against vertical un-
bundling in a given year
Figure 5.27: Eﬀect of vertical unbundling on the der-
ated margin
5.4.2 Eﬀect of renewable generation and associated policies on system margins
As is discussed at the beginning of this chapter, privatised and liberalised systems have come un-
der some scrutiny with regards to their ability to deliver suﬃcient investment in new generation.
In particular, the need to decarbonise the electricity system has resulted in policies that push
for the closure of some old power stations and attempt both to encourage forms of generation
with lower carbon emissions, and to discourage the more polluting generation technologies.
This section, therefore, evaluates the evidence that this drive for lower-carbon generation options
has aﬀected the overall system margin. Using the same methods applied above, this section
assesses the relationship between the deployment of renewable generation and the associated
renewables policies on the system margin.
5.4.2.1 Installed capacity of new renewables
The most widely available and consistently reported measure of renewable generation activity
in the OECD countries is the amount of renewable generation that has been installed. The ﬁrst
measure of interest, therefore, how an increase in the proportion of new renewable generation on
a system impacts on the system margin.
Derated margin remains the best measure of system security, but it is perhaps useful to look
also at the more conventional measure of the system margin. Figure 5.28 shows that there is
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a positive correlation between the proportion of new renewables on a system and the overall
margin of that system. The mixed model analysis shown in Figure 5.29 shows that this is a real
eﬀect. Increasing the proportion of renewable generation on the system is strongly associated
with an increase in the margin.
Figure 5.28: Margin (all county-years) against the
proportion of new renewables on the system
Figure 5.29: Lagged eﬀect of increasing the new re-
newable proportion on margin
If however, ‘derated margin’ is used, the eﬀect is far less noticeable (Figures 5.30 and 5.31). This
illustrates the impact that the choice of the ‘margin’ measure can have on an analysis. Power
systems that have a large proportion of their electricity generated by new renewable technologies
have to increase the overall margin to maintain a given level of LOLP.
Figure 5.30: Derated margin (all county-years)
against the proportion of new renewables on the sys-
tem
Figure 5.31: Lagged eﬀect of increasing the new re-
newable proportion on the derated margin
The evidence shown in Figure 5.31 is certainly weaker than that for Figure 5.29, but the eﬀect
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is still positive for all lags. The error bars all contain zero so it is conceivable that the true eﬀect
of increasing renewables is to depress the derated margin, but it is more likely that there is no
eﬀect or that the eﬀect is a positive one.
5.4.2.2 Renewable electricity support schemes
It may not be that the expansion of renewable generation per se is problematic for the sys-
tem margin. Rather, it is conceivable that policies intended to promote renewables have an
inadvertent eﬀect on the overall level of investment that in turn could either:
1. Discourage new capacity construction by dissuading projects that otherwise might have
gone ahead.
2. Encourage too much investment by keeping electricity prices artiﬁcially high.
The following sections test these hypotheses, ﬁrst asking whether renewable support schemes in
general aﬀect the derated margin, and then asking whether the choice of incentive scheme has
an impact.
Any renewable support scheme
As Figure 5.32 shows, there is little diﬀerence between the derated margins with and without any
renewable support mechanism. Figure 5.33 shows more clearly that in most years the countries
with some form of renewable support mechanism have slightly lower derated margins than those
that do not.
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Figure 5.32: Mean derated margin by presence of re-
newable support mechanism
Figure 5.33: Mean derated margin by renewable sup-
port and by year
Using the mixed eﬀects model to test this relationship, it can be seen by Figure 5.34 that
introducing an unspeciﬁed renewable support mechanism has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on the derated
margin.
Figure 5.34: Lagged eﬀect of introducing renewables support mechanisms on the derated margin
It is possible that some support mechanisms have an eﬀect, while others do not, or that the
eﬀect is diﬀerent in each case. Combining the mechanisms as above has the potential to hide
such details, so in addition these interventions are tested independently.
Feed-in Tariﬀ
The diﬀerence between systems that have a Feed-in Tariﬀ (FIT) is more pronounced than in the
aggregate indicator, suggesting that margins are higher where countries have a FIT. This can be
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seen in Figure 5.35 for all years, and in Figure 5.36 where it is clear than those countries that
implemented an FIT had higher derated margins.
Figure 5.35: Mean derated margin in systems with
(1) and without (0) Feed-in Tariﬀ schemes
Figure 5.36: Mean derated margin by FIT and by
year
As before, the observation that the FIT and non-FIT groups have diﬀerent is not suﬃcient to
conclude that the implementation of an FIT brought about a change in the margin. Figure 5.37
does, however, seem to oﬀer some tentative support for this hypothesis. Only the 1-year lag is
signiﬁcant at the 5% level, but the measured eﬀect is fairly consistent at all lags.
Figure 5.37: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a feed-in tariﬀ on the derated margin
If this analysis did indicate a real eﬀect, the Feed-in Tariﬀ would appear to have the eﬀect
of increasing the derated margin by around 5%. The absolute magnitude of the eﬀect may
depend on the choice of parameters in the underlying capacity credit formula, so it may be more
appropriate just to make relative comparisons with the other renewable support mechanisms.
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Quota / Tradeable Green Certiﬁcate / Renewables Obligation
In contrast to the FIT, countries employing Tradeable Green Certiﬁcate (TGC) schemes such
as the UK’s Renewables Obligation (RO) tend to have lower derated margins, as can be seen in
Figure 5.38. By looking at the yearly numbers in Figure 5.39 it is apparent that in all but one
year TGC countries have had lower margins.
Figure 5.38: Mean derated margin in systems with
(1) and without (0) Tradeable Green Certiﬁcates
Figure 5.39: Mean derated margin by TGC scheme
and by year
The mixed eﬀects model illustrated in Figure 5.40, however, shows that there is little evidence
to support the hypothesis that there is a causal link between introducing a TGC scheme and
there being a change in the derated margin. Certainly, if there is a real eﬀect to be observed, it
is neither as large as that observed under the FIT scheme.
Figure 5.40: Lagged eﬀect of introducing tradeable green certiﬁcates on the derated margin
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Tendering Process
Countries with a tendering process for renewable generation have, on average, lower derated
margins than those that do not (Figure 5.41. This diﬀerence has narrowed in recent years
(Figure 5.42) but there are now far fewer countries using tendering processes than there were in
the past. Most countries have instead adopted alternative renewable support mechanisms.
Figure 5.41: Mean derated margin by whether a re-
newables tendering process exists
Figure 5.42: Mean derated margin by tendering pro-
cess and by year
The eﬀect of introducing a tendering scheme on the derated margin is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero, but it is nonetheless negative (Figure 5.43). Since the trend has been for these schemes
to ﬁnish, it is perhaps more relevant to say that countries that have abandoned tendering process
have seen a slight increase in their subsequent margin as a result.
Figure 5.43: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a tendering process on the derated margin
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Renewables Tax Incentives / Investment Grants
As with TGCs and tendering processes, countries that provide tax incentives or investment
grants for renewable technologies have, on average, lower derated margins than those that do
not (Figure 5.44). As Figure 5.45 shows, this diﬀerence has remained fairly consistent over the
period analysed.
Figure 5.44: Mean derated margin by the existence of
a renewables tax incentive
Figure 5.45: Mean derated margin by tax incentive
and by year
In terms of the causal relationship, there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect that can be seen. Though it is
not statistically signiﬁcant, as with the tendering process, it is more likely that any true eﬀect
is negative in the sense that removing these incentives has, in the past, increased the derated
margin over the subsequent years.
Figure 5.46: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a renewables tax incentive on the derated margin
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5.4.2.3 The impact of GDP on derated margin
The generation margin comprises two underlying measures: the installed capacity (or rather,
the derated capacity) and the peak load on the system. The demand for electricity is strongly
correlated with the productivity of the wider economy, as can be seen from Figure 5.47.
Figure 5.47: Scatter plot of peak load against GDP Figure 5.48: Lagged eﬀect of GDP on peak load
Indeed, this is a causal relationship, with a rise in GDP for a given country causing a subsequent
rise in the demand for electricity. This is shown clearly in Figure 5.48.
GDP is also correlated with the installed electricity generation capacity, as shown in Figure 5.49.
Figure 5.49: Scatter plot of derated capacity against
GDP
Figure 5.50: Lagged eﬀect of GDP on derated capac-
ity
Again, this relationship is causal, both directly in the sense that a rise in GDP enables new
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electricity investment, and indirectly in that a rise in GDP causes a rise in demand, which leads
to a rise in the rate of capacity expansion. Figure 5.50 shows the impact of a rise in GDP on the
derated capacity.
Again, this eﬀect is unambiguously strong, but the shape of the lagged eﬀect is diﬀerent from
that exhibited by the peak load plot. Following a rise in GDP, the immediate and 1-year lag
eﬀect is to increase the peak load by more than the derated capacity. Conversely, for the lags of
3,4 and 5 years the resulting capacity increase is larger than that of the peak load. This would
suggest that capacity expansion tended to lag behind demand increases, and then, after this
initial delay, was prone to over-supply.
Whilst these diﬀerences are signiﬁcant at the capacity and the peak load level, the resulting
eﬀect on the derated margin appears to be negligible. As Figure 5.51 shows, the overall eﬀect is
slightly negative, but is small in absolute terms.
Figure 5.51: Lagged eﬀect of GDP on derated margin
5.4.2.4 The impact of electricity price on derated margin
The analysis of electricity prices suggests that, unlike GDP, there is no signiﬁcant relationship
with either peak load or the derated generation capacity.
Figures 5.52 and 5.54 show no consistent overall correlation between electricity price and peak
load, and Figures 5.53 and 5.55 suggest no signiﬁcant eﬀect of a change in price.
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Figure 5.52: Scatter plot of peak load against indus-
trial electricity prices
Figure 5.53: Lagged eﬀect of industrial electricity
price on peak load
Figure 5.54: Scatter plot of peak load against house-
hold electricity prices
Figure 5.55: Lagged eﬀect of household electricity
price on peak load
Similarly for the derated generation capacity, there appears to be little overall correlation (Figures
5.56 and 5.58), and there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect of electricity prices, as shown in Figures 5.57
and 5.59.
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Figure 5.56: Scatter plot of derated capacity against
industrial electricity price
Figure 5.57: Lagged eﬀect of industrial electricity
price on derated capacity
Figure 5.58: Scatter plot of derated capacity against
household electricity price
Figure 5.59: Lagged eﬀect of household electricity
price on derated capacity
Although electricity prices do not have a strong eﬀect on either peak load or derated generation
capacity, the overall derated margin is sensitive to small diﬀerences between these two measures.
Indeed, Figures 5.60 and 5.61 show that over all lags the impact of an increase in industrial
and household electricity prices is to increase the overall margin. Although the largest eﬀect for
household and industrial prices occurs at diﬀerent lags, the eﬀect has a magnitude of 1, meaning
that an increase of 1 cent is associated with an increase of 1% in the margin.
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Figure 5.60: Lagged eﬀect of industrial electricity price on derated margin
Figure 5.61: Lagged eﬀect of household electricity price on derated margin
The conclusions that can be drawn here are twofold. First, GDP is a strong driver of both peak
load and the installed capacity, but despite this it has little eﬀect on the diﬀerence between the
two - i.e. the margin. Conversely, the price of electricity has only a small bearing on either the
demand for, or the capacity to supply, electricity in absolute terms. What small eﬀect there
is, however, serves to reduce demand whilst either retaining or increasing the levels of installed
capacity. The overall eﬀect on margin is, therefore, an increase.
5 GENERATION SYSTEM MARGINS 170
5.4.3 Conclusions about the eﬀect of liberalisation and low-carbon policies on margins
The ﬁndings of this analysis reveal that the majority of the diﬀerence in system margins be-
tween countries exists prior to the decision to liberalise the electricity system. There is a clear
diﬀerence in the generation margin between those countries that have undergone a process of
liberalisation & privatisation and those that have not. Under most measures of liberalisation,
the diﬀerence between liberalised and non-liberalised countries has narrowed over time as more
countries undergo this process.
Overall, there is a negative correlation between the margin and the degree of liberalisation and
privatisation. The pertinent question, however, concerns the impact that liberalisation has had
on margins, and for this the evidence is much weaker. There is no good data to support the
idea that either liberalisation or privatisation have had a noticeably depressive impact on system
margins.
The second question addressed in this chapter concerned the eﬀect of renewables support mech-
anisms on system margins. The results can be summarised as follows:
1. An increase in the proportion of renewable generation resulted in an increase in not only
the installed capacity but also the derated margin, suggesting that there is a net positive
beneﬁt in terms of the grid’s Loss of Load Probability.
2. The derated margins of countries that have renewable support mechanisms are noticeably
diﬀerent from those that do not.
3. For countries with TGCs, tendering processes or tax incentives, the margin is lower, whereas
for countries that have FITs, their margins tend to be higher.
4. Beyond this, there is some tentative evidence that the introduction of a feed-in tariﬀ in-
creases the overall derated margin of that country’s electricity system.
These ﬁndings suggest that, thus far, the contribution of renewable generation to the system
margin has been positive. This will, however, depend on the calculation of renewables’ capacity
credit, which may be smaller than has been assumed in this research. The data available for
speciﬁc renewables mechanisms across the OECD countries are limited at this stage, but it
appears that any beneﬁt to margin that may be drawn from renewables depends on the means
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by which the expansion of the renewable sector was achieved. As has been discussed, it appears
that Feed-in Tariﬀs have been most able to maintain or improve margins whilst expanding the
level of renewable generation, whereas schemes such as the Renewables Obligation have been less
successful on this measure. The relevance of this ﬁnding to UK energy policy will be discussed
in Part III.
The next chapter discusses the impact that privatisation, liberalisation and regulation have had
on the diversity of the generating technologies that comprise an electricity system.
6
System Diversity
6.1 Deﬁning Diversity
This chapter attempts to analyse how the diversities of diﬀerent electricity systems have changed
as a result of privatisation and liberalisation. One issue that is not always made explicit when
discussing diversity, however, is precisely how the term is being deﬁned. Diversity can be subdi-
vided into properties of variety, balance and disparity (Jansen et al., 2004) referring, respectively,
to the number of diﬀerent elements in a system, their relative contribution and a measure of how
diﬀerent they are from each other. Variety and balance have been widely adopted as measures
of diversity, and indices, such as the Shannon-Weiner index (Stirling, 1998), have been devised
to compare the diversity of diﬀerent systems.
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A resilient system is one that can cope well with a wide variety of unforeseen adverse scenarios.
As has been discussed in previous sections, an electricity system, and in particular a privatised
electricity system, is susceptible to adverse events that fall under the categories of ‘uncertainty’
and ‘ignorance’ (Grubb et al., 2006). Diversity provides a hedge against a wide range of adverse
scenarios, both from within the system (‘reliability-type’ failures) and from outside the system
(‘exposure-type’ events).
As has already been discussed, there is a risk when making energy security decisions, of falling
into the ludic fallacy (Taleb, 2007). A system cannot ever be fully understood; there will always
be adverse events that will not be anticipated. This is true for all systems, but the ludic fallacy
can be particularly pernicious in “high-reliability” designs. As modelling techniques become more
sophisticated, the conﬁdence of decision-makers and system designers grows. The quantiﬁed risks
are managed, but the exposure to unforeseen events can be inadvertently increased. Viewing
system security instead in terms of “diversity” can address many of these unforeseen risks.
A system with a large number of disparate technologies makes a system resilient for a number of
reasons. First, if the generation mix runs on a number of diﬀerent fuels, an adverse event cutting
oﬀ the supply of one of these fuels is unlikely to aﬀect all generators. Second, any adverse-event
that is technology-speciﬁc (such as droughts forcing certain generators to shut down as a result
of a lack of coolant) is minimised if the aﬀected technology represents only a small proportion of
the overall technology mix.
A lack of diversity, whether in terms of fuel or technological design, can lead to energy supply
risks in a number of diﬀerent ways. Tokyo, for example, experienced an energy security risk as
a result of a lack of resilience in their generating mix.
The supply of electricity in Tokyo and other cities in the Kanto region is domi-
nated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Nuclear safety concerns in
the winter of 2002 led to the closing of 17 TEPCO-owned nuclear power stations,
representing 29% (17GW) of Japans generating capacity. A fault had been discov-
ered in only one of these generators, but these 16 other generators had been similarly
designed so it was believed that they all could be similarly at risk and were conse-
quently shut down. The crisis did not threaten the whole of Japan, but the potential
for power transfers into the aﬀected region was limited as the TEPCO-supplied net-
work operates at 50Hz, while most of the rest of Japan operates at 60Hz.
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To return to some terminology introduced in section 3, the initial adverse event is classiﬁed here as
a ‘reliability-type’ failure, since it originated from within the system. The failure itself, however,
would not have presented a problem to the system as a whole because the system margin would
have been suﬃcient. The problem came as a result of a lack of diversity in generator design. If
the identiﬁcation of a fault in one generator means that a number of similar generators have to
be shut down, this could result in a high forced outages. The problem is not unique to Japan;
a similar case occurred in the UK, although not on the scale seen in Tokyo. In 2007 a problem
was found with the boiler of one of the Hartlepool nuclear reactors. Its twin reactor was shut
down to check for a similar design problem, as was a unit in Heysham.
The need for diversity in dealing with exposure-type events is more commonly seen. In particular,
shortages of a particular fuel are commonly seen. For this reason, a discussion of ‘diversity’ in
the context of energy security is often reduced to one of ‘fuel diversity’. When gas supplies are
physically constrained, a country with only a small proportion of gas generators is more likely to
be able to continue normal operation using its existing generating capacity that a country that
is dominated by gas-ﬁred generators.
6.2 Diversity in the UK Policy Literature
Of all the attributes that have been associated with a system’s resilience, diversity is perhaps the
most prominent in the energy policy literature. For example, from the 2003 Energy White Paper,
2006 Energy Review, 2007 Energy White Paper and 2008 Nuclear White Paper, respectively make
reference to the concept:
“diversity is the best way of protecting ourselves against interruptions of supply,
sudden price rises, terrorism or other threats to reliability of supply. As the UK
becomes a net importer of energy we will need many sources, many suppliers and
many routes” (DTI, 2003)
“For the UK, the Government believes that the best way to maintain energy
reliability is through energy diversity in our sources of energy, our suppliers, and
our supply routes. Competitive markets can help us achieve diversity, as companies
themselves seek diversity in order to manage risks”. (DTI, 2006a)
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“Our aim will be to ensure that companies have a wide range of low carbon options
available so we can retain a diverse energy mix, which is good for our security of
supply, and will help us to become a low carbon economy . . .We have a diverse mix
of power stations: coal and gas account for over one third each; nuclear about a ﬁfth;
and renewables around 4%. This diversity helps avoid over-dependence on a single
fuel type, contributing to security of supply.” (DTI, 2007)
“It is our view that, given these uncertainties, our energy strategy should be
based on diversity and ﬂexibility in the energy mix and has accordingly developed
policies which keep open the widest possible range of low-carbon generating options.”
(BERR, 2008a)
Whilst diversity has long been seen as being an important component in delivering supply security
to the UK electricity system, the perceived need for governments to maintain levels of energy
diversity has, as with the wider question of energy security, ﬂuctuated over the years. Prior to
1990, of course, all electricity planning was centrally controlled. It would seem, however, that
the government in the period immediately following privatisation saw little need for extensive
regulation in order to maintain adequate levels of security in general, and diversity in particular.
The 1995 White Paper, “The Prospects for Nuclear Power in the UK” ((DTI, 1995), cited in
(Helm, 2002)), states, for example:
“the government cannot identify any reasons why the electricity market should
not of its own accord provide an appropriate level of diversity”
This 1995 quotation is to some extent reﬂected in the government’s later references to diversity,
as is illustrated by the quotations above. In particular, the 2006 Energy Review states that
the competitive markets can encourage the diversiﬁcation of the system. The two most recent
quotations speak of the role of government in facilitating the markets to ensure that diversity can
be maintained. Whilst these more recent publications in no way suggest that the markets are
inadequate to deliver diversity, they suggest that the government should have a role in monitoring
diversity, and perhaps making policy to ensure that it is adequately maintained.
This raises two questions:
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• Will the real market (as opposed to a theoretical idealised market) deliver adequate levels
of diversity?
• What regulations, if any, are necessary to ensure that this diversity can be achieved?
We need to establish whether the view expressed in the 1995 White Paper is a good reﬂection of
how a free market in electricity generation functions, or whether, as later reviews suggest, some
government involvement could be necessary to provide the market with technological ‘options’
from which to choose. Furthermore, it should be asked whether the principle of the free market,
either in theory or in practice, should be expected to deliver the collectively optimal level of
diversity through the collective decisions of individual market actors.
6.2.1 Liberalisation and Diversity
Those countries that are nearly exclusively electriﬁed by a single fuel tend to be those that are
state run: nuclear power in France and hydroelectric power in Brazil, Chile, Norway and New
Zealand provide examples of this (IEA, 1998). Furthermore, it could be argued that a large
number of individuals operating with incomplete information will make diﬀerent investment
decisions at diﬀerent times, which would result in diﬀerent generator types being constructed.
For example, the future gas price is extremely uncertain; one investor may decide that future gas
prices will be low and will conclude that gas-ﬁred generation provides the best expected proﬁt.
Another investor, conducting his analysis under diﬀerent assumptions may decide that the future
price of gas is likely to be high, and may choose instead to build coal or nuclear generators.
Of course, in centrally planned systems, governments could make a conscious decision to optimise
the diversity of the electricity system (or, rather, to make a trade-oﬀ between optimum diversity
and technology and fuel costs). It is not, therefore, necessary that central planning must lead
low levels of fuel diversity.
The other approach that needs to be considered in this context is ‘portfolio theory’ (Awerbuch
and Berger, 2003; Awerbuch, 2006). Private investors do not simply look outward, predicting
future gas and electricity prices to make investment decisions. Rather, they base their decision
in part on their existing generating portfolio. From a wider system security perspective, we want
diverse generating technologies in order to protect against fuel supply disruptions. An energy
company wants its own portfolio to be diverse in order to provide a ﬁnancial hedge against fuel
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price variations. Physical supply availability and fuel costs are not independent of each other,
and the system as whole beneﬁts from diversity in the form of smoothed electricity prices, even
in the absence of physical supply constraints.
There is, therefore, good reason to think that the hedging behaviour of individual electricity
generation companies will translate into diversity in the electricity system as a whole. We also
need to think about how diversity optimisation scales when moving from the investor level to
the system level. Diversity involves choosing technologies that are not least-cost – reducing risk
at the expense of expected proﬁts. Given this fact, it is clear that there is a limit beyond which
diversity is costing more than it is worth in terms of providing resilience. Individual investors
will presumably make investment decisions in a relatively rational way, attempting to place their
portfolio on the eﬃcient frontier of risk and expected proﬁt (Awerbuch and Berger, 2003). The
wider system’s position in relation to this frontier, however, depends on how diversity scales
up over all the diﬀerent generating companies. It is possible that the optimal level of investor
portfolio diversity, when summed over all investors, results in sub-optimal diversity for the system
as a whole. Conversely, it may be that summing over all investors provides excessive diversity,
meaning that consumers are paying more for system diversity that they would ‘choose’.
In his paper, Energy policy: security of supply, sustainability and competition, Dieter Helm 2002
notes that whereas typical energy security measure relate to supply and demand, diversity is
particularly concerned with risks associated with shocks. This ﬁts with the thesis of this work
that diversity is a key component of a system’s resilience. Helm 2002 argues “there is no reason to
believe that competition will necessarily inhibit securing diversity. In many cases, it might help by
allowing markets to experiment with new technologies, and by facilitating entry”. This reiterates
the 2006 Energy Review, which argues that as companies seek to diversify individually, the
diversity of the whole system is increased (DTI, 2006a). Helm nonetheless rejects the conclusion
that competition will be suﬃcient to deliver security, particularly, he argues, when other political
constraints are placed on the electricity system.
It is worth noting that fuel diversity is not the only form of diversity that needs to be considered
for exposure-type events (adverse events that originate outside the electricity system). Australia,
for example, has at times had its supplies threatened because regional droughts had caused the
availability of water in the rivers and lakes to decline. This meant that a number of generators
could not operate, since they required the water to be used as coolant. The two generator types
that were aﬀected were coal-ﬁred power stations and hydro-electric plant. A crude analysis of
diversity may conclude that a country’s generator diversity is adequate, whereas they may be
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similarly susceptible to a single source of insecurity. Fuel is therefore just one of a number of
‘inputs’ into an electricity system; a complete diversity analysis should attempt to include as
many of these inputs as possible.
The most common use of the term “diversity” in the context of electricity systems, is “generator
diversity”, or perhaps more broadly, “technological diversity”. These terms reﬂect the need for
the generating capacity itself to be suﬃciently diversiﬁed in terms of its design and its fuel in
order to reduce the risk of common-mode failures to a reasonable level.
The following analysis is intended to answer two questions:
1. How has market liberalisation aﬀected the diversity of the electricity mix?
2. How will eﬀorts to expand the renewables sector aﬀect diversity?
6.3 Diversity Indicators
As discussed in chapter 2.2, there are many potential indicators for the diversity of the gen-
erating stock. The most appropriate indicator would, in theory, be one that incorporated the
notion of disparity, such as one discussed by Skea (2010), so that not only are the number and
proportions of generator types included, but also the comparative “diﬀerentness” of them is con-
sidered. Whilst the importance of including the disparity of technologies in future analyses is
acknowledged, as the research stands there are a number of ways of deﬁning disparity, and there
is certainly no consensus on numerical value that should be placed between, say, wind and solar,
or gas and coal technologies.
Until such consensus is reached, the approach taken here focuses on a measure of diversity
that incorporates only “variety” (the number of generator types) and “balance” their respective
proportions, the Shannon-Wiener Index (SWI):
SWI = −
n∑
i=1
pi ln pi
where n is the number of diﬀerent generator types and pi is the proportion of the i
th generator
on the system.
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As in the previous chapter, the relevant explanatory variables are:
1. Liberalisation indicators: These indicators describe diﬀerent aspects of electricity liberali-
sation and privatisation
• overall lib:What is the overall level of liberalisation (this is a function of the following
six indicators)
• tpa :How are the terms and conditions of third party access (TPA) to the electricity
transmission grid determined?
• liberalisedpool :Is there a liberalised wholesale market for electricity (a wholesale
pool)? liberalised is a binary variable generated from liberalisedpool .
• supplychoice :What is the minimum consumption threshold that consumers must
exceed in order to be able to choose their electricity supplier?
• ownercode :What is the ownership structure of the largest companies in the gen-
eration, transmission, distribution, and supply segments of the electricity industry?
privatised is a binary variable generated from ownercode .
• transgensep:What is the degree of vertical separation between the transmission and
generation segments of the electricity industry? transgen unbundling is a binary
variable generated from transgensep.
• vertsepoverall :What is the overall degree of vertical separation in the electricity
industry? overall unbundling is a binary variable generated from vertsepoverall .
2. Low-carbon policies: These explanatory variables indicate the type of policies put in place
by governments to encourage the increased contribution of new renewables to the electricity
mix
• renew support binary :Is there any form of renewables policy in place?
• newrenewable proportion :What proportion of installed capacity is made up of new
renewable technologies?
• ﬁt , tgc, tender , tax : Is there a Feed-In Tariﬀ, Tradeable Green Certiﬁcate, Ten-
dering or Tax/Incentive scheme, respectively, in place for renewable generation tech-
nologies?
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6.3.1 Statistical Method
The statistical approach taken here is very similar to that used for the previous chapter on gener-
ator margins. The only diﬀerence in terms of analysis is that rather than using the international
data to generate panel data of margins, the same data are converted into a number of diﬀerent
indicators of diversity. The steps taken in this analysis are summarised as follows:
1. Import the panel data into Stata (30 electricity systems over 90 time points)
2. Import dummy variables of privatisation and liberalisation
3. Apply mixed eﬀects model using xtmixed function
4. Extract p-values for privatisation and liberalisation
The above procedure makes a number of necessary assumptions about the structure of the
diversity data. First, the data are assumed to be autocorrelated with order 1 (AR1). This
means that for each country, the distribution of possible levels of diversity is a function primarily
of the previous year’s diversity level. This is consistent with the way that the generation mix
changes – namely, through the closure of old plant and the construction of new plant. The
current mix is therefore a combination of the previous year’s mix and some change in that mix.
The second important assumption comes from the use of the mixed eﬀects model (xtmixed).
This model assumes that the data have a ﬁxed and a random component. The assumption of a
random component means that the eﬀect of the explanatory variables (in this case, privatisation
and liberalisation) is distributed normally over the diﬀerent electricity systems. This assumption
constrains us since it prevents us from asking about the eﬀect of, say, privatisation on a particular
country; instead we can only say how privatisation aﬀects countries such as these sampled for
this analysis. The advantage of making this assumption is that it greatly increases the power of
the analysis, making it more likely to see an eﬀect where such an eﬀect is truly occurring. This
is particularly important where the amount of data available is relatively small, as is the case
here.
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6.4 Changes to generator diversity over time
The OECD countries have almost all undergone a period of increasing diversity, as shown in
Figure 6.1. This means that most countries have either introduced more types of generation
onto their systems, or that the market share between these generation options has become more
balanced.
The UK’s own diversity has increased considerably since 1980, as shown in Figure 6.2. This rate
of increase has been fairly constant except for a period immediately after privatisation, when the
rate of diversity increase went up. As Figure 6.3 shows, this is almost entirely attributable to
the introduction of natural gas into the generation fuel mix at the beginning of the 1990s.
By way of contrast, both Finland and Sweden are dominated by hydroelectric power and nuclear
generation – a situation that has changed little since the early 1980s (Figures 6.4 and 6.5). For
this reason, the SWI in these two countries has remained largely static and has, in fact, declined
by a small amount.
The question of interest for the remainder of this chapter is whether the change in diversity can
be attributed to either the liberalisation or the subsequent regulation of electricity systems.
6.5 Eﬀect of liberalisation and privatisation on diversity
This section asks whether diﬀerent liberalisation measures are causally associated with a change
in the level of generator diversity.
6.5.1 Eﬀect of overall liberalisation
As Figure 6.6 shows, there is a correlation between increasing liberalisation and increasing di-
versity. More liberalised systems tend to have a higher level of diversity. This representation
of the data simply plots the level of diversity against the overall level of liberalisation for all
country-years, and does not reveal whether this trend occurs as a result of diﬀerences between
countries or whether those diﬀerences arise within countries over time.
The question of interest is whether an increase in overall liberalisation is associated with a change
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in the level of diversity. The panel data analysis described above was used to test this question,
looking for a relationship between a change in overall liberalisation and a change in diversity
from between zero and 5 years into the future.
Figure 6.7 show the results of this analysis. Across all lags the impact of an increase in the level of
overall liberalisation is positive although, with the exception of the lag at 3 years, these eﬀects do
not appear to be signiﬁcant. The 3-year lag, however, does not appear to be an outlier. Rather,
it appears to be the apex of an eﬀect that increases steadily from the initial policy change and
declines steadily afterwards.
This suggests that not only do countries with higher levels of overall liberalisation tend to have
higher levels of diversity, but that there is evidence of a causal relationship. If true, this would
mean that an increase in overall liberalisation caused an increase in the diversity of the generation
mix.
It is possible that the association is not causal. The lagged eﬀect eliminates the possibility of
reverse causality (in which an increase in system diversity would increase the probability that a
government chose to increase the level of liberalisation). There remains, however, the possibility
that overall liberalisation and the increase in diversity shared a common cause. For example, an
increase in GDP could encourage investment in new forms of generation, whilst also providing
government with the conﬁdence to enact a change in policy.
Indeed, as Figure 6.8 shows, there appears to be some correlation between GDP and SWI.
Further analysis shows that a change in GDP is indeed associated with a change in diversity
(Figure 6.9), so there is a possibility that once GDP has been taken into account, the apparent
eﬀect of overall liberalisation on SWI will disappear.
Once GDP is controlled for (Figure 6.10), however, the eﬀect of overall liberalisation on SWI
remains. There may still be other confounding variables that have not been identiﬁed, but it
can be said that, irrespective of changes in the productivity of the wider economy, there is an
association between the level of overall liberalisation and the diversity of electricity systems.
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Figure 6.1: Shannon-Wiener Index (SWI) for all OECD countries
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Figure 6.2: SWI for the UK Figure 6.3: Generation mix of the UK
Figure 6.4: Generation mix of Finland Figure 6.5: Generation mix of Sweden
Figure 6.6: SWI (all county-years) vs overall degree
of liberalisation
Figure 6.7: Lagged eﬀect of overall liberalisation on
SWI
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Figure 6.8: SWI (all county-years) vs GDP Figure 6.9: Lagged eﬀect of GDP on SWI
Figure 6.10: Lagged eﬀect of overall liberalisation on SWI, controlling for GDP
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Assuming that the relationship between overall liberalisation and diversity is a causal one, there
remains the question of what aspects of liberalisation are responsible. The following sections
investigate this question.
6.5.2 Eﬀect of the creation of a liberalised pool on diversity
The measure of overall liberalisation (overall lib) is a composite of a number of diﬀerent liberali-
sation indicators deﬁned by the OECD. One of these is a binary indicator that measures whether
there is a liberalised pool in operation. As with all the binary explanatory variables used in this
research, this has been coded to take a value of 1 if the liberalised pool exists and 0 if it does
not.
As can be seen from Figure 6.11, the countries with a liberalised pool have, on average, slightly
higher generation diversity than those that do not, but this between-group diﬀerence is consid-
erably smaller than the within-group diﬀerence.
Figure 6.11: Overall mean SWI with and without a
liberalised pool
Figure 6.12: Mean SWI by year, with and without a
liberalised pool
On a year-by-year basis, as shown in Figure 6.12, the overall trend for both liberalised and
non-liberalised systems is towards increasing diversity. Until the year 2000, countries with a
liberalised pool had, on average, lower diversity than those that had not liberalised. The rate
of diversity increase is higher in the countries with a liberalised pool an diversity was higher in
these countries in the years after 2000.
Again, the causal question is whether creating a liberalised pool caused a change in the level of
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the SWI. Figure 6.13 shows the result of this analysis.
Figure 6.13: Eﬀect of the creation of a liberalised pool on SWI
As with overall lib, the eﬀect of introducing a liberalised pool appears to be to increase the
system’s diversity. The eﬀect is less marked: the only statistically signiﬁcant result is again at
a lag of 3 years, but the eﬀect on SWI is only an increase of 0.23 (p=0.03). The eﬀect at other
lags is not consistently positive, providing less support for the contention that this eﬀect at a lag
of 3 years reﬂects a true association.
If the creation of a liberalised pool does contribute to the association between overall liberalisation
and diversity, the contribution is only a small one. The next section considers the eﬀect of
privatisation on diversity.
6.5.3 Eﬀect of the ownership arrangements on generation diversity
The ownership arrangements variables describe the extent to which the largest generation, trans-
mission, distribution and supply companies have been privatised in a given country. The ‘own-
ercode’ variable takes a value of 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 or 1 depending on whether a country’s main
electricity companies are, respectively, ‘public’, ‘mostly public’, ‘mixed’, ‘mostly private’ or ‘pri-
vate’. Further, a binary variable ‘privatised’ has been generated from the ownercode and takes
a value of 1 if a country’s system is privatised or mostly privatised, and takes 0 otherwise.
A plot of the mean SWI against ownercode (Figure 6.14) reveals a positive correlation between the
degree of privatisation and the level of diversity. In particular it seems to show that systems that
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are either fully (0) or mostly publicly (0.25) owned, or are classed as having ‘mixed’ ownership
(0.5) have lower diversity than those that are fully or mostly privatised.
Figure 6.14: SWI (all county-years) against the degree
of private ownership
Figure 6.15: Eﬀect of the ownership arrangements on
the SWI
As Figure 6.15 shows, the lagged eﬀect after 3 years is signiﬁcant, but there is also an eﬀect at
lags of 1 year and a borderline case at 2 years. The eﬀects at 1-,2- and 3-year lags are 1.2, 0.6
and 0.6, respectively. These are between three and six times larger than the maximum eﬀect
exhibited by the creation of a liberalised pool, suggesting that privatisation has a greater eﬀect
on the generation mix than the means by which electricity is traded.
As in Chapter 5 a binary variable was created, ‘privatised’. This pooled the ownercode variable
so that ‘privatised’ and ‘mostly privatised’ were considered as one category and ‘mixed’, ‘mostly
public’ and ‘public’ were categorised as another.
This variable conﬁrms that that have undergone privatisation have higher mean diversity (Fig-
ure 6.16). Breaking this analysis down into separate years reveals the relationship shown in
Figure 6.17. In all years the countries with predominantly privately-owned electricity sectors
had electricity systems that had a higher level of diversity.
There is a positive eﬀect of privatising a system on its subsequent diversity – an eﬀect that peaks
after 3 years after privatisation (Figure 6.18). The maximum eﬀect of privatisation on SWI is
0.6, which is comparable to the eﬀect of overall liberalisation and three times that of the eﬀect
of creating a liberalised pool.
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Figure 6.16: Mean SWI whether privatised (1) or not
(0)
Figure 6.17: Mean SWI by whether privatised and by
year
Figure 6.18: Lagged eﬀect of privatisation on SWI
6.5.4 Vertical Separation
Vertical integration is indicated by two variables: the degree of vertical separation between the
transmission and generation segments of the electricity industry (transgensep, where 0=In-
tegrated, 0.5=Accounting Separation and 1=Separate Companies) and the overall degree of
vertical integration (vertsepoverall, where 0=Integrated, 0.5=Mixed and 1=Unbundled). As
before, two corresponding binary variables were created. These are transgen unbundling and
overall unbundling, and take a value of 0 if the system is vertically integrated and 1 otherwise.
There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in diversity between countries with diﬀerent degrees of separation
between the transmission and generation sector (Figure 6.19). Nor does the eﬀect of changing
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this separation appear to have an eﬀect on the subsequent level of diversity within a country’s
generation mix (Figure 6.20).
Figure 6.19: SWI (all county-years) against the degree
of transmission-generation separation
Figure 6.20: Eﬀect of a change to the degree of
transmission-generation separation on the SWI
Figure 6.21 shows the diﬀerence in SWI between systems with fully integrated transmission and
generation sectors and those with some degree of separation. The diﬀerence is small in all years,
and one group is not consistently higher than the other.
Figure 6.21: SWI by year against whether transmission and generation are integrated (0) or not (1)
Similarly, diﬀerent levels of overall vertical separation have very similar levels of diversity on
average (Figure 6.22), and neither a large nor consistent eﬀect can be seen on SWI of vertical
unbundling (Figure 6.23).
The annual view reveals no signiﬁcant or consistent diﬀerence between the diversities of the
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Figure 6.22: SWI (all county-years) against degree of
overall vertical integration
Figure 6.23: Eﬀect of a change to the degree of overall
integration on the SWI
integrated and unbundled systems.
Figure 6.24: SWI against whether the system has undergone vertical unbundling in a given year
In terms of diversity, then, neither the overall vertical separation within the system nor a sepa-
ration between the generation and transmission sector more speciﬁcally seems to have an eﬀect
on the subsequent diversity of the generation mix.
The creation of a liberalised pool for trading electricity is associated slightly with an increase
in the diversity of the system, but it is the transfer of the generation, transmission, distribution
and supply operations from public to private ownership that seems to have the strongest eﬀect.
6 SYSTEM DIVERSITY 192
6.6 Eﬀect of renewable generation and associated policies on system di-
versity
Using the same methods applied above, this section assesses the relationship between the de-
ployment of renewable generation and the associated renewables policies on the system diversity.
6.6.1 Installed capacity of new renewables
Here, the installed capacity of new renewables (wind, solar and marine renewables) is compared
with the overall diversity of the generation mix. As Figure 6.25 shows there is some positive
correlation between the level of renewables penetration and the diversity of the system, but this
plot is dominated by the years in which little or no renewable generation capacity was installed.
Figure 6.25: SWI (all county-years) against the pro-
portion of new renewables on the system
Figure 6.26: Lagged eﬀect of increasing the new re-
newable proportion on the SWI
Unlike policy changes, which might exhibit an eﬀect for a number of years after their imple-
mentation, the relationship between renewables penetration and system diversity is likely to be
immediate since the renewables themselves will be contributing to the diversity directly. This is
what is observed in Figure 6.26, where it can be seen that the immediate eﬀect of increasing the
proportion of renewables on the system is to increase SWI. An increase by 1% of the proportion
of renewables is associated with an increase of 0.013 in the level of SWI. This eﬀect is not carried
over into the future, meaning that this initial increase in diversity does not last.
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6.6.2 Renewable electricity support schemes
The following sections investigate whether the provision of support for these new renewables has
an eﬀect on diversity.
6.6.2.1 Any renewable support scheme
The overall diﬀerence in diversity and the diﬀerence seen on an annual basis (Figures 6.27 and
6.28, respectively) show that diversity is consistently higher in those countries that have in place
some sort of support mechanism for renewable generation.
Figure 6.27: Mean SWI by whether some renewable
support mechanism is in place (1) or not (0)
Figure 6.28: Mean SWI by renewable support and by
year
The observed eﬀect is shown in Figure 6.29. Whilst the eﬀect is positive for all lags, it is small
and the results are not signiﬁcant. There is little evidence, then, that the implementation of a
renewables scheme in general will increase the diversity of the system. Rather, it seems that it
is those systems that are diverse that are likely to implement renewable support mechanisms.
It is possible that, whilst renewables policies overall have not signiﬁcantly increased the system
diversity, diﬀerent types of policy design might show an eﬀect when analysed independently of
the others. The following sections show the results of this analysis.
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Figure 6.29: Lagged eﬀect of introducing renewables support mechanisms on the SWI
6.6.2.2 Feed-in Tariﬀ
For all the years considered, electricity systems with a Feed-in Tariﬀ (FIT) scheme have higher
diversity than those without (Figure 6.30.
Figure 6.30: Mean SWI by presence of a FIT scheme
and by year
Figure 6.31: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a feed-in
tariﬀ on the SWI
The mixed modelling analysis, however, shows no eﬀect of introducing an FIT (Figure 6.31),
suggesting that those countries that bring in a FIT scheme tend, on average, already to be more
diverse than those that do not.
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6.6.2.3 Quota / Tradeable Green Certiﬁcate / Renewables Obligation
The ﬁrst countries to introduce Tradeable Green Certiﬁcates (TGC) had less generation diversity
than the average, but by 2002 the average SWI in TGC-operating companies was above the
average.
Figure 6.32: Mean SWI by presence of a TGC scheme
and by year
Figure 6.33: Lagged eﬀect of introducing tradeable
green certiﬁcates (TGC) on the SWI
There is no support, however, for the hypothesis that the introduction of a TGC scheme causes
a change to the system diversity, as illustrated by Figure 6.33.
6.6.2.4 Tendering Process
Tendering process have not been widely implemented, so the diﬀerences observed between the
two groups in Figure 6.34 should not be over-interpreted.
The eﬀect of introducing a tendering process shows no eﬀect on the diversity of the system
(Figure 6.35).
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Figure 6.34: Mean SWI by use of a renewables ten-
dering process and by year
Figure 6.35: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a tendering
process on the SWI
6.6.2.5 Renewables Tax Incentives / Investment Grants
The use of tax incentives and investment grants has been more widespread. Those countries that
have made use of such mechanisms tend to have more diversity than those without, as shown by
Figure 6.36.
Figure 6.36: Mean SWI by existence of tax incentives
for renewables and by year
Figure 6.37: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a renewables
tax incentive on the SWI
As with the other renewable support mechanisms, however, there is no observable eﬀect of
introducing tax breaks or investment grants on the diversity of the system (Figure 6.37).
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6.6.3 Conclusions
It would seem from the above analysis that in terms of overall measures of liberalisation and
privatisation, the more liberalised systems are more technologically diverse. Furthermore, an
increase in overall liberalisation within a given country, on average, increases the diversity. The
act of undergoing deregulation a system, therefore, leads to an increase in diversity. Closer
analysis, however, revealed, that this appeared to be more a function of privatisation than
it was of unbundling. If liberalisation had been the driver of increased diversity, this would
have suggested that there would be a competitive pressure to diversify a company’s generation
portfolio. That the driver appears to have instead been privatisation would reveal something
about the underlying mechanism. This point is explored in more depth in Chapter 9.
The next chapter addresses two aspects of resilience indicative of consumers’ ability to cope with
system disturbances: the intensity of their demand for electricity, and the price of that electricity.
7
Energy Intensity and Prices
The previous two chapters have concerned the resilience of the electricity system itself, via
measures of generation margins and generation diversity. The focus of this chapter is on the
resilience of society to disruptions that might arise from the electricity system. Speciﬁcally, it
considers the impact of liberalisation and regulation on the intensity of electricity consumption
(the electricity consumed per unit GDP and per capita) and the price of that electricity (in real
terms), both to industry and to households.
198
7 ENERGY INTENSITY AND PRICES 199
7.1 Energy Intensity
The ‘energy intensity’ indicators reﬂect the extent to which economies and the individuals within
that economy are dependent on the energy system. In this sense, energy intensity is a measure
of society to a disruption in the provision of energy services.
7.1.1 Changes to Energy Intensity over time
Figure 7.2 shows the annual electricity consumption per unit GDP for the OECD countries.
Diﬀerent countries exhibit diﬀerent trends: some are upward, including Turkey, Greece, Portugal,
Spain, Korea and Mexico; some, such as the UK, USA, Germany and the Czech Republic decrease
over time. These trends can in part be attributed to structural changes in the economies of these
countries. As Figure 7.1 shows, a number of those countries that reduced their energy intensity
were also decreasing the proportion of GDP that came from the industrial and construction
sectors (OECD, 2010).
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Figure 7.1: Proportion of national GDP attributable to the industrial and construction sectors (OECD, 2010)
Figure 7.3 shows the second energy intensity measure: the electricity consumed on average by
each person in a country. Here, the overall trend in the OECD countries is almost universally
upward. Despite increases in energy eﬃciency, these increases in electricity use are driven by
both population and per capita income growth in the majority of the OECD countries over this
period (Azar et al., 2002).
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Figure 7.2: kWh/GDP for all OECD countries
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Figure 7.3: kWh per capita for all OECD countries
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As with a number of other countries, the UK’s economic energy intensity has been decreasing
for a number of years (Figure 7.4). Whilst the UK’s overall GDP has been increasing over this
period, the expansion of the service industry and the contraction of the manufacturing sector has
decoupled this growth from the indigenous electricity consumption. In this case the embedded
energy associated with consumed products remains the same, but is expended outside of UK
national borders.
Figure 7.4: kWh/GDP for the UK Figure 7.5: kWh per capita for the UK
An alternative explanation for the decoupling of electricity consumption from GDP is that in-
dustrial eﬃciency gains allow the same products to be manufactured using less energy. In either
case, the extent to which UK productivity might be aﬀected by a disruption to the UK electricity
supply is reﬂected by the economic energy intensity indicator.
The OECD’s per-capita electricity intensity shows an increasing trend in nearly all cases. The
UK’s trajectory is no exception here, with Figure 7.5 revealing strong growth over this time
period, although it peaked in 2005 and showed a considerable drop in 2009.
7.1.2 Eﬀect of liberalisation and privatisation on energy intensity
7.1.2.1 Eﬀect of overall liberalisation
A scatter plot of economic energy intensity against overall liberalisation (Figure 7.6) shows no
discernable relationship between the two. This is somewhat conﬁrmed by Figure 7.7, which
provides little evidence that a change in the overall level of liberalisation induces a change in the
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economic energy intensity.
Figure 7.6: kWh/GDP (all county-years) against the
degree of overall liberalisation
Figure 7.7: Lagged eﬀect of increasing the overall de-
gree of liberalisation on the per-GDP electricity inten-
sity
The per-capita electricity electricity consumption appears to be negatively correlated with overall
liberalisation (Figure 7.8), but the relationship is not a strong one. Furthermore, as Figure 7.9,
there is no evidence to suggest a causal relationship.
Figure 7.8: kWh per capita (all county-years) against
the degree of overall liberalisation
Figure 7.9: Lagged eﬀect of increasing overall liberal-
isation on per-capita electricity intensity
7.1.2.2 Eﬀect of the creation of a liberalised pool on energy intensity
For most of the years observed, countries with liberalised pools have tended to have higher per-
GDP and per-capita electricity consumption levels (Figures 7.10 and 7.11). The mean energy
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intensities (for both indicators) of the countries with electricity pools has been declining, whereas
for those without pools the trend has either been ﬂat or slightly increasing.
Figure 7.10: Mean kWh/GDP by whether liberalised
and by year
Figure 7.11: Mean kWh per capita by whether liber-
alised and by year
The ﬁgures above suggest that early-liberalisers had more energy-intensive economies. The
subsequent decline could either arise as a within-country transformation, such as transition from
manufacturing- to service-based economies, or it could be a result of countries with below-
average intensities eventually liberalising. Figures 7.12 and 7.13 are somewhat equivocal. No
signiﬁcant eﬀects are seen at the 5% level, but there is some suggestion that 3, 4 and 5 years
after introducing a liberalised pool there is an associated decline in the per-GDP and per-capita
electricity consumption.
Figure 7.12: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a liberalised
pool on kWh/GDP
Figure 7.13: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a liberalised
pool on kWh per capita
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7.1.2.3 Eﬀect of privatisation on energy intensity
As Figure 7.14 shows, there appears to be some overall relationship between increasing levels of
private ownership and a decreasing economic energy intensity. No trend, however, is apparent
for the per-capita electricity consumption (Figure 7.15).
Figure 7.14: kWh/GDP (all county-years) against the
degree of private ownership
Figure 7.15: kWh per capita (all county-years) against
the degree of private ownership
In both cases, however, the lagged eﬀects appear to be negligible (Figures 7.16 & 7.17), meaning
that there is no evidence that privatisation aﬀects per-GDP or per-capita electricity consumption.
Figure 7.16: Lagged eﬀect of increasing private own-
ership kWh/GDP
Figure 7.17: Lagged eﬀect of increasing private own-
ership kWh per capita
The binary “privatised” variable conﬁrms this lack of association, as seen in Figures 7.18 and
7.19, which show no eﬀect of privatisation on either indicator.
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Figure 7.18: Lagged eﬀect of privatising on
kWh/GDP
Figure 7.19: Lagged eﬀect of privatising on kWh per
capita
The by-year plot for economic intensity (Figure 7.20) shows that across all years privatised
systems consume around 40% less electricity for each unit of economic output. There is less of a
diﬀerence between the two groups on the per-capita indicator (Figure 7.20) showing very similar
levels of electricity consumption per head, with both increasing slowly until 1997, after which
privatised systems remained at a fairly constant level and non-privatised systems continued to
increase their per-capita consumption.
Figure 7.20: Mean kWh/GDP by whether privatised
and by year
Figure 7.21: Mean kWh per capita by whether priva-
tised and by year
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7.1.2.4 Vertical Separation
Vertical separation appears to have little relationship with the economic energy intensity of
countries. Figure 7.22 shows that whether generation and transmission are fully integrated, sep-
arated by accounting practices or fully separated, there is no diﬀerence in terms of the electricity
consumed per unit of economic productivity. Figure 7.23 conﬁrms that there is no association
between transmission-generation separation and the electricity intensity of the economy.
Figure 7.22: kWh/GDP (all county-years) against the
degree of transmission-generation separation
Figure 7.23: Lagged eﬀect of decreasing transmission-
generation separation on kWh/GDP
This is also true for the binary transgen unbundling variable. There is a small diﬀerence in
the kWh per GDP in the early 1990s, but this has gone within a decade (Figure 7.24). Figure
7.25 further shows that there is little evidence of an association here.
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Figure 7.24: Mean kWh/GDP by whether transmis-
sion and generation have at least accounting separation
and by year
Figure 7.25: Lagged eﬀect of binary trans-gen un-
bundling on kWh/GDP
The conclusions are very similar when considering overall vertical separation, which includes
distribution and supply unbundling. Figures 7.26 and 7.27 do not reveal any association between
this measure and the kWh per GDP indicator. Nor does the binary variable overall unbundling
show a large diﬀerence between integrated and unbundled systems over time (Figure 7.28) or as
a result of the ﬁxed eﬀects model (Figure 7.29).
Figure 7.26: kWh/GDP (all county-years) against
overall vertical separation
Figure 7.27: Lagged eﬀect of overall vertical separa-
tion on kWh/GDP
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Figure 7.28: Mean kWh/GDP by year grouped into
vertically integrated and unbundled or mixed
Figure 7.29: Lagged eﬀect of binary overall un-
bundling on kWh/GDP
As with the electricity-per-GDP indicator, there seems to be little evidence to support a rela-
tionship between transmission-generation separation and the per-capita electricity consumption
(Figures 7.30 & 7.31).
Figure 7.30: kWh per capita (all county-years) against
the degree of transmission-generation separation
Figure 7.31: Lagged eﬀect of decreasing transmission-
generation separation on kWh per capita
Nor does the binary variable transgen unbundling suggest a strong relationship. The kWh-
per-capita is initially slightly higher in the unbundled systems, but the rate of increase for
those systems that remain integrated is higher (Figure 7.32). Figure 7.33, however, shows no
association between unbundling and per-capita consumption.
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Figure 7.32: Mean kWh per capita by whether trans-
mission and generation have at least accounting separa-
tion and by year
Figure 7.33: Lagged eﬀect of binary trans-gen un-
bundling on kWh per capita
There is slightly more evidence of an association between overall vertical separation and the
per-capita electricity consumption. Figure 7.34 shows that a proportion of the integrated system
have above average per-capita consumption levels, and there is weak evidence from Figure 7.35
that there is a negative association.
Figure 7.34: kWh per capita (all county-years) against
overall vertical separation
Figure 7.35: Lagged eﬀect of overall vertical separa-
tion on kWh per capita
The binary variable overall unbundling again shows an initially higher level of per-capita
consumption for unbundled systems, but that this declines over time, whereas for the systems
that remain vertically integrated the reverse is true (Figure 7.36). The evidence of association,
shown in Figure 7.37, is not strong, providing little evidence for the idea that unbundling the
system leads to a change in per-capita electricity consumption.
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Figure 7.36: Mean kWh per capita by year grouped
into vertically integrated and unbundled or mixed
Figure 7.37: Lagged eﬀect of binary overall un-
bundling on kWh per capita
7.1.3 Eﬀect of renewable generation and associated policies on electrical energy intensity
Using the same methods applied above, this section assesses the relationship between the deploy-
ment of renewable generation and the associated renewables policies on the levels of per-GDP
and per-capita electricity consumption.
7.1.3.1 Installed capacity of new renewables
Figure 7.38 suggests that there is a negative correlation between the level of renewables pene-
tration and per-GDP electricity consumption. Figure 7.39 provides only weak support for this
hypothesis, however.
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Figure 7.38: kWh/GDP (all county-years) against the
proportion of new renewables on the system
Figure 7.39: Lagged eﬀect of increasing the new re-
newable proportion on the kWh/GDP
The relationship between renewables penetration and per-capita electricity consumption is more
marked. Again, a scatter plot indicates some correlation (Figure 7.40), but it is the mixed eﬀects
model that reveals the association (Figure 7.41). This association discounts the diﬀerences
between countries with low and high levels of penetration, and shows that a within-country
increase in the proportion of renewables on the system is associated with an immediate and
sustained reduction in the amount of electricity consumed by the average person.
Figure 7.40: kWh per capita (all county-years) against
the proportion of new renewables on the system
Figure 7.41: Lagged eﬀect of increasing the new re-
newable proportion on the kwhpercapita
None of the changes in these explanatory variables occurs independently of the others, so it is not
possible to conclude that an increase in renewables causes a reduction in electricity demand. The
two variables may share a proximal cause (perhaps unmeasured). Even if the association is truly
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a causal, the causal pathway needs to be clariﬁed. It is likely, for example, that an increase in
the proportion of renewables leads to an increase in the electricity price, which in turn constrains
demand. This would still represent a causal chain between renewables penetration and demand
reduction, but the pathway has implications for policy.
The particular question of the eﬀect of renewables penetration levels and policies are addressed
later in Section 7.2.3.
7.1.3.2 Renewable electricity support schemes
The following sections investigate whether the provision of support for these new renewables has
an eﬀect on the energy intensity of the economy or individual consumers.
Any renewable support scheme
The overall diﬀerence in diversity and the diﬀerence seen on an annual basis (Figures 7.42 and
7.43, respectively) both show that countries with a renewable support mechanism in place tend
on average to have a lower per-GDP electricity consumption that those without.
Figure 7.42: Mean kwhpergdp by renewable support Figure 7.43: Mean kwhpergdp by renewable support
and by year
The same can be said of the per-capita electricity consumption. Economies without a renewable
support mechanism tend to use electricity more intensively, and this appears to be an increasing
trend (Figure 7.45).
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Figure 7.44: Mean kwhpercapita by renewable sup-
port
Figure 7.45: Mean kwhpercapita by renewable sup-
port and by year
On both the per-GDP and the per-capita measure, the results of the mixed eﬀects analysis are
not signiﬁcant at the 5% level (Figures 7.46 & 7.47). There is some weak evidence, however,
that the introduction of a renewables support mechanism has a depressive eﬀect on the per-
GDP electricity consumption, and this holds for all observed lags. The eﬀects on per-capita
consumption are also negative, but the eﬀect is a very small proportion of the overall variability.
Figure 7.46: Lagged eﬀect of introducing renewables
support mechanisms on the kwhpergdp
Figure 7.47: Lagged eﬀect of introducing renewables
support mechanisms on the kwhpercapita
Feed-in Tariﬀ
The trends observed for renewables policies in general seem to hold with respect to the particular
case of Feed-in Tariﬀs (FITs). Electricity systems with a Feed-in Tariﬀ (FIT) scheme have lower
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per-GDP and per-capita electricity consumption than those without (Figures 7.48 & 7.50. In
both cases, however, whilst the results of the mixed eﬀects analysis show a negative impact of
FITs on electricity intensity (Figures 7.49 & 7.51), these impacts are small and well within the
margin of error.
Figure 7.48: Mean kwhpergdp by FIT and by year Figure 7.49: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a feed-in
tariﬀ on the kwhpergdp
Figure 7.50: Mean kwhpercapita by FIT and by year Figure 7.51: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a feed-in
tariﬀ on the kwhpercapita
Quota / Tradeable Green Certiﬁcate / Renewables Obligation
Countries that have implemented Tradeable Green Certiﬁcates (TGCs) have consistently had
lower per-GDP electricity consumption than the average (Figure 7.52). There is, however, little
evidence to suggest that this is predominantly a causal association, as shown by Figure 7.53.
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Figure 7.52: Mean kwhpergdp by TGC and by year Figure 7.53: Lagged eﬀect of introducing tradeable
green certiﬁcates (TGC) on the kwhpergdp
The same is true for the per-capita electricity consumption, where countries with TGCs tend to
be lower than those without (Figure 7.54) but with no evidence of a causal link (Figure 7.55).
Figure 7.54: Mean kwhpercapita by TGC and by year Figure 7.55: Lagged eﬀect of introducing tradeable
green certiﬁcates (TGC) on the kwhpercapita
Tendering Process
As mentioned in previous chapters, tendering processes have not been widely implemented.
Until 2006, the countries with tendering processes tended to have lower per-GDP electricity
consumption (Figure 7.56). The per-capita electricity consumption diﬀerence between the two
groups is smaller (Figure 7.57).
In both cases, there is little evidence that there is a causal relationship in eﬀect. Neither Figures
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7.56 nor 7.57 show a consistent association, and at all lags the eﬀect is well within the margins
of error.
Figure 7.56: Mean kwhpergdp by tendering process
and by year
Figure 7.57: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a tendering
process on the kwhpergdp
Figure 7.58: Mean kwhpercapita by tendering process
and by year
Figure 7.59: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a tendering
process on the kwhpercapita
Renewables Tax Incentives / Investment Grants
The use of tax incentives and investment grants has been more widespread. Those countries
that have made use of such mechanisms have, on average, slightly lower per-GDP and per-capita
levels of electricity consumption (Figures 7.60 & 7.62). The diﬀerence is very small, however,
and as Figures 7.61 and 7.63 show, there is no evidence that introducing taxes or incentives in
favour of renewables has any causal relationship with the energy intensity measures.
7 ENERGY INTENSITY AND PRICES 218
Figure 7.60: Mean kwhpergdp by tax incentive and
by year
Figure 7.61: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a renewables
tax incentive on the kwhpergdp
Figure 7.62: Mean kwhpercapita by tax incentive and
by year
Figure 7.63: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a renewables
tax incentive on the kwhpercapita
7.2 Electricity Prices
The price of electricity relates to the resilience of society to changes in electricity availability.
Physical unavailability in countries such as the UK, which have well-developed energy systems,
occurs fairly infrequently. Furthermore, when it does occur it tends to be a localised event arising
from a failure in the distribution network.
Of more concern to most consumers is the price of electricity. For some, there will be a price
point beyond which basic energy services such as heating and lighting become unaﬀordable.
Access to electricity, more broadly then, should account for both the physical availability and
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the aﬀordability of a resource.
Indirectly, electricity prices are also likely to be one of the causal pathways between other ex-
planatory variables and the resilience indicators. For example, in Section 7.1.3 it was found that
increasing renewables penetration was associated with a reduction in demand. One explanation
for this is that increasing the proportion of renewable forms of generation pushes up electricity
prices, which in turn pushes down demand.
7.2.1 Changes to electricity prices over time
Figures 7.64 and 7.65 shows the industrial and household electricity prices for the OECD coun-
tries, respectively.
7 ENERGY INTENSITY AND PRICES 220
Figure 7.64: Industrial electricity price for all OECD countries
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Figure 7.65: Household electricity price for all OECD countries
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In nearly all countries the price of electricity for industry and households have been steadily
increasing over the past two decades. The rate of increase has also gone up since the turn of the
century in the vast majority of the OECD countries, including the UK (Figures 7.66 & 7.67).
Figure 7.66: Industrial electricity price for the UK Figure 7.67: Household electricity price for the UK
7.2.2 Eﬀect of liberalisation and privatisation on electricity prices
7.2.2.1 Eﬀect of overall liberalisation
A scatter plot of industrial electricity prices against overall liberalisation (Figure 7.68 seems to
suggest a slight positive correlation between the two. Figure 7.69 provides some weak evidence
that there is a positive association here, meaning that an increase in overall liberalisation within
a country pushes up industrial electricity prices within a year.
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Figure 7.68: Industrial electricity price (all county-
years) against overall lib
Figure 7.69: Lagged eﬀect of overall lib on the indus-
trial electricity price
A similar conclusion can be drawn about the household electricity price, which shows a positive
correlation in Figure 7.70 and evidence of an association in Figure 7.71. At a lag of 3 years there
is a drop in eﬀect, which appear to be in contrast with the general trend, so may be an outlier.
Figure 7.70: Household electricity price (all county-
years) against overall lib
Figure 7.71: Lagged eﬀect of overall lib on the house-
hold electricity price
For both households and industry, the impact of increasing overall liberalisation seems to have
the eﬀect of increasing the price of electricity. This somewhat surprising conclusion runs counter
to one of the precepts of the privatisation and liberalisation program: that a combination of
private ownership and competitive markets will increase the eﬃciency of electricity generation,
resulting in lower prices to customers.
The following sections investigate the components of the overall lib indicator to further under-
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stand this behaviour.
7.2.2.2 Eﬀect of the creation of a liberalised pool on electricity prices
Figure 7.72 describes the industrial electricity prices in countries with and without a liberalised
electricity trading pool. From 1990 to 1996 the two groups are very similar. From 1996 to 2003
the price of electricity to industry was cheaper on average in ‘liberalised’ systems, ﬁtting with the
theory that competition leads to price reductions. From 2004 onwards, however, the relationship
had switched, and the ‘liberalised’ systems had on average more expensive electricity.
This behaviour is also reﬂected in the household electricity prices. Liberalised systems had
cheaper prices in the early years of liberalisation, but by 1997 this diﬀerence had gone, and
from 2001 onwards liberalised systems’s household electricity had become more expensive. This
diﬀerence increased further as time progressed.
Figure 7.72: Mean industrial electricity price by lib-
eralised and by year
Figure 7.73: Mean household electricity price by
whether liberalised and by year
However, the lagged eﬀects shown by the mixed modelling analysis (Figure 7.74 & 7.75) do not
show good evidence of an association, and certainly not as strong as was seen for the overall lib
indicator. This would suggest that whilst the presence of a liberalised pool might be a good
predictor of a country having above-average electricity prices, this does not mean that a given
country’s electricity price would be expected to rise as a result of introducing its own trading
pool.
7 ENERGY INTENSITY AND PRICES 225
Figure 7.74: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a liberalised
pool industrial electricity prices
Figure 7.75: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a liberalised
pool on household electricity prices
7.2.2.3 Eﬀect of privatisation on electricity prices
Figures 7.76 and 7.77 show a scatter plot of electricity prices against the degree of privatisation.
On this snapshot view, which plots a value for each country-year, neither industrial nor household
electricity prices seem to be related to the degree of privatisation.
Figure 7.76: Industrial electricity price (all county-
years) against the degree of private ownership
Figure 7.77: Household electricity price (all county-
years) against the degree of private ownership
The mixed modelling analysis broadly supports this conclusion (Figures 7.78 & 7.79), showing
no eﬀect of privatisation on household electricity prices, and only a tentative positive association
between privatisation and industrial electricity prices between 1 and 3 years after a change in
the ownership structure.
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Figure 7.78: Lagged eﬀect of increasing private own-
ership on industrial electricity prices
Figure 7.79: Lagged eﬀect of increasing private own-
ership on household electricity prices
Using the binary privatised indicator, the by-year diﬀerences in electricity prices between pri-
vatised and nationalised systems can be seen (Figures 7.80 & 7.81). For both industrial and
household electricity prices, the early-privatising countries had, on average, higher electricity
prices. For nearly all years observed, however, the two groups’ prices have been converging,
meaning that the average electricity price has been increasing more rapidly in the nationalised
group than the privatised group.
Figure 7.80: Mean industrial electricity price by
whether privatised and by year
Figure 7.81: Mean household electricity price by
whether privatised and by year
Figures 7.82 and 7.83 show the eﬀect of the privatised variable. The eﬀect is slightly negative,
but is very small and is well within the conﬁdence intervals. The conclusion here, then, is that
the convergence seen in Figures 7.80 and 7.81 arise because the late-privatising countries have
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lower prices than the early-privatising countries, thereby deﬂating the average of the ‘privatised’
set and inﬂating the average of those countries that remain predominantly nationalised. There is
little evidence, then, that privatising the system increases electricity prices within that system.
Figure 7.82: Lagged eﬀect of privatised on industrial
electricity prices
Figure 7.83: Lagged eﬀect of privatised on household
electricity prices
7.2.2.4 Vertical Integration
This section concerns the relationship between vertical integration in the electricity sector and
the price of electricity. The ﬁrst indicator describes the degree of separation speciﬁcally between
the transmission and the generation parts of the industry. Figures 7.84 and 7.86 show this
relationship over all country-years, and the eﬀect of increasing this level of separation is described
in Figures 7.85 and 7.87, respectively. The price of electricity seems to be largely unaﬀected by
separating these two sectors of the industry.
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Figure 7.84: Industrial electricity price (all county-
years) against the degree of transmission-generation
separation
Figure 7.85: Lagged eﬀect of decreasing transmission-
generation separation on industrial electricity prices
Figure 7.86: Household electricity price (all county-
years) against the degree of transmission-generation
separation
Figure 7.87: Lagged eﬀect of decreasing transmission-
generation separation on household electricity prices
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The binary variable transgen unbundling combines systems that have completely unbundled
with those that have accounting separation, comparing them with systems that are fully inte-
grated in this respect. Figures 7.88 and 7.90 shows the prices in these groups over time. There
is little diﬀerence between the two groups, and this ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by Figures 7.89 and
7.91, which show no association between separating transmission from generation and the price
of electricity to consumers.
Figure 7.88: Mean industrial electricity price by
whether transmission and generation have at least ac-
counting separation and by year
Figure 7.89: Lagged eﬀect of binary trans-gen un-
bundling on industrial electricity prices
Figure 7.90: Mean household electricity price by
whether transmission and generation have at least ac-
counting separation and by year
Figure 7.91: Lagged eﬀect of binary trans-gen un-
bundling on household electricity prices
If separating transmission from generation has little discernable eﬀect on electricity prices, the
same cannot be said for the eﬀect of overall vertical unbundling. Figures 7.92 and 7.94 sug-
gest a positive relationship between overall vertical separation and increasing electricity prices,
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especially for households. Figures 7.93 and 7.97 both suggest that increasing overall vertical
separation is associated with increasing electricity prices. The eﬀect, however, does not appear
to be large, amounting to no more than a 5% increase.
Figure 7.92: Industrial electricity price (all county-
years) against overall vertical separation
Figure 7.93: Lagged eﬀect of overall vertical separa-
tion on industrial electricity prices
Figure 7.94: Household electricity price (all county-
years) against overall vertical separation
Figure 7.95: Lagged eﬀect of overall vertical separa-
tion on household electricity prices
To put this in context, electricity price trends are distinguished by the binary overall unbundling
variable shown in Figures 7.96 and 7.98. Industrial electricity prices are largely comparable be-
tween the two groups, whereas for household prices, the increase is more marked for vertically
unbundled systems. Again, the eﬀect shown in Figures 7.97 and 7.99 is positive and signiﬁcant
at some lags, but is still only a small eﬀect with respect to the overall diﬀerence seen in the
time-series plot.
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Figure 7.96: Mean industrial electricity price by year
grouped into vertically integrated and unbundled or
mixed
Figure 7.97: Lagged eﬀect of binary overall un-
bundling on industrial electricity prices
Figure 7.98: Mean household electricity price by year
grouped into vertically integrated and unbundled or
mixed
Figure 7.99: Lagged eﬀect of binary overall un-
bundling on household electricity prices
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From this, it can be said that separating transmission from generation has little, if any, eﬀect on
electricity prices, whereas there is a small eﬀect if overall vertical integration is reduced. Assum-
ing this eﬀect is real, this would suggest that the real eﬀect lies in the separation of transmission
of electricity from its distribution and/or supply, and that the result of that separation is (to a
small degree) to increase electricity prices.
7.2.3 Eﬀect of renewable generation and associated policies on electricity prices
This section assesses the relationship between the deployment of renewable generation and the
associated renewables policies on gas and electricity prices.
7.2.3.1 Installed capacity of new renewables
A scatter plot showing the relationship between the proportion of new renewables (wind, solar
and marine renewables) and the price of industrial and household electricity is shown in Figure
7.100 and Figure 7.102, respectively. Both show a positive correlation, but it is particularly
marked in the case of household electricity prices.
Those countries with high proportions of renewables seem to have high electricity prices. As
before, it is possible that this is a between country eﬀect – that a country’s characteristics give it
a propensity to have both a large proportion of renewables and high electricity prices. As Figures
7.101 and 7.103 suggest, however, this is a real association – that increasing the proportion of
renewables is associated with an increase in the price of electricity.
Table 7.1: Eﬀect of increasing the proportion of renewable generation on the price of household electricity
lag eﬀect se pvalues
0 0.283 0.091 0.002
1 0.337 0.091 0.000
2 0.346 0.099 0.000
3 0.457 0.104 0.000
4 0.545 0.115 0.000
5 0.520 0.121 0.000
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Figure 7.100: Industrial electricity price (all county-
years) against the proportion of new renewables on the
system
Figure 7.101: Lagged eﬀect of increasing the new re-
newable proportion on the industrial electricity price
Figure 7.102: Household electricity price (all county-
years) against the proportion of new renewables on the
system
Figure 7.103: Lagged eﬀect of increasing the new re-
newable proportion on the household electricity price
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The underlying values from Figure 7.103 are shown in Table 7.1. Increasing the proportion of
new renewables in a given year has the eﬀect of increasing the price of household electricity by
0.3 cents per kWh in the ﬁrst year. The average electric price in the sample is 11 cents per kWh.
Using this ﬁgure, a 1% increase in renewable generation increases the cost of household electricity
by around 3%. The peak eﬀect of that increase, however, comes after 4 years, by which time the
eﬀect of that 1% increase would have been, in total, to increase the price by 0.5c/kWh, or 5%.
7.2.3.2 Renewable electricity support schemes
The following sections investigate whether the eﬀect that renewable generation has on electricity
prices diﬀers depending on the nature of the support mechanism in place.
Any renewable support scheme
Figures 7.104 and 7.105 show that overall, countries with a renewable support mechanism tend
to have higher electricity prices than those that do not.
Figure 7.104: Mean industrial electricity price by re-
newable support
Figure 7.105: Mean household electricity price by re-
newable support
Figures 7.106 and 7.107 show how this behaviour changes over time. In both cases, countries
with renewables support mechanisms have higher prices in all years. In the case of industrial
electricity prices, this disparity appears to increase over time, whereas for household electricity
prices the magnitude of the diﬀerence varies over time.
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Figure 7.106: Mean industrial electricity price by re-
newable support and by year
Figure 7.107: Mean household electricity price by re-
newable support and by year
The observed eﬀect is shown in Figures 7.108 and 7.109. Whereas the proportion of new renew-
ables was directly associated with price increases, this does not appear to be the case for the
renewables policies designed to bring about the renewables deployment. There is some suggestion
that ﬁve years after the introduction of a renewables support mechanism there is some eﬀect.
The industrial electricity price at a lag of 5 years, for example, shows an increase of 1 cent per
kWh – an increase of around 9%.
Figure 7.108: Lagged eﬀect of introducing renewables
support mechanisms on the industrial electricity price
Figure 7.109: Lagged eﬀect of introducing renewables
support mechanisms on the household electricity price
In theory, extending the number of lags should be able to test whether this is a real eﬀect.
Figures 7.110 and 7.111 show the eﬀect of introducing a renewables support mechanism for lags
up to 10 years. Drawing conclusions about these longer-term eﬀects, however, requires that the
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renewables policies be in place for a suﬃcient length of time. At present this is not the case, but
there is tentative evidence here that the eﬀect ﬁrst seen at the ﬁve-year lag continues.
Figure 7.110: Lagged eﬀect of introducing renewables
support mechanisms on the industrial electricity price
Figure 7.111: Lagged eﬀect of introducing renewables
support mechanisms on the household electricity price
Feed-in Tariﬀ
The diﬀerence in industrial electricity prices between countries with a FIT and those without
is very small for most years, although in the last three years considered this gap appears to
have grown (Figure 7.112. The diﬀerence is more marked for household electricity prices, where
from 2003 onwards FIT-operating countries have, on average, higher and more rapidly increasing
electricity prices.
Figure 7.112: Mean industrial electricity price by FIT
and by year
Figure 7.113: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a feed-in
tariﬀ on the industrial electricity price
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Figure 7.114: Mean household electricity price by FIT
and by year
Figure 7.115: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a feed-in
tariﬀ on the household electricity price
The results of the mixed eﬀects model shown in Figures 7.113 and 7.115, however, do not re-
veal a strong association. The association with industrial electricity prices is positive, but not
signiﬁcant, whereas the eﬀect on household electricity prices is positive and signiﬁcant at a lag
of two years, but is not reﬂected in the other lags. If there is a positive association between
FIT-introduction and electricity prices, therefore, it is small in comparison with the underlying
country characteristics that lead both to FIT-introduction and high electricity prices.
Quota / Tradeable Green Certiﬁcate / Renewables Obligation
Industrial prices are, on average higher in countries with TGCs (Figure 7.116). The mixed eﬀect
model provides some weak evidence that there is an association between TGCs and industrial
electricity prices, showing a signiﬁcant eﬀect at a lag of four years (Figure 7.116). This does not
appear to be an outlier, as it is reﬂected to a lesser extend at the other lag levels.
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Figure 7.116: Mean industrial electricity price by
TGC and by year
Figure 7.117: Lagged eﬀect of introducing tradeable
green certiﬁcates (TGC) on the industrial electricity
price
There is no real diﬀerence for household electricity prices between the two groups when viewed
on a year-by-year basis (Figure 7.118). The association shown in Figure 7.119 conﬁrms that there
is no discernable relationship between introducing TGCs and the price of electricity to domestic
consumers.
Figure 7.118: Mean household electricity price by
TGC and by year
Figure 7.119: Lagged eﬀect of introducing tradeable
green certiﬁcates (TGC) on the household electricity
price
Tendering Process
Systems operating with Feed-in Tariﬀs or Tradeable Green Certiﬁcate have been seen to have
higher electricity prices than average, and there is some evidence that, in some cases, introducing
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these mechanisms increases the price of electricity to consumers.
By contrast, where tendering schemes for new renewables are in place, the electricity price seems
to be below average for both industrial and domestic customers in most years (Figures 7.120 &
7.122).
Figure 7.120: Mean industrial electricity price by ten-
dering process and by year
Figure 7.121: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a tendering
process on the industrial electricity price
Figure 7.122: Mean household electricity price by ten-
dering process and by year
Figure 7.123: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a tendering
process on the household electricity price
The evidence that introducing a tendering scheme is weaker, but there is some suggestion in
Figures 7.121 and 7.123 that the association is negative, meaning that introducing a tendering
system tends to reduce the electricity price.
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Renewables Tax Incentives / Investment Grants
This depressive eﬀect on electricity prices is also seen where tax incentives or investment grants
have been used to encourage renewables deployment. Industrial electricity prices are slightly
lower under such schemes, particularly in later years (Figure 7.124), but it is in household
electricity prices that the diﬀerence is most evident (Figure 7.127).
Figure 7.124: Mean industrial electricity price by tax
incentive and by year
Figure 7.125: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a renew-
ables tax incentive on the industrial electricity price
Figure 7.126: Mean household electricity price by tax
incentive and by year
Figure 7.127: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a renew-
ables tax incentive on the household electricity price
The associations shown in Figures 7.125 and 7.127 do not reach the level of signiﬁcance, but the
overall picture is indicative of a slight reduction in electricity prices, particularly for households,
between two and four years after these schemes are introduced.
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FITs & TGCs vs. Tenders, Tax breaks and Grants
By the standards of evidence required for a full longitudinal study, the evidence of renewables
incentive schemes is currently very limited. What the above analyses suggest, though, is that
there is some tentative evidence towards the following conclusions:
• Feed-in tariﬀs and TGC schemes such as the UK’s Renewables Obligation have been im-
plemented in countries with above-average electricity prices.
• Once implemented, FITs and TGCs either have no eﬀect on electricity prices or have a
small upward eﬀect.
• Tendering process, tax breaks and investment grants are more often implemented in coun-
tries where the price of electricity is below the OECD average.
• Once implemented, these schemes tend to decrease the electricity price. In the case house-
hold electricity prices, tax breaks for renewables seems to result in a reduction of up to
2c/kWh in the price of electricity.
These conclusions say nothing of the overall cost eﬀectiveness of introducing these diﬀerent
measures. It is more likely that whereas the costs associated with FITs and TGCs tend to be
passed onto consumers, tenders and tax breaks tend to be absorbed by central governments.
7.2.4 Conclusions
This chapter has focussed on two indicators that measure society’s exposure to an electricity
system disruption. The impact of privatisation and liberalisation, it would seem, are less impor-
tant than the wider economic changes that the countries under investigation have undergone.
In nearly all the countries the per-capita demand for electricity has been rising. At the same
time, the expansion of the service industries in these same countries has led to a reduction in
the per-GDP energy intensity.
By far the most important predictor of price, it would seem, is the expansion of the renewable
sector. This is perhaps unsurprising, as such technologies are (in general) currently more ex-
pensive than alternative, more well-established, technologies. What may be of more concern to
policymakers is that domestic customers seem to be more susceptible to price rises than are the
industrial consumers. Combined with the increasing domestic demand for electricity, and the
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further planned expansion of the renewables sector, there seems to be a need to ensure that
households are not adversely aﬀected. This could be done either by ensuring price stay at a
manageable level for consumers, or by enabling them to reduce their demand for energy. The
policy proposals for each of these strategies, and their implications, are discussed further in Part
III. The next chapter, however, addresses energy independence: an indicator that is not a perfect
measure of a country’s energy security, but one that brings a useful perspective to the concept
of resilience.
8
Energy Independence
Energy independence does not necessarily ensure security of supply. Most disturbances expe-
rienced by an electricity system originate within national borders. However, in the sense that
resilient system design is concerned with preparing for unforeseen or unquantiﬁable events, there
is an argument to be made for not being overly reliant on systems and institutions beyond one’s
regulatory control.
This concept can be quantiﬁed in various ways, but for the purposes of this analysis, an indicator
was chosen that reﬂected the extent to which the fuels on which a given electricity system relies
are imported from outside national borders. The Import Dependence Indicator (IDI) reﬂects
both the proportion of a fuel that needs to be imported for electricity production and the extent
to which the electricity system is reliant on that fuel, and is deﬁned as follows:
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IDI =
1
T
(
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Po + Io
)
(8.0.1)
where C is the installed capacity, I is the imported fuel and P is the amount of fuel produced
indigenously; g, c and o refer to gas, coal and oil, respectively, and T is the total installed capacity
in a given country.
These fuels have been chosen partly because their associated datasets are suﬃciently complete,
but also because most other fuels represent only a small proportion of any country’s fuel mix
(e.g. peat). One notable exception is uranium for nuclear reactors. The data required to include
uranium in the IDI is not available. Furthermore, the cost of uranium contributes only a small
amount to the running costs of nuclear reactors, and the physical amounts required for each unit
of electricity are small when compared with coal or gas. This means that physical availability
and price ﬂuctuations are less likely to have an impact on the availability or price of the resulting
electricity generated.
Where a country has a high proportion of renewables, the IDI will indicate low energy dependence
as the contribution of gas, coal and oil to the overall installed capacity will be reduced.
8.1 Changes to the IDI over time
The IDI indicator requires a number of diﬀerent sources of data, namely, installed capacity by
fuel, indigenous production ﬁgures and fuel import amounts. Not all countries report these
ﬁgures, so the sample of countries is smaller here than in previous chapters. Figure 8.1 shows
how the IDI has changed over time.
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Figure 8.1: IDI for all OECD countries
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IDI can be driven in two ways. An increase in IDI can either arise because:
1. For a given generation mix, the amount of the associated fuel that needs to be imported
increases. This can arise because indigenous production dwindles or a competing industries
divert an increasing amount of fuel from electricity generation;
2. For a given level of fuel imports, the amount of that fuel type required for electricity
generation increases.
The UK’s IDI has increased fairly steadily since the beginning of the 1980s, as can be seen by
Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2: IDI for the UK
The natural gas component of the IDI remains low and level until 2000, as shown in Figure
8.3. Figure 8.4 reveals that during this period the proportion of gas generation increases, but
the corresponding demand for gas is met by increasing levels of indigenous production, meaning
that the gas import dependence remains relatively unchanged. From 2000 onwards, however, the
amount of indigenous gas production begins to fall, and the level of imported gas increases to
fuel the still-increasing numbers of gas-ﬁred generators. The resulting eﬀect is a sudden shift in
the gas IDI from ﬂat to steeply increasing (Figure 8.3).
8 ENERGY INDEPENDENCE 247
Figure 8.3: UK IDI for gas Figure 8.4: UK gas generation, imports and indige-
nous production
The IDI’s coal component has twice the eﬀect on overall IDI than the gas component. Its
increase is more steady over the period in question (Figure 8.5). This increase is driven both by
a signiﬁcant decline in the levels of indigenous coal production and a corresponding increase in
the amount of coal imported annually. Over this time, the installed coal-ﬁred generation capacity
has decreased, but not at a rate low enough to oﬀset the decline in indigenous production.
Figure 8.5: UK IDI for coal Figure 8.6: UK coal generation, imports and indige-
nous production
Since 2000 the indigenous oil production has declined, and the import levels have increased,
thereby putting an upward pressure on the UK’s oil IDI. However, the contribution made by oil-
ﬁred generation to the UK electricity mix has been in decline over this period, and particularly
since the early 1990s. Whilst oil import dependence has increased, therefore, the net eﬀect is a
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decline in the direct exposure of the UK electricity system to extra-national oil shocks.
Figure 8.7: UK IDI for oil Figure 8.8: UK oil generation, imports and indigenous
production
8.2 Eﬀect of liberalisation and privatisation on IDI
This section asks whether diﬀerent liberalisation measures are causally associated with a change
in the IDI in the OECD countries.
8.2.1 Eﬀect of overall liberalisation
As Figure 8.9 shows, there appears to be little, if any, correlation between overall liberalisation
and IDI when considered over all country-years. The results of the mixed eﬀects model shown
in Figure 8.10 similarly reveal no association between the two variables.
8.2.2 Eﬀect of the creation of a liberalised pool on IDI
As can be seen from Figure 8.11, countries with a liberalised pool have very similar IDIs, on
average, to those without. On a year-by-year basis, as shown in Figure 8.12, the overall trend
for both liberalised and non-liberalised systems is slightly towards increasing energy dependence.
In most years, countries with higher levels of energy dependence tended to be those without a
liberalised pool. This diﬀerence was increasing year-on-year in the 1990s, so that countries with
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Figure 8.9: IDI (all county-years) vs overall liberali-
sation
Figure 8.10: Lagged eﬀect of overall liberalisation on
IDI
a liberalised pool saw an overall decline in IDI, whereas for those without, the IDI increased. By
2007, however, the diﬀerence between the two groups has reduced to zero.
Figure 8.11: The overall mean IDI with and without
a liberalised pool
Figure 8.12: The mean IDI by year, with and without
a liberalised pool
Figure 8.13 addresses the causal question: does introducing a liberalised pool, all other things
being equal, cause a change in the level of energy dependence for a given electricity system? In
the year in which liberalised pools are introduced the association is positive, but not statistically
signiﬁcantly so (at a 5% signiﬁcance level). Over the subsequent ﬁve years, however, the appar-
ent eﬀect decreases until by year 5 there appears to be a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect of 0.014
(p=0.029).
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Figure 8.13: Eﬀect of the creation of a liberalised pool on IDI
This would suggest that there is a small year-on-year cumulative eﬀect of introducing a liberalised
pool that tends to result in an electricity system that is less reliant on imported fuels.
8.2.3 Eﬀect of the ownership arrangements on IDI
A plot of the mean IDI against ownercode (Figure 8.14) reveals a broadly positive correlation
between the degree of privatisation and the degree of energy dependence. This trend, however,
is not consistent over all levels of privatisation, so strong conclusions should not be drawn about
this relationship.
The mixed modelling analysis (Figure 8.15) reveals no association between increasing the degree
of private ownership and the resulting IDI.
The binary variable, privatised, shows the diﬀerence between the more privatised systems and
the more nationalised ones (Figure 8.16). The by-year plot shows that for all years under analysis,
countries with mostly privately-owned electricity companies also tend to have higher levels of
import dependence, as indicated by the IDI (Figure 8.17).
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Figure 8.14: IDI (all county-years) against the degree
of private ownership
Figure 8.15: Eﬀect of the ownership arrangements on
the IDI
Figure 8.16: Mean IDI by privatised Figure 8.17: Mean IDI by whether privatised and by
year
Again, however, there is little evidence that privatising an electricity system changes a given
country’s energy import dependence (Figure 8.18). It can only be said, then, that those countries
that already have an above-average dependence on fuel imports are the ones more likely to
undergo privatisation.
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Figure 8.18: Lagged eﬀect of privatised on IDI
8.2.4 Vertical Separation
There is very little diﬀerence in IDI between countries with diﬀering levels of separation between
their transmission and generation sectors. The overall diﬀerence shown in Figure 8.19 shows the
three categories to have similar average IDIs, and the results of the mixed eﬀects model shown
in Figure 8.20 reveals no signiﬁcant within-country association.
Figure 8.19: IDI (all county-years) against the degree
of transmission-generation separation
Figure 8.20: Eﬀect of a change to the degree of
transmission-generation separation on the IDI
Similarly, the yearly IDI plots for the binary transgen unbundling shows little diﬀerence
between integrated and unbundled transmission and generation systems.
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Figure 8.21: IDI by year against whether transmission and generation are integrated (0) or not (1)
For overall vertical separation, there is slightly more of a suggestion that vertically unbundled
systems are more likely to have a lower IDI, as shown by Figure 8.22 and by Figure 8.24. The
mixed eﬀects model, however, does not provide evidence that this relationship is causal (Figure
8.23).
Figure 8.22: IDI (all county-years) against overall ver-
tical separation
Figure 8.23: Eﬀect of a change to the degree of overall
integration on the IDI
8 ENERGY INDEPENDENCE 254
Figure 8.24: IDI against whether the system has undergone vertical unbundling in a given year
8.3 Eﬀect of renewable generation and associated policies on system di-
versity
Using the same methods applied above, this section assesses the relationship between the de-
ployment of renewable generation and the associated renewables policies on energy import de-
pendence.
8.3.1 Installed capacity of new renewables
Figure 8.25 shows a scatter plot of IDI against the proportion of installed renewables. No obvious
association emerges from this plot.
For the mixed eﬀects model, no signiﬁcant association is seen in any lags, although the eﬀect
of increasing the proportion of new renewables has a consistently negative eﬀect on IDI. If this
were indicative of a true association it would mean that increasing the proportion of wind, solar
and marine generation reduced an electricity system’s dependence on foreign fuel imports.
Although not quite signiﬁcant at the 5% level, the lag at ﬁve years shows an eﬀect of -0.70
(s.e.=0.38, p=0.066). Were this to apply speciﬁcally to the UK, the increase from an IDI of 0.1
to 0.3 experienced between 1989 and 2003 would have been reduced by 0.7 had an additional
10% of renewables been installed.
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Figure 8.25: IDI (all county-years) against the pro-
portion of new renewables on the system
Figure 8.26: Lagged eﬀect of increasing the new re-
newable proportion on the IDI
8.3.2 Renewable electricity support schemes
The following sections investigate whether the provision of support for these new renewables has
an eﬀect on IDI.
Any renewable support scheme
The overall diﬀerence in diversity and the diﬀerence seen on an annual basis (Figures 8.27 and
8.28, respectively) show that countries with renewable support mechanisms have consistently
higher levels of fuel import dependence.
Figure 8.27: Mean IDI by renewable support Figure 8.28: Mean IDI by renewable support and by
year
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The outcome of the mixed eﬀects model, however, ﬁnds no signiﬁcant eﬀect of introducing such
a policy on IDI within the timescales considered for this analysis (Figure 8.29).
Figure 8.29: Lagged eﬀect of introducing renewables support mechanisms on the IDI
The diﬀerence between the two groups, then, is more likely to arise from system characteristics
that lead to the decision to introduce a mechanism for expanding the renewables sector. It is
possible, for instance, that having a high level of fuel import dependence provides the political
motivation to support forms of generation that are less reliant on foreign fuels. In other words,
IDI would be a predictor of the decision to incentivise renewables.
Alternatively, there could be an unmeasured national characteristic that predicts both high IDI
and renewable policy implementation. Countries that are reluctant to rely on fuel imports may,
for example, be the same countries that are unwilling to implement policies such as low-carbon
incentives, which are designed primarily to beneﬁt extra-national individuals.
Feed-in Tariﬀ
As with renewables mechanisms more generally, countries with a Feed-in Tariﬀ tend, on average,
to have higher levels of energy import dependence than those without (Figure 8.30).
The mixed modelling analysis, however, shows no eﬀect of introducing an FIT (Figure 8.31),
suggesting that those countries that bring in a FIT scheme, on average, tend to have a higher
IDI prior to that decision being made.
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Figure 8.30: Mean IDI by FIT and by year Figure 8.31: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a feed-in
tariﬀ on the IDI
Quota / Tradeable Green Certiﬁcate / Renewables Obligation
There is very little to distinguish between the IDIs in countries either with or without a TGC
mechanism (Figure 8.32). The mixed eﬀects model reveals a slightly positive association, but at
no time is the eﬀect signiﬁcant.
Figure 8.32: Mean IDI by TGC and by year Figure 8.33: Lagged eﬀect of introducing tradeable
green certiﬁcates (TGC) on the IDI
Tendering Process
As can be seen by the absence of standard error bars, from 2003 onwards in Figure 8.34, only
one country had both a renewables tendering process and suﬃcient data to determine the IDI
(with the sole exception of 2005). Strong conclusions about the eﬀect of tendering processes on
the IDI are therefore unlikely.
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Nevertheless, countries that have a tendering scheme have higher energy import dependence than
those that do not. The mixed eﬀects model shows no signiﬁcant association, although the eﬀect,
if any, appears to be negative.
Figure 8.34: Mean IDI by tendering process and by
year
Figure 8.35: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a tendering
process on the IDI
Renewables Tax Incentives / Investment Grants
There is almost no diﬀerence in IDI between countries with or without tax incentives or invest-
ment grants (Figure 8.36). Nor is there an observable eﬀect of introducing (or retracting) such
schemes on the IDI.
Figure 8.36: Mean IDI by tax incentive and by year Figure 8.37: Lagged eﬀect of introducing a renewables
tax incentive on the IDI
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8.3.3 Conclusions
The UK’s dependence on foreign imports to fuel its electricity system has been increasing now for
a number of decades. It is unsurprising, therefore, that some commentators have raised concerns
about this fact. It remains to be shown, however, that such dependence represents a real risk to
the UK’s security of supply.
In general, this increase in dependence appears to be unrelated to liberalisation or privatisation,
although the case of the UK may be viewed as a notable exception to this trend. As for the
claim that an expansion in the renewables sector will reduce reliance on foreign imports, this
appears to be supported. Perhaps most telling, however, is that the countries that chose to
push for renewables expansion most strongly were those that already had a high reliance on
imported fuels. The implementation of such policies, therefore, is indicative of governments’
concerns about security of supply. Disentangling this underlying drive from the eﬀect of the
policy intervention itself will always be diﬃcult.
Part III attempts to bring together these various indicators of resilience and to relate the ﬁndings
of this research to the most recent UK policy developments.
Part III
Assessing Future Policy Options
9
UK resilience trends and the role of
liberalisation and renewables
The analysis presented in Part II illustrates a number of diﬀerent indicators of electricity system
resilience, and the relationship of those indicators initially to liberalisation and later to the
introduction of policies to reduce the reliance on fossil fuels. In many cases there is either no
discernable eﬀect. This is not to say that such interventions have no impact on the outcome;
rather, the underlying variability in these indicators is too large to identify the role played by
speciﬁc interventions.
At any given moment in time the diﬀerence in resilience between, say, a liberalised system and
a monopolistic system could be explained in three distinct ways:
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1. Liberalisation caused the diﬀerence in the resilience indicator;
2. The resilience indicator caused (or contributed causally to) the decision to liberalise;
3. An unmeasured variable (e.g. GDP, institutional maturity, political stability) is drives both
the decision to liberalise and the diﬀerence in the resilience indicator.
For many countries there is a diﬀerence between their resilience indicators at the point they
introduce privatisation, liberalisation and low-carbon policies. This would be suggestive of points
2 and 3 above, which is to say that (whether causal or not) the underlying diﬀerence in resilience
is predictive of the decision to liberalise. In some cases, however, there is additional evidence
that once the intervention (such as liberalisation) has occurred, a further change in the resilience
indicator can be measured. It is this additional change that describes the post-intervention
association, from which it would be plausible to conclude that intervening caused a change in
the resilience indicator.
The following sections summarise and expand on the ﬁndings of Part II, attempting to understand
the mechanism at work where a relationship between liberalisation and resilience is found and,
where no such eﬀect is observed, to explain why this might diﬀer from existing theories of
liberalisation.
9.1 Derated Generation Margins
9.1.1 The role of liberalisation
The ability of a privatised and liberalised system to deliver suﬃcient new build has been one of
the primary concerns regarding the security of the electricity system in the UK (Surrey, 1996).
As Figure 9.1 shows, however, the decline in margins in the UK was at its most steep in the
1970s and the ﬁrst half of the 1980s. From 1973 to 1986 the reserve margin dropped from 59%
(its highest level since 1933) to 16%.
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Figure 9.1: UK Reserve Margins 1924 – 2007
As the analysis of Chapter 5 shows, countries that ﬁrst chose both to liberalise and privatise
had lower margins than those that did not. One of the reasons for undergoing liberalisation was
because of a belief that there was excess electricity generation that was not economically justiﬁed
(Newbery, 2004). The ﬁndings of this research do not contradict this as such, but they do show
that whilst the desire to reduce the system’s ‘gold-plating’ may have been a motivating factor,
there were many countries with higher margins that did not choose to liberalise.
In an article written prior to the privatisation of the UK electricity sector, Kay and Thompson
(1986) gave a number of diﬀerent reasons that the UK Government may have had for privatising
and liberalising the state-owned entities:
One purpose is to improve the economic performance of the industries concerned.
Another is to resolve the persistent problems of management and control which have
made the relations between government and nationalised industries one of the unhap-
pier elements of British public administration. . . The Treasury is greatly interested
in the revenue which can be obtained from privatisation. Although the objective is
rarely articulated, privatisation may also be seen by the government as a means of dis-
ciplining the power of public sector trades unions. A ﬁnal objective is the promotion
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of a kind of popular capitalism through wider share ownership.
A desire by Government to resolve diﬃculties in its relationships with both the management
and the unions associated with the state-owned industries appears to have been a factor in the
decision to privatise, as was the need to improve the public ﬁnances. Improving the economic
performance of these industries appears, therefore, to be just one of a number of reasons for the
decision to liberalise and privatise. As David Newbery (2001) argues, however, “the emphasis
in Britain was on ending state ownership, not on liberalising the network utilities”, citing the
example of British Telecoms, which “was privatised as a de facto monopoly”.
When it came to the power sector, it was argued by economists such as Vickers and Yarrow
(1988) that it was not privatisation, but liberalisation, and the increase in competition that
arose as a result, that would lead to the largest beneﬁts. This view was reﬂected in the decision
to unbundle the electricity generation sector concurrently with privatisation (Newbery, 2001).
Whether or not this increased eﬃciency resulted in a reduction in consumer electricity prices is
discussed in Section 9.3.1, but in terms of reserve margins, there is little evidence that either
privatisation or the introduction of competitive elements have signiﬁcantly contributed to the
decline that has occurred since 1990. Newbery (2001) argues that proﬁts in the power sector were
higher in the ﬁve years after privatisation than they would have been in the counterfactual world
in which the system remained nationalised. If this is true, it can be concluded that such proﬁts
did not arise because of a change in the way in which the decision to construct new capacity was
made.
The other intervention investigated in this research was the vertical unbundling of the electricity
supply chain. As with the indicators that referred to privatisation and the creation of a liberalised
pool, those countries that unbundled transmission from generation tended to have lower margins
than those that did not. Rather than being a statement about the eﬀect of vertical unbundling, it
is possible that this ﬁnding is more a reﬂection of the fact that unbundling tends to occur as part
of an overall liberalisation package. The data are insuﬃcient to control for such confounding, so
the eﬀect of such a correlation cannot be easily eliminated.
In terms of the impact that liberalisation and privatisation had once they had been implemented,
there is little evidence that there was any eﬀect. There are some tentative grounds for saying that
separating transmission from generation and decreasing the overall vertical integration reduced
the level of the system margin. This would suggest that vertical separation has more of an eﬀect
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on reducing margin than horizontal separation. This is in agreement with the argument made
by Newbery (2001) that “increased competitive pressure on generation is needed to reduce costs
and that requires separating generation from transmission and distribution.”
9.1.2 The role of new renewables
The evidence suggests that renewable generation and the policies surrounding it have a more
signiﬁcant impact on margins than any aspect of liberalisation or privatisation. As will be dis-
cussed, however, there are interactions between renewables expansion and the liberalised markets
that may impact on questions of resource adequacy.
Because of the non-dispatchable nature of renewables such as wind and solar generators, addi-
tional backup generation in the form of coal or CCGT has to be held, meaning that the overall
margin will increase with increasing levels of renewables (Zhang and Chowdhury, 2009). The
data strongly support this theory, showing that an increase in renewable generation is strongly
predictive of an increase in the absolute margin.
What is less apparent is whether the amount of additional dispatchable generation is suﬃcient
to maintain the desired Loss of Load Probability (LOLP). For this measure, the ‘capacity credit’
of a renewable generator, rather than its absolute capacity, is a more appropriate measure of
its ability to contribute to system security (Boyle, 2008). By estimating the average eﬀective
capacity of the new renewables added to the system, it was shown in Chapter 5 that the derated
margin (which attempts to account for the non-dispatchable nature of renewables) still increases
as the proportion of new renewables goes up. This additional security comes at a price to
consumers, as is discussed below, but in terms of a strict deﬁnition of security in terms of LOLP,
it appears that the margins are maintained or even increased. An increase in the proportion of
new renewables seems to have at worst a benign inﬂuence on the derated margin, and perhaps
a protective one.
This ﬁnding does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that renewables increase the resilience of
the electricity system. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the LOLP measure itself has come under
some scrutiny, particularly with the expansion of the renewables sector. The UKERC report on
the Costs and Impacts of Intermittency, for example, refers to a debate as to whether LOLP and
similar measures of reliability “fully capture the changes that arise when intermittent sources of
are added to the network” (UKERC, 2006).
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All forms of generation are prone to periods of unavailability (both planned and unplanned). The
characteristics of wind variability, however, are diﬀerent from conventional plant. In particular,
wind farm outputs are potentially highly correlated during ‘cold snap low wind’ events (UKERC,
2006). “Large-scale variability” would arise from an anticyclone covering most or all of the
country, resulting in low or zero wind speeds (Laughton, 2008).
Such common mode failures (Laughton, 2008) are generally agreed to be rare, assuming that the
grid region is suﬃciently large, but as the UKERC (2006) report notes, a number of studies have
used relatively short weather data sets, which would tend to under-report the probabilities. The
report cites work by Sinden (2005), however, which uses longer-term weather data and concludes
that such events would be extremely rare in the case of the UK.
The potential for such High Impact Low Proability (HILP) events presents some concerns about
maintaining adequate supply levels. This may be particularly problematic under a market-based
system that relies on private investment. DECC noted in a call for evidence in 2009 that there
may be a need for some reserve to be held centrally to accommodate such rare periods of supply
unavailability (DECC, 2009b):
It has been suggested that there could be a case for an additional reserve – essentially,
a number of MW that could be called on as a last resort, when other options had
been exhausted, perhaps to deal with high-impact low-probability events. This could
be controlled by National Grid or by another body. . . There are situations where an
emergency reserve might be useful — for example, prolonged periods of low out-
put from wind generation, or rare but serious events that mean that a signiﬁcant
proportion of the electricity generation capacity in GB is unavailable.
The potential impacts of such an intervention, along with other proposed policy changes, is
discussed in Chapter 10. It also highlights, however, the point that the risk that a renewables
expansion would have on margins depends to a large extent on the policies that bring about that
expansion. Again, the historic performance of renewables policies on this measure have been
assessed in this research.
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9.1.3 Renewables policies and system margins
The overall introduction of a renewables support mechanism (of any design) resulted in a slight
increase in the derated margin, but the results do not appear to be signiﬁcant. These interven-
tions were separated into Feed-in Tariﬀs, Tradeable Green Certiﬁcates, Tendering processes and
tax incentives for investment. The introduction of these latter two — tenders and tax breaks —
led to a reduction in the derated margin by as much as 7%. This suggests that these mechanisms
tended to encourage renewable generation at the expense of other forms of conventional power.
Tradeable Green Certiﬁcates did not lead to this depressive eﬀect, but neither is there evidence
that derated margins were increased as a result of their introduction. This would suggest that any
additional renewable capacity brought on as a result of the TGCs resulting in a corresponding
loss (or deferred investment) in the corresponding amount conventional generation.
The most striking eﬀect was seen in those countries that introduced a Feed-in Tariﬀ. Within one
year of introducing the FIT, the average eﬀect was an increase of over 5% in the margin – an eﬀect
that was sustained over the ﬁve subsequent years, meaning that it is unlikely to be an anomalous
result. It cannot be ruled out that countries that chose to introduce an FIT were diﬀerent in some
relevant but unmeasured parameter from those countries that chose an alternative mechanism.
The primary suggestion, however, is that FITs have been more successful in achieving their
primary objective of encouraging new renewables without displacing other forms of generation.
A direct comparison of TGCs with FITs shows that FITs have been more successful in terms of
maintaining or improving margins. If this additional capacity results in an increased electricity
price to consumers, this diﬀerence could be attributed to the more interventionist approach of
the FIT scheme. In fact, as will be discussed below, the evidence suggests that whilst both
schemes have resulted in increased electricity prices, it is the TGC mechanisms that have led to
the largest price increases.
It became apparent in conducting this analysis that there was a large underlying variation in
countries’ system margins and their underlying peak loads and installed capacities. It would
be impossible to control for all the causes of this variation, particularly since the data set is of
limited size. GDP and electricity price had the potential to aﬀect both the level of demand and
the amount of investment in new capacity, so these variables were investigated.
GDP was found to be strongly correlated with both peak load and the derated generation capacity
and this association was likely to be causal. An increase in the productivity of the wider economy
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was associated with an increased demand for electricity and a subsequent increase in the amount
of new-build generation capacity. This presented the potential for a mis-match to arise as demand
outstripped supply. There was some evidence that demand increased occurred more rapidly than
installed capacity following an increase in GDP, and that subsequently the demand dropped
more quickly than power stations were being retired. On further examination of the evidence
the association did not, however, result in a disparity between peak load and derated capacity,
meaning that the eﬀect of GDP on the derated margin was negligible.
Conversely, the price of electricity had only a small eﬀect on both peak load and derated capacity
in absolute terms, well within the conﬁdence interval. This small eﬀect, however, was suﬃcient
to show a positive overall eﬀect on the derated margin, meaning that an increase in electricity
price was associated with a subsequent increase in the system margin.
9.2 System Diversity
The diversity of an electricity system was here deﬁned in terms of the number of diﬀerent types
of generator and the balance of those diﬀerent types in the overall generation mix. Speciﬁcally,
the Shannon-Wiener Index (SWI) was used, which increases with increasing diversity. The
hypothesis under investigation in this thesis is that liberalising the electricity generation sector
(which is to say, increasing the diversity of ownership) would result in an increase in the diversity
of generation technologies.
There are beneﬁts to individual operators to diversify their generation portfolios to some extent.
For example, a private company with a generation portfolio comprising only nuclear power is
very exposed to the variation in electricity prices, since there is no opportunity to take advan-
tage of correlations with fuel prices. The privately-owned nuclear generator could diversify by
constructing, say, a number of CCGT plants. By aligning its portfolio more closely with the
national generation mix, the company is protected against price ﬂuctuations. In the UK, for
example, gas and electricity prices are highly correlated so a decline in electricity price tends to
be associated with a decline in gas price, and hence operating costs (Roques et al., 2008).
These price-based risk calculations are not so important in state-owned monopolies, as the gov-
ernment shareholder can exert control over electricity tariﬀs. Whilst the price risk is not an issue,
such single-fuel conﬁgurations are susceptible to physical risks. There are numerous examples
of countries whose electricity supply has been threatened because of too high a dependence on
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a single generation technology (IEA, 2005b,c,d). Where price risks can be managed through
risk management strategies, the lessons from resilience thinking show that it is not suﬃcient
to protect against the known, quantiﬁable risks. This is especially true in the case of complex
entities such as power systems. To return to Part I, the reason that diversity is a key indicator
of resilience is that it protects against both the know and unknown risks – both the quantiﬁable
and the unquantiﬁable uncertainties.
9.2.1 Liberalisation and privatisation
The analysis revealed that increasing levels of overall liberalisation (which includes measures of
privatisation and vertical unbundling) are correlated with increasing levels of diversity: more
liberalised systems are more technologically diverse. Furthermore, an increase in liberalisation
within a given country, on average, increases the diversity. The act of liberalising a system,
therefore, leads to an increase in diversity. It was thought possible that GDP was correlated both
with liberalisation and diversity, which would induce an association between the two. Indeed, a
correlation between GDP and SWI was found, but after controlling for GDP the eﬀect of overall
liberalisation on SWI remained.
Again, overall liberalisation was broken into its composite variables: there was very little to
distinguish the diversity of the liberalised and non-liberalised groups; nor did vertical integration
explain the diﬀerence in diversity. The largest diﬀerence in diversity was seen between those
countries that had privatised and those that had not. The same was true when using the mixed
eﬀects model to test for the impact of privatising the system. The eﬀect on diversity was three
times higher for privatisation than it was for liberalisation.
This ﬁnding means that the technological diversity of the generating mix is increased the most
by transferring the ownership of the power system assets from public to private hands. This
process, more than the unbundling of generation and transmission assets, and more than the
creation of a liberalised trading pool, is the component of ‘overall liberalisation’ that leads to an
increase in the diversity of the generation mix.
The fact that privatisation, rather than increasing competition, seems to be the best predictor of
increasing diversity reveals something about the underlying mechanism. If liberalisation had been
the driver of increased diversity, this would have suggested that there would be a competitive
pressure to diversify a company’s generation portfolio. The fact that there is no signiﬁcant
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correlation between liberalisation and diversity implies that no such driver exists, or that it is
counterbalanced by some other mechanism. Once such mechanism is suggested by Roques et al.
(2008):
A perfect market should motivate individual investment decisions leading to the so-
cially optimal fuel mix, but the conditions for this to hold are strong. . . In particular,
herd behaviour (in which investors observe others’ decisions, and assume they are
based on superior information that justiﬁes imitating their choices) may encourage
investment in one or two dominant technologies. . .
The Roques et al. (2008) paper argues that whilst market liberalisation would hypothetically lead
to an optimally diverse generation mix, this relies on the assumption of perfect foresight and
perfectly rational price and risk behaviour. Since these conditions are never met, the observed
lack of correlation between diversity and liberalisation is unsurprising.
Nonetheless, there remains a signiﬁcant correlation between privatisation and diversity. Return-
ing to an earlier argument, privatisation of the generation sector tends also to result in a loss
of electricity tariﬀ controls. Even if newly-formed private entities do not operate in a fully ‘ra-
tionally’ competitive manner, they are exposed to price ﬂuctuations that they need to manage.
One approach is to diversify the fuel mix of their generation plant. Some of this will be done
through the buying and selling of existing assets, but this diversiﬁcation will also be reﬂected in
the choices for new-build generation capacity.
9.2.2 Renewable electricity generation
Increasing the contribution of an otherwise under-represented technology to the electricity mix
will increase the overall diversity of the system. This is perhaps a simple statement of fact, but
it does rely on the assumption that the eﬀect is not countered by a corresponding reduction of
diversity elsewhere in the system.
The analysis of the evidence conducted for this thesis does indeed show that the addition of new
renewable generation to the grid has the immediate eﬀect of increasing diversity. This eﬀect,
however, is reduced very quickly, suggesting that any diversity gains for adding a new form of
generation are lost as other plant is then retired. Increasing the UK’s generation diversity is not
the primary driver for expanding the renewables sector, but it would nonetheless be desirable
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from the point of view of the resilience of the overall system. Furthermore, it should be noted
that the chosen diversity indicator most likely underestimates the value of renewables as it
ignores the ‘disparity’ metric, which describes how ‘diﬀerent’ two technologies are from each
other. Nevertheless, it is in the interests of system resilience to understand whether this tailing
oﬀ in diversity can be mitigated to leave a lasting net beneﬁt.
What the analysis of renewables policies shows is that where such incentives are in place, there
is evidence that this drop-oﬀ is slowed to some extent. Comparing the two groups (those with
renewable support and those without) shows a clear diﬀerence in the diversity of the two groups.
The mean SWI in groups with renewable support is approximately equal to 1, whereas the
mean SWI of the groups with no support mechanism is 0.5. The eﬀect of introducing a support
mechanism leads to an increase in SWI of 0.3, suggesting that much of the sustained diﬀerence
between the two groups can be attributed to the presence of the support mechanism.
These results, therefore, are somewhat ambivalent about the hypothesis that adding renewables
to the system increases system resilience by means of increasing diversity. There is certainly an
initial increase in SWI following an increase in the renewables proportion, but it is less clear that
this is not oﬀset over time by a subsequent change elsewhere in the generation mix. There is
some evidence, however, that the use of policy intervention can have more of a lasting positive
eﬀect on the diversity of the system. Again, the SWI indicator fails to value how dissimilar
renewable generation technologies are from the existing stock in terms of their fuel consumption,
their physical design and their network characteristics. Furthermore, the levels of renewable
penetration remain low and relatively novel, so the drop-oﬀ eﬀect should not be overstated.
9.3 Energy Intensity & Prices
Energy intensity is a measure of the extent to which a society or an economy is dependent
on the electricity system. It is one proxy for the exposure of that economy to the collapse of
the electricity system should it occur. In this research, both the economic electricity intensity
(kWh/GDP) and the per-capita electricity intensity (kWh/capita) were analysed.
The UK’s economic energy intensity has been in steady decline over the past 30 years, whereas,
apart from a drop in the last three years, the electricity consumed per person in the UK has
steadily increased over the same time period.
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The price of electricity to both industry and households has increased since 1980, and has seen a
particularly steep rise since the beginning of the 21st century. The UK’s economic productivity
is protected to some extent against this rise since the per-GDP electricity consumption has
decreased. For households, this is not the case: the high prices, combined with the increasing
dependence on electricity, makes consumers more vulnerable both to price spikes and physical
supply shortages.
Many of these changes in the intensity of electricity use and its price can be attributed to wider
economic changes such as the decline of manufacturing in many of the OECD countries and
the increase in commodity prices in the global markets. This research considered whether, ﬁrst,
privatisation and liberalisation were protective or exacerbating factors, and second, the extent
to which the recent expansion of the renewables sector has contributed to the changes.
9.3.1 Liberalisation and privatisation
As has been mentioned before, there were a number of reasons – some ideological, some eco-
nomic – for the privatisation of the UK electricity sector. One central reason, however, was the
belief that liberalised, competitive utilities would operate more eﬃciently, and crucially, that the
eﬃciency savings that resulted would be passed onto consumers.
The overall liberalisation indicator does not appear to have any relationship with the electricity
demands of either the economy or individuals within society. Furthermore, whilst there are
diﬀerences between countries that chose or did not choose to introduce a liberalised pool or to
privatise, this diﬀerence does not appear to be a causal one. This contrasts with the eﬀect that
this indicator had on the electricity price, which for both industrial and domestic consumers
increased as a result of increasing overall liberalisation.
On the ‘liberalised pool’ indicator the evidence suggest that those countries that introduced a pool
early tended to have both higher economic electricity dependence (kWh/GDP) and individual
electricity demand (kWh/capita). Conversely, countries that privatised their electricity systems
had comparable levels of per-capita electricity consumption but consistently and signiﬁcantly
lower per-GDP electricity consumption.
The impact of creating a liberalised pool and privatising the electricity assets has a minimal
eﬀect on the electricity prices. Any eﬀect of these interventions on energy intensity does not
therefore seem to operate via a price mechanism. There is, however, evidence that vertically
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unbundling the power sector tends to increase both domestic and industrial electricity prices.
Again, this runs counter to the view that unbundling should lead to increased competition and
thereby result in lower prices for consumers. These data suggest that countries that chose instead
to allow power companies both to supply and to distribute and transmit electricity, had lower
price increases than those that opted for more aggressive unbundling.
There may be two factors at play to explain the either neutral or perhaps adverse eﬀect of
liberalisation on electricity prices. First, whilst there is evidence from the literature that the
eﬃciency of operations did increase in the power sector as a result of privatisation and liberalisa-
tion (Newbery, 2001), the resulting savings are not necessarily passed on to consumers. Second,
countries with a state-owned power sector have are more likely to subsidise the price of electricity
(Bacon, 1995). By shifting some of the burden of electricity from consumers to taxpayers, this
may inﬂate the perceived eﬃciency of state-owned operations, and correspondingly depress the
perceived savings resulting from increased competition.
9.3.2 Renewable electricity generation
Costs associated with renewable electricity generation technologies tend to be higher than those
for incumbent technologies. A study by Parsons Brinckerhoﬀ (2010), for example, produced the
following breakdown of estimates of levelised costs by generating technology:
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Figure 9.2: Estimate of 2010 levelised costs by generating technology
These estimates take into account a projection for future carbon prices but, with the exception
of onshore wind and biomass, the costs of new renewables is signiﬁcantly higher (and more
uncertain) than the cheapest conventional alternatives (nuclear and CCGT).
The analysis conducted for this thesis shows that an increase in the proportion of new renewables
onto the electricity system has a depressive eﬀect on both per-GDP and per-capita electricity
consumption. The most likely cause of this is via the price of electricity. This is conﬁrmed by
the analysis of renewables penetration on electricity price. An increase of 10% in the proportion
of renewables increases industrial electricity prices by, on average, 1 cent (US) per kWh of
electricity. For households this ﬁgure is between 3 and 5 cents for the same increase in renewables.
Householders, therefore, appear to take more of the price increases associated with renewables,
and this has been reﬂected in the reduction in an otherwise upward trend in domestic electricity
intensity.
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9.4 Energy Independence
The Import Dependence Indicator (IDI) reﬂects the amount of fuel required for generating elec-
tricity in a given country, and the proportion of that fuel that has to be imported. There is no
single trend across the OECD, but the UK’s IDI has been steadily rising over the past thirty
years. This has arisen because of a decline in the indigenous production of both coal and gas,
and in particular as a result of an increasing reliance on gas-ﬁred generation. The renewables
sector is intended to deliver some degree of energy independence, but as yet the levels are too
low to have a strong eﬀect on the IDI.
9.4.1 Liberalisation and privatisation
Taking the OECD as a whole, the analysis of the data reveal some small eﬀects of liberalisation
and privatisation on the IDI, but none of them are strong enough to suggest there is any real
relationship between privatisation or liberalisation and energy import dependence.
The fact that there is no overall eﬀect across the OECD countries does not mean that privatisation
and liberalisation had no impact in the UK. As was discussed previously, one of the motivating
factors for privatising the electricity was to diminish the power of the unions, and in particular
to decrease the country’s reliance on coal. The decline of the UK coal mining industry has
been more rapid than the closure of coal-ﬁred power plant. As a result, of the fuel commodities
required for the UK’s electricity production, coal was the most signiﬁcant contributor to the
UK’s increasing import dependence. Initially, this increase in dependence on imported fuels was
mitigated to some extent by the ‘dash for gas’ that followed privatisation. The contribution of
gas to the IDI was at ﬁrst neutral, as production from the North Sea was suﬃcient to meet the
demand from new CCGT plant; once these gas supplies began to decline from 2000 onwards,
however, the continued expansion of gas generation drove up the UK’s import dependence.
Not included within the IDI measure is any sense of the diversity of fuel imports or the means to
stockpile those fuels. The increased use of Liquiﬁed Natural Gas (LNG), and the diversiﬁcation
of the gas network would improve the resilience of the UK’s current electricity generation mix
to supply disruption, as would an increased use of gas storage. Nor should it be concluded that
an increase in IDI is necessarily bad from the point of fuel security. It is, however, a reﬂection
of the country’s exposure to adverse events beyond its control. As such it is one measure of the
resilience of the national system to events whose probability of occurrence cannot be changed,
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and whose impacts must be mitigated.
9.4.2 Renewable electricity generation
The introduction of renewables, it has been argued, reduces a country’s dependence on imported
fuels, thereby increasing a nation’s energy security. As was observed with the measure of diversity,
the true eﬀect of introducing a new generating technology depends on the subsequent response of
the rest of the market, and the intuitive beneﬁt can be oﬀset by a change in another generating
technology.
In the case of IDI, it seems that there is some evidence that introducing renewables reduces
import dependence, and that the eﬀect is sustained. Even more noticeable is the underlying
diﬀerence in IDI between those countries that introduced a renewable support mechanism and
those that did not. The IDI in countries that introduced renewable support was, on average, an
order of magnitude higher than those that did not. Further investigation revealed that it was
countries with FITs or tendering processes in particular that exhibited higher IDI levels.
An number of factors could explain this, but one likely explanation is that it is those countries
that were particularly conscious of their reliance on foreign fuel were more inclined to use renew-
able generation as a means of reducing this reliance. Of the four renewable support mechanisms,
FITs and tendering represent the two most interventionist approach. Tendering, in particular, is
a quantity-based approach to delivering new generating plant. FITs take much of the future elec-
tricity price risk away from investors, and have proved to be successful in their aim of delivering
the required new build.
It is possible however, that the apparent success of FITs and tendering is a manifestation of
‘regression to the mean’. If countries with high IDI, for whatever reason, were more likely to
opt for these policy mechanisms, the natural ﬂuctuation in IDI for each country will tend to
mean that high values decrease over time. This phenomenon may explain the apparent success
of a number of policy interventions. A policy to reduce electricity prices, for example, is likely
to be implemented when prices are considered to be above-average. A subsequent decline in
prices could occur either because of market forces correcting the anomaly, or because the policy
is indeed eﬀective. The purpose of a multi-country statistical analysis is to distinguish between
these two explanations. Where the explanatory variable is dependent to some extent on the
outcome variable (as in the case where FITs and tenders are more likely in high IDI countries),
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a large proportion of this ‘regression to the mean’ eﬀect may remain.
This chapter has attempted to understand how privatisation, liberalisation and renewables poli-
cies have historically aﬀected the resilience of electricity systems. In the next chapter the ﬁndings
of this, and previous, chapters are discussed in the context of UK policy. A number of policy
changes are being proposed for the regulation of the UK’s electricity system. Some directly
address issues of security; others do not, but may impact on security indirectly. The intention is
to understand how the historic experience of the OECD countries should best be used to inform
these policy proposals, and to understand what adverse (or beneﬁcial) impacts on resilience may
be expected.
9.5 Conclusions: What role have policy changes had on electricity system
resilience?
This chapter attempted to consolidate the statistical analysis on the resilience indicators in order
to understand ﬁrst, what trends can be seen in the UK and the OECD countries and second,
what role privatisation, liberalisation and the expansion of the renewables sector have played in
those trends.
Resilience trends
Based on an aggregate view of the resilience indicators identiﬁed, the UK’s electricity system
has experience decreasing resilience overall since the 1980s. Although not universal, this trend
was also seen in the wider OECD. The trend has not, however, been the same for all indicators:
• Capacity margins have seen a particular decline in the UK, but this has to a lesser extent
been a trend visible in most OECD countries.
• Diversity of generation technologies has increased considerably in the UK, driven by a large
increase in the use of natural gas for electricity generation. Except for countries dominated
by large hydro plant, this trend towards increasing diversity is replicated across the OECD.
• Per-capita energy intensity has increased in the UK and OECD countries as demand for
electricity services increases with income. The UK’s per-GDP energy intensity, by con-
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trast, has declined, along with other OECD that have reduces the contribution from their
industrial sectors and moved more towards being a service industry. Where the manufac-
turing industries remain an large part of an economy, however, the per-GDP intensity has
increased.
• Electricity prices, both industrial and domestic, have increased above inﬂation levels across
the OECD, including the UK. The domestic sector seems to have been particularly aﬀected
by these rises, and the rate of increase has been climbing since the early 2000s.
• Import dependence has varied across the OECD, but the UK trend is clearly deﬁned. It
has been increasing since the 1980s as indigenous coal stocks declined. Through the 1990s
the ‘dash for gas’ in generation was matched by an increase in domestic gas production.
However, since 2000 the need for imported fuel to supply the UK electricity generation
ﬂeet has accelerated.
Testing the association with policy change
Impact of privatisation and liberalisation
The data were analysed to assess impact of privatisation and liberalisation on the derated system
margin. No eﬀect could be seen, suggesting that if there was a relationship, it could not be a
strong one. What was seen, however, was that countries that chose to liberalise already tended to
have lower margins. This conﬂicts somewhat with the narrative that privatisation was primarily
seen as a necessary remedy to excessive margins and ‘gold plated’ systems. This may have been
a factor in some of the decisions, but there were countries with similar or larger margins that
did not choose that policy route.
There was similarly little evidence for liberalisation aﬀecting a country’s energy intensity. Coun-
tries that had privatised consumed 40% less electricity per unit GDP, on average, but this is
more attributable to the fact that countries that had wound down their industrial sectors tended
also to undergo electricity reform, rather than privatisation causing any change in the use of
electricity in the economy. Little eﬀect was seen of privatisation on import dependence. This is
not to say that there were not speciﬁc cases where a link can be found (the UK itself being a
notable example), but the the relationship is not a universal one, and as such cannot be seen as
a general eﬀect.
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Prices were generally increasing over the period of interest, but one might have expected liberal-
isation to have provided a buﬀer against these rises as industrial eﬃciency resulted in lower bills.
In fact, the evidence points in the opposite direction, showing an increase in both industrial and
domestic electricity prices in the years after liberalisation. This eﬀect is on top of the underlying
trend of increasing prices seen across the OECD.
Although low margins are now a concern for a number of countries’ electricity systems, one
of the rationales for privatising these systems was to allow seemingly excessive margins to be
reduced. That privatisation and liberalisation seem not to have contributed to a decline in
margins suggests that this goal was not achieved for these reasons. Further, the ‘gold plating’
under nationalisation was thought to be driving high prices, but if there is any eﬀect on prices
it is only to contradict this hypothesis. Rather, the impact of privatisation and liberalisation
seems secondary to the other many changes that these energy systems were undergoing.
The exception to this is the relationship between privatisation and diversity. There is some
evidence to suggest the diversity of investors arising from liberalisation drove the increased
diversity of generating technologies. However, perhaps because of a herd mentality (Roques
et al., 2008) this eﬀect was smaller than may have been expected. Rather, it was privatisation
– the transfer of ownership from public to private hands – that seems to have driven generation
diversity. The tendency of national operators to select a small number of generation technologies
(such as nuclear generation in France) is manageable when tariﬀ controls can protect consumers
against the volatility of the power price. However, privatisation has tended to be occur alongside
a reduction in such tariﬀ controls. Under such conditions, there is an incentive on private
operators to diversify their own portfolios, partly perhaps by the acquisition of existing plant,
but also in the choice of new-build generating technologies.
A summary of the eﬀects of liberalisation and privatisation is given in Table 9.1. This also
summarises the eﬀect of low-carbon policies on the resilience indicators, which have perhaps had
a more signiﬁcant eﬀect that the preceding years of privatisation and liberalisation.
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DeratedMargins GeneratorDiversity EnergyIntensity Price(ind.&domest.) ImportDependence(IDI)
UKtrend
Bumpydecline,flattersince
1980butstilldeclining
Increasedconsiderablysince
1980
PerGDPdecreasingasmove
toservices.Percapita
increasing.
Bumpyincreaseovertime
withrapidaccelerationsince
early2000s.Domprices
higherthanind.
Increasesince1980s(coal
mainly).Dashforgasfrom
1990matchedbyproduction
till2000thenrapidIDI
increase
OECDtrend Decliningbutnotinallcases
Increasing,exceptlarge
hydrocountries
PerGDP:UK,USA,Norway,
Irelanddecrease,Greece,
Portugal,Mexicoincrease.
Percapitauniversally
upward.
Steadilyincreasingoverthe
pasttwodecades(inreal
termsi.e.1990prices)and
therateofincreasehasgone
up
Mixtureoftrends.Denmark's
hasdeclined,ashasNew
Zealand's.Greece,Spain,
TurkeyandUShasincreased
Overall
liberalisation
Overallliberalisationtendsto
increasediversity,even
controllingforGDP
Norelationshipeitherper
GDPorpercapita
Increaseinindustrialand
domesticpricesintheyears
afterliberalisation
Nodiscernableeffector
underlyingdifference
Liberalisedpool Weakpositiveassociation
Meanintensityhasbeen
declininginlibcountriesbut
onlyweakeffect
Noeffectbutliberalised
countriestendedtohave
lowerpricesinearlyyears
Liberalisedcountriestendto
belessimportdependent
andeventuallylibcausesa
decrease
Privatisation
Strongpositiveeffect,3
timeslargerthanoveralllib
Privatisedcountries40%
lowerperGDPintensitybut
nocausaleffectseen.Noper
capitadifference,but
increasinginbothgroups
Noeffectbutprivatised
countrieshadhigherprices
typically
Privatisedcountriestendto
bemoreimportdependent,
butthisisnotaneffectof
privatising.Thereverse
mightbetrueimport
dependenceleadsto
privatisation
VerticalSeparation
Noeffectofanysortof
verticalunbundling
Nogoodevidencethat
unbundlinghasanyeffect,
norisdifferenceseen
Transgenseparationgave
small(5%)butsignificant
increaseinpriceesp.
domestic
Nodifferenceoreffectcan
beseen
Renewables
proportion
Renewablesincreased
absolutemarginandeven
deratedmargintosome
extent
Initialpositiveeffect,butitit
notnecessarilysustainedin
futureyears
Increasedrenewablesleads
tosmallperGDPdrop,but
strongdownwardeffecton
percapitaintensity
V.strongeffect,particularly
ondomestic:1%renew
increasegives5%price
increaseafter4years
Asexpected,import
dependencedecreaseswith
increasingrenewables
Overallrenewable
support
Noeffect,butrenewable
supportmorelikelyif
marginsarelow
Itismorethatdiverse
systemstendtoimplement
renewablesupport
"Support"countriestendto
havelowerintensityonboth
measures,butonlyweak
evidencethatthisiscausal
Ifpolicyhasaneffectitisa
laggedone.Certainlyless
immediatethanthe
installationofrenewcapacity
itself
Noeffect,butstongevidence
thatrenewablesupport
tendstobeofferedifIDIis
high
FIT
FITseemstoincrease
deratedmarginby5%.
Marginswerealsohigherto
startwithinFITcountries
DiversityhigherinFIT
countriesbutnoeffectof
theirintroduction
FITcountriestendtohave
higherIDI,butnocausal
effect
Quota/RO/TGC
FirstROcountrieshadlow
diversitybutinconsistent
andnoeffectseen
Nodifferenceoreffectcan
beseen
Tendering
Tenderingsporadically
applied.Noeffectvisible
Noevidenceofdifferenceor
causaleffect
Typicallyusedincountries
withlowerelectricityprices.
Maybeweakdepressive
effectonprices
Datatoolimitedtodraw
conclusions
Taxincentive/Grant
Morewidespread.Countries
typicallymorediversebutno
effectseen
Verysmalldifference
betweengroupsbutno
effectseen
Slightreductioninprices
seen,particularlydomestic
Nodifferenceoreffectcan
beseen
GDP
Strongcausaleffecton
capacityanddemand,butno
overalleffectonmargin
IncreaseinGDPhaseffectof
increasingdiversity
  
Electricityprice
Priceincreasereduces
demandandincreases
capacity.Individualeffects
notsignificantbutsignificant
enoughtoincreasemargin
   
Key:
Detrimentaleffect
Weaklydetrimentaleffect
Nomeasurableeffect
Weaklypositiveeffect
Positiveeffect
Renewableshavebeenpositiveforresilienceon
allmetricsexceptforprice
Almostnoeffectonresilienceseen,butmaybe
anincreaseinprices
Impactofprivatisationlimitedtoimproving
diversity,butthishasbeenastrongeffect
Liberalisationcomponenthashadweakly
positiveeffectsondiversity,intensityand
importdependence
Summary
Overallliberalisationhasimproveddiversitybut
theremayhavebeenapriceincrease.Little
effectonmarginsortheothermetrics
MixedstoryacrosstheOECD.Again,diversity
tendstoincrease,butmarginsaredeclining.
Priceisuniversallyincreasingasispercapita
intensity
WiththeexceptionofdiversityandperGDP
intensity,allotherindicatorsaresuggestinga
loweringofresiliencefortheUK
Summary
MixedacrossOECD.UKhas
increasingIDIfor20years.
Increasedcoalusewith
decliningindigenous
production,followedbydash
forgasanddecliningNorth
Seaproduction.Adding
renewablestothesystem
resultsinlowerIDIas
expectedbutnopolicy
standsout
Noeffectoveralloron
subset.However,for
countriesthatchoseto
privatise,liberaliseor
verticallyunbundle,derated
marginstendedtobelower
SameforFIT&ROcountries.
Thesecountriesless
intensive,butonlyaweak
effectoftheintervention
FIT&ROtypically
implementedincountries
withhighprices.Haveeither
noeffectorasmallupward
effect
Electricitypricehadsmallimpactoncapacity
anddemandbutwasenoughtoshowupasan
effectonmargin
GDPgreatlyaffectedcapacityanddemand,but
theneteffectonmarginswassmall.GDPdid
howeverincreasediversity
Almostnoeffectcouldbeseen,butthesample
wassmall
Almostnoeffectcouldbeseen,butthesample
wassmall
RenewableObligationtypemechanismsdidnot
damagethederatedmarginbutdidnothelp.
Feedintariffimprovedderatedmargins.A
smalldecreaseinintensitycorrespondstoa
smallincreaseinprices
Theimplementationofpolicymeasuresoverall
hadlittleeffect
Noeffectonmargin.ButTGC
countrieshadlowermargins,
asdidthecountriesthat
tenderedorhadgrants.
Negativeeffectseen
probablymorebecause
marginsrecoveredafterthey
stopped
Realpricesincreasingin
nearlyallcountries,andrate
ofincreasehasbeengoing
up.Overall_libseemstohave
increasedprices,whichis
unexpected.Impactof
renewablesismore
significantthough.Roleof
policyhereisnotclearbut
likelytobeweak.
Percapitaintensityhasbeen
increasingacrosstheOECD.
PerGDPhasdeclinedfor
thosecountriesmovingto
serviceindustries.Littleif
anyeffectfromoverall_lib,
butintensityispusheddown
bynewrenewables,probably
viapriceincreases
Moreliberalisedsystemsalso
tendtobemore
technologicallydiverse.
Overall_libfurtherincreases
diversityevenafter
controllingforGDP,butthis
ismoretodowith
privatisationthan
liberalisation.
Majorityofdifferenceoccurs
beforeliberalisation.
Overall_libitselfshowsno
effect.Renewablesdidnot
increasederatedmargin
unlessFIT.GDPaffected
capacityandloadbutnot
margin,whereaspricedid
increasemargin.
Table 9.1: Summary of policy impacts on resilience
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Impact of renewables expansion
The primary purpose of renewable generating technologies is to reduce the use of fossil fuels
for electricity generation. Arguments have been made, however, that security could be harmed
by reducing the eﬀective capacity on the system. Conversely it has also been argued that such
technologies would be beneﬁcial to overall system security by diversifying the electricity mix and
reducing the dependence on imported fuels. This research has been able to test each of these
claims.
First, an increase in renewable generation can be shown to increase the eﬀective derated mar-
gin on the system. This approach, in principle, accounts for the variability inherent in non-
dispatchable plant such as wind and solar technologies by using their ‘capacity credit’ rather
than their nameplate capacity. The renewables expansion has, therefore, been beneﬁcial in pro-
viding additional capacity. This is particularly so in the case of countries that have used a Feed-in
Tariﬀ mechanism to encourage investment. In practice, there remains some uncertainty about
the precise measure of ‘capacity credit’ for a given electricity system, but there seems to be little
reason for concern, and certainly not at the levels of penetration seen to date.
The case made for renewables providing diversity of generation seems less strong, however. Al-
though the initial eﬀect of introducing more renewable capacity onto the system is to increase
diversity, this eﬀect seems to wear oﬀ as older plant is retired. However, the reduction in import
dependence was a visible and sustained result of increased renewables. In this way, although
renewable generation in itself presents uncertainties, its inclusion in the generation mix reduces
dependence on fuel supplies beyond the control of national borders and institutions.
Renewables, then, improve the eﬀective margin on the system and reduce the dependence on
imports. However, this seems to come at a cost in the form of electricity prices. An increase
of 1% in the level of renewables on the system is associated with a 5% increase in domestic
electricity prices. If the ability to aﬀord electricity is to be considered an important indicator of
resilience, then, the beneﬁts of renewables need to be tempered by this observation.
That renewable generation seems to have inﬂated prices historically does not preclude the possi-
bility that future fuel prices will rise and that renewable technologies will become more aﬀordable.
However, as the expansion of the renewables sector increases, policies to prevent an adverse im-
pact on fuel poverty may be required if societies are to remain resilient to future increases in the
cost of generating electricity.
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The conclusions of this chapter do not present a single story for the impact of either liberalisation
or the expansion of the renewables sector on electricity system resilience. Apart from diversity,
liberalisation has had surprisingly little eﬀect on resilience – a fact that will be relevant to ongoing
policy discussions about the future of the UK system. Perhaps more important has been the
way in which liberalisation has been done and the underlying characteristics of the country in
which it has been implemented. Further, the introduction of large-scale renewables projects has
been the more signiﬁcant factor for the resilience of electricity systems in the past decade, and
this trend is likely to continue.
The largely positive impact of such expansion on the resilience of these systems should be en-
couraging to policymakers, but the evidence also suggests that these beneﬁts can be transient if
not managed through appropriate policies. The following chapter considers the proposals being
put forward by the UK Government and attempts to understand these proposals in the light of
their historical context.
10
Assessing future policy in the light of the
historical analysis
This chapter considers the most recent UK policy documents, and attempts to review their
proposals and ﬁndings from a “resilience” perspective. The Electricity Market Reform (EMR)
consultation (DECC, 2010a) provides a particular focus for this chapter because of its direct
signiﬁcance for policy change; however, other relevant policy documents are considered and
discussed:
• The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan (DECC, 2009c)
• The UK Renewable Energy Strategy (DECC, 2010c)
• Ofgem’s Project Discovery (Ofgem, 2010)
• Energy Market Assessment (DECC, 2010b)
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In particular, this chapter focuses on the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) document’s propos-
als, which are “designed to ensure that low-carbon technologies become a more attractive choice
for investors, and adequately reward back up capacity to ensure the lights stay on.” The reform
proposals discussed in the EMR consultation include:
• Carbon price support (CPS)
• Feed-in tariﬀs (Premium, Fixed, Contract for Diﬀerence (CfD))
• Targeted capacity mechanism
• Emissions Performance Standard (EPS)
10.1 Generation System Margin
The ﬁndings of this thesis are broadly that, despite some initial concerns, the history of privati-
sation and liberalisation has not been detrimental to system margins in the OECD countries.
The Electricity Market Reform (EMR) consultation document agrees with this ﬁnding in the
speciﬁc case of the UK, where it states that the “market has performed well” and has “delivered
the almost 30GW of gas generation currently in operation and maintained an adequate capacity
margin”.
The concern for the margins in the generation system, then, are not based on historic perfor-
mance, but rather express concern about the impact of delivering the UK’s other energy policy
objectives. As the EMR puts it, “as the UK progresses in decarbonising the electricity sector, the
Government will need to ensure that electricity supplies continue to be secure” (DECC, 2010a).
It goes on:
Over 19GW of nuclear, oil, coal and gas plant is scheduled to close over the com-
ing decade as stations reach the end of their design lives and due to the eﬀects of
environmental legislation. Over 20 GW of new capacity is either in construction or
development and will therefore enable the UK to maintain secure supplies for the
time being. However modelling shows that de-rated capacity margins will reduce in
the latter part of the decade from circa 20% to below 10% and we need to ensure that
the market design provides the right investment signals for both new baseload gas
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plant and the additional ﬂexible plant that is required to ensure system balancing in
the latter part of this decade and into the 2020s (DECC, 2010a).
Similar concerns are expressed in the Low Carbon Transition Plan (2009) report about the
intermittency of renewables such as wind, particularly if plans for higher levels of penetration
to 2020 are achieved. If the market provides the adequate price signals, the theory is that
market participants will invest in the appropriate levels of conventional generation to exploit
periods of high electricity prices when the intermittent sources of electricity are unavailable.
Levels of renewables penetration across the OECD remain relatively low in comparison with
the UK’s future targets, so predictions about market behaviour at high penetration levels are
based more on theory than experience. As the LCTP states: “Since our electricity system has
never experienced this level of plant intermittency and price volatility before, there is a lot of
uncertainty as to how prices will behave in reality” (DECC, 2009c).
Ofgem’s Project Discovery (2010) questions whether existing arrangements will deliver the price
increases required to make the economic case for building new CCGTs viable. The reduced load
factor for these plants that would arise as a result of the additional renewables would mean
that the electricity price would need to rise to make the case for investment. This, the report
concludes, would require supply scarcity (in the form of low margins) to ensure that prices were
suﬃciently high. This conclusion, it argues, provides the justiﬁcation for further intervention in
the market as the renewables penetration levels increase.
An alternative outcome is that CCGT investment may not be forthcoming because
investors become concerned about the risk of future government intervention to ad-
dress these issues (e.g. promotion of CCS and nuclear) and thus of stranding assets
in the future. In this case, the system would experience a reduced level of security
of supply in the 2016-2020 period before new CCS/nuclear plant comes on stream
(Ofgem, 2010).
The analysis conducted for this thesis showed that there was little evidence that either liberalisa-
tion or privatisation has had a detrimental impact on countries’ ability to delivery suﬃcient levels
of capacity to meet demand. Furthermore, the experience of building new renewable capacity to
date has had a positive eﬀect on margins, providing a protective level of system security, even
when the contribution made by variable generation is derated appropriately.
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This may be a situation where the past is not especially useful for predicting the future. The
main diﬀerence between now and the past 20 years is that a rapid new-build programme is
needed in the UK, and this has to be done whilst attempting to meet a number of environmental
objectives. In the EMR report by the Energy and Climate Change Select Committee, it argues:
. . . it is not clear that the policies introduced in the EMR Consultation would increase
the overall capacity margin in the next ten years because of the lead times involved
in building new low-carbon plant and the low “de-rated” capacity of wind power
(ECCC, 2011).
The argument here is that, whilst the expansion of renewables has not in the past necessarily
reduced derated margins, wind power is perhaps not the optimal way to add capacity rapidly
to the system. The evidence from this thesis shows that, historically, the UK’s choice of a
Renewables Obligation (RO) as the means by which to deliver new-build renewable generators
may explain in part why it is not seen as likely that margins can be signiﬁcantly increased
without substantial change. The Feed-in Tariﬀ mechanism, by contrast, is the only incentive
mechanism that has a track record of adding renewables whilst resulting in a net beneﬁt to the
overall derated margin.
Nevertheless, past experience of these policy mechanisms remains limited, and there will continue
to be large uncertainty about how best to implement the measures. Particularly as the proportion
of electricity delivered by non-dispatchable plant increases, the behaviour of the system and
of investors becomes less certain still. At current levels, the amount of wind on the system
is manageable under existing operational arrangements, but increasing levels will need to be
managed by increasing levels of balancing plant:
At present, there is very little wind on the system and therefore dealing with its
intermittent nature is not a problem. It will only cause problems once there is a
much greater penetration on the system. At the moment, levels of intermittent
renewables are forecast to reach the scale at which balancing starts to be a problem
around 2020.” (ECCC, 2011)
Delivering both the wind capacity itself, and the additional balancing plant to maintain the
overall margin, has potential risks. The three other main proposals will aﬀect these risks in
diﬀerent ways:
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10.1.1 Emissions Performance Standard (EPS)
The Emissions Performance Standard (EPS) proposed by the government consultation would
set a limit on the per-kWh CO2 emissions allowed for a power plant. In responses to the
consultation, this proposed measure has come under some criticism (ECCC, 2011), primarily
because it is seen by many to be redundant, given the other proposals being put forward. Indeed,
the DECC consultation itself acknowledges that the EPS would be a “regulatory backstop” within
a “package of reforms to prevent the construction and operation of new unabated coal-ﬁred power
stations” (DECC, 2010a).
Some contributors have further argued that the EPS would contribute an additional, unnecessary
layer of regulatory uncertainty. The HoC 2011 report cites evidence that the EMS proposals
“could in fact undermine policy certainty and credibility, thus introducing a negative impact on
investment in low-carbon capacity”. This counterintuitive conclusion, the report argues, arises
from the recognition of two possibilities:
1. The Welsh Power Group, in its response, expressed concern that an EPS could, over time,
be made increasingly stringent. By potentially being applied to future gas-ﬁred plant, this
could provide a source of investment uncertainty.
2. RenewableUK’s concern was that an EPS that did not align with the CO2 targets and
the Committee on Climate Change’s emission reduction pathway would lead to “mixed
messages”.
It is not clear whether these speciﬁc objections are valid, but it seems likely that the EPS, as
currently proposed, is unlikely to contribute to the decarbonisation of the UK electricity system.
It has already been noted that investor uncertainty is one of the key concerns for delivering the
UK’s required level of new build. If the EPS has little or no upside, the potential downside of
adding further to this uncertainty seems unnecessary.
10.1.2 Carbon price support (CPS)
The introduction of a carbon price ﬂoor is intended to provide some stability to the carbon
price, and thereby reduce the risk seen by investors in new renewables whilst also discouraging
the construction of high-CO2-emitting plant. In conjunction with the EPS, the construction of
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new UK coal plant is made very unlikely in the future. One of the rationales here is that the
carbon price is highly sensitive to policy decisions, and so is inherently linked to Government
decision-making:
Carbon price uncertainty is predominantly driven by wider regulatory uncertainties
and the Government might therefore be better placed to manage some carbon price
risk (HM Treasury, 2010).
The mechanism is, however, technology non-speciﬁc; as a result it will likely beneﬁt all forms of
low-carbon generation, including nuclear power. Whilst increasing the attractiveness of new nu-
clear plant for investors may beneﬁt the overall margin, the proposed increase in non-dispatchable
plant will require corresponding plant with fast ramp rates to mitigate the additional variability
— this is most likely to be CCGT.
For investors in gas plant there is a need to see stability in the spread between gas and power
prices. The Treasury report argues that although carbon prices have been volatile, the volatility
of the gas price is much greater:
While the carbon price is an important factor aﬀecting investment decisions, the gas
price is a larger source of uncertainty. Gas prices have historically been more volatile
than carbon prices (HM Treasury, 2010).
A carbon price ﬂoor may encourage renewable generation and strongly discourage coal plant,
but there remains an uncertainty about the ability of the proposed market and regulatory en-
vironment to deliver the CCGTs needed to balance the system. For this and other reasons, a
capacity mechanism has been proposed, which is discussed below.
10.1.3 Targeted capacity mechanism
The EMR consultation (DECC, 2010a) proposes a capacity mechanism as a means to ensure
that security of supply be maintained whilst meeting other energy policy objectives, saying: “it
is necessary to introduce a capacity mechanism in order to provide greater assurance of the
future security of electricity supplies” (DECC, 2010a, p.86). The need for such a mechanism is
twofold: ﬁrst, it is now thought uncertain whether a purely market-based system would deliver
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the sorts of price signals needed to deliver large amounts of new capacity with suﬃcient speed;
and second, that the speciﬁc mix of ﬂexible plant required to balance the increasing levels of
non-dispatchable plant requires targeted intervention.
On this ﬁrst point, Ofgem’s Project Discovery report (Ofgem, 2010) argues that “by providing
an additional capacity revenue stream this may reduce the investment risk and lower the cost of
capital (Ofgem, 2010)”. A particular concern for potential investors in CCGT plant is that they
will be under-utilised, and that price spikes will be inadequate to recoup the initial investment.
A capacity mechanism may alleviate some of this risk by oﬀering a secondary means by new
plant can generate revenues.
A DECC memorandum on the EMR consultation reiterates this view:
‘The Government believes some form of capacity mechanism is necessary to ensure
security of supply in future. Analysis suggests that as levels of low carbon generation
increase, the price signal alone may not be suﬃcient to incentivise adequate levels of
the additional ﬂexible backup capacity required to run for only a few hours operation
a year (DECC, 2011).
This also highlights the need for ﬂexible capacity, which is not incentivised by any other proposed
intervention. The capacity mechanism is, in part, intended to perform this role:
Support for low-carbon technologies such as wind and nuclear energy (through the
Feed-in Tariﬀ) will skew the system in favour of generation that cannot easily or
reliably respond to short-term peaks and troughs in demand. The proposed capacity
mechanism is intended to counteract that diﬃculty by paying plant for being available
to generate, because it is likely to generate for much shorter periods during the year
and ﬁnd it hard to recover its ﬁxed costs from energy sales.” (ECCC, 2011)
It has been argued before in this thesis that, unlike the electricity itself, the ‘energy security’
component of the electricity system exhibits some collective good characteristics, at least in some
spacial dimensions: system security is non-rival (security is not part of a zero-sum game in which
one must lose for another to gain) and non-excludable (it cannot be given to one consumer but
denied to his neighbour). For this reason, security will tend to be undersupplied, which is why
a grid operator has always required the additional purchase of various balancing services. The
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retaining of additional capacity is an extension of this idea. Indeed, as the Energy and Climate
Change Select Committee reports:
The Welsh Power Group also proposed an extension of the role of the SO as a central
buying agency for more reserve capacity to balance increasing intermittency. National
Grid agreed that “the mechanisms currently employed by National Grid as System
Operator to procure ‘balancing services’ could also be extended or amended to provide
additional ‘back-up’ capacity (ECCC, 2011).
Of the ﬁve investigated, system margin is the indicator about which most concern has been
expressed in the policy literature. Undoubtedly margins have declined in the UK since privatisa-
tion began, but that is not necessarily suﬃcient evidence to support the idea that privatisation
or liberalisation caused this change. Indeed the analysis of OECD countries found no consistent
eﬀect on any of the liberalisation indicators. It cannot be concluded, however, that privatised
systems will therefore continue to deliver adequate margins. Indeed, there are good reasons to
believe that the rapid capacity expansion required in the UK will not be achieved without some
sort of intervention.
The UK’s electricity system has in the past beneﬁted from adequate (some have argued excessive)
margins, so relatively little new-build capacity was needed. The next twenty years are unlikely
to reﬂect the past twenty years, however. The closure of a large amount of renewable plant,
the implementation of the LCPD, and the need for new generation that meets the government’s
environmental objectives have the potential to leave a supply shortfall.
On the question of renewables, the statistical analysis showed that the net eﬀect of expanding
the renewables sector was to increase a system’s margin. An increase is not necessarily of overall
beneﬁt, as non-dispatchable plant such as wind requires additional backup capacity to achieve
a given level of LOLP. By analysing the derated margin, an estimate of the real contribution of
new renewables to system security was made, and it was found that renewables still provided a
net beneﬁt.
There was, however, a caveat on these results: in some cases the initial beneﬁt of increasing the
proportion of new renewables was dissipated over time as older plant was eventually displaced.
The speed of this tailing-oﬀ appears to depend on the policy that brought about the renewables
expansion. The sample size available was small, and should be interpreted with caution, but
it appears that where renewable generation was introduced primarily as a result of a tendering
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process, or through speciﬁc tax breaks, the derated margin actually decreased by 7%. Where
Tradeable Green Certiﬁcates were used (such as the Renewables Obligation), there was no eﬀect
on the derated margin. The only policy that saw a beneﬁt in terms of the margin was the Feed-in
Tariﬀ schemes. These saw an sustained increase of 5% to the derated margin, suggesting that
the new renewable plant was able to be added to the system without displacing the existing
conventional plant.
The proposals in the EMR agree with the ﬁndings of this thesis that there is little reason to
suppose that liberalised markets have been unsuccessful in maintaining the desired levels of
system margin. However, they also reﬂect a large amount of uncertainty for the future. This
reﬂects both the relatively short time horizons under which liberalised electricity markets have
operated, and the new challenges of ageing networks, increasing demand and the need to deliver
on carbon-reduction commitments.
The UK government has a range of strategies it could adopt. At one extreme is the ‘do-nothing’
option where the existing market and regulatory mechanisms are deemed to be capable of main-
taining adequate levels of reliability. Perhaps the opposite extreme would be some form of direct
state investment in the electricity generation sector, or a return to state-owned and centrally
planned operation. In between these two extremes lie policy actions such as those aimed at ad-
dressing regulatory problems and overcoming market barriers, as well as more direct interventions
such as the reintroduction of a system of explicit payments for the provision of capacity.
A signiﬁcant additional layer of complexity is that markets do not just respond to price signals
and market information: they also respond to actual or anticipated policy actions. Generating
companies will thus base their investment decisions on both market appraisal and assessments of
the direction of future government policy (Gross et al., 2007a). One consequence of this is that
companies may choose to delay investment until the policy landscape is clearer, which could have
signiﬁcant implications for investment and hence system margin. This uncertainty might suggest
that a ‘wait-and-see’ approach is most appropriate, allowing policies to be adjusted in light of
any new developments. The danger is that this creates a self-fulﬁlling prophesy of anticipated,
then real, intervention: if investors believe that the government might intervene in the market
it would be prudent for them to exercise the option to wait. If all investors wait, then policy
intervention becomes inevitable: “frequent revision of policy could lead to the worst possible
outcome – no investment at all while players wait for the situation to become clear” (Scott and
Watson, 2006)
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The British market was one of the ﬁrst to liberalise, and it still enjoys a higher degree of compe-
tition than the rest of Europe and most of the rest of the world. The British ‘experiment’ with
liberalisation delivered eﬃciency gains and cost reductions during the 1990s. Since then, policy
goals have changed, and both security and environmental commitments will require considerable
investment and re-engineering. It remains to be seen whether the more limited set of levers
policymakers have available under the liberalised arrangements will be suﬃcient to balance the
beneﬁts of the market in delivering higher eﬃciency and lower costs against the risk that the
market will not deliver the levels of supply security which the UK has hitherto enjoyed.
10.2 System Diversity
The ﬁndings of this thesis show that, even after controlling for GDP, an increase in the overall
level of privatisation and liberalisation is positively associated with an increase in diversity.
Further analysis revealed that this was explained primarily by the measure of ‘privatisation’. It
was not the increase in competition that induced an increase in the diversity of the generating
mix, but rather the transfer of ownership from the state to private hands.
The Electricity Market Reform consultation (DECC, 2010a) states the Government’s ambitions
for diverse electricity generation as follows:
Our mix of electricity generation capacity should be diverse, so that problems with
one technology or fuel do not lead to the failure of the entire electricity system.
Diversity can be technological (a wide range of electricity generation technologies)
and geographic (primary fuels imported from a wide range of countries). Diversity
can also address uncertainty as it helps to address the issues around technology costs
maturing at diﬀerent rates over time, and so reduces the overall costs we might face
if we put our faith in only one or two technologies.
One of the consistent arguments in favour of low-carbon technologies is that it would increase
the diversity of the generation mix, and to reduce exposure to global commodity prices. This
sentiment is illustrated by the Energy Market Assessment:
Developing sources of low-carbon energy will help to diversify energy supply so as to
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strengthen the UK’s resilience to any geopolitical instability or global price volatility
(DECC, 2010b).
Analysis of the data for this thesis revealed that, indeed, the addition of new renewables increased
the diversity of a generation system. By looking at the lagged eﬀects, however, it also showed
that such increases could rapidly dissipate as old plant then closes. This diversity drop-oﬀ can
be mitigated through the use of policy interventions, but the evidence is not suﬃciently strong
to say which mechanisms are best placed to achieve this eﬀect. The conclusion, therefore, is that
diversity is not a guaranteed result of increased investment in renewables, and that governments
should consider carefully their interventions to maximise the beneﬁt to the generation mix.
This seems to be reﬂected in the policy literature. Ofgem’s Project Discovery report, for exam-
ple, notes that there is a risk in introducing Capacity Tenders of reducing the diversity of the
generation mix: “if tenders are highly speciﬁed in terms of technology, the beneﬁts of diversity
on security of supply may be undervalued” (Ofgem, 2010). Following Jim Skea’s work on valuing
diversity (Skea, 2010) it may be possible to design a tendering mechanism that incentivised gen-
erating technologies that were dissimilar to the existing stock, but this has not been proposed
in recent policy proposals. The Ofgem report highlights similar problems with the notion of
capacity mechanisms, saying “the Central Energy Buyer may undervalue the diversity that a
more competitive market may deliver”
Project Discovery (Ofgem, 2010) notes that the introduction of a carbon price ﬂoor, while achiev-
ing low carbon investment, could also improve the diversity of the generation mix by reducing the
proportion of gas-ﬁred generation. It also notes, however, that such a mechanism would likely
lead to the early closure of coal-ﬁred power stations. The Redpoint analysis conducted for the
EMR, however, suggests that the driving eﬀect of the carbon price ﬂoor would be to encourage
new nuclear, which would not necessarily lead to an increase in system diversity:
. . . nuclear is favoured over CCS when the investment incentive is purely based on a
market-wide price signal, as is the case under Carbon Price Support. This is because
it is assumed to be lower cost and to mature earlier (Redpoint, 2010).
The report goes on:
Under Premium Payments, Fixed Payments and Contracts for Diﬀerence there is a
greater proportion of CCS since we assume that it would receive targeted support
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at a level that bridges the diﬀerent funding gaps. As a result these options tend to
promote a more diversiﬁed, but (initially) more expensive generation mix (Redpoint,
2010).
Under this analysis, then, the FIT has the most potential to deliver a diversiﬁed system. It seems
clear that the net eﬀect on diversity of any of the proposed policy mechanisms is uncertain, and
depends on the speciﬁcs of how those interventions are targeted. The ﬁndings of this research
seem to show that diversity is encouraged by privatising a system, and that this beneﬁt can be
maintained under appropriate policy regimes.
A resilient system is one that can cope well with a wide variety of unforeseen adverse scenarios.
As has been discussed in previous sections, an electricity system, and in particular a privatised
electricity system, is susceptible to adverse events that fall under the categories of ‘uncertainty’
and ‘ignorance’ (Grubb et al., 2006). Diversity provides a hedge against a wide range of adverse
scenarios. A system with a large number of disparate technologies makes a system resilient for
a number of reasons. First, if the generation mix runs on a number of diﬀerent fuels, an adverse
event cutting oﬀ the supply of one of these fuels is unlikely to aﬀect all generators. Second,
any adverse-event that is technology-speciﬁc (such as droughts forcing certain generators to shut
down as a result of a lack of coolant) is minimised if the aﬀected technology represents only a
small proportion of the overall technology mix.
In contrast with generation system margins, which have been considered by many commentators
to be threatened by privatisation, diversity drew little of such attention. The 1995 White Paper,
“The Prospects for Nuclear Power in the UK” ((DTI, 1995), cited in (Helm, 2002)), states, for
example:
“the government cannot identify any reasons why the electricity market should
not of its own accord provide an appropriate level of diversity”
In the years since 1980 the diversity of the UK’s electricity system has steadily increased. This
has been caused largely by the increased use of natural gas for electricity generation, but the
trend has not been consistent across the OECD countries. This thesis attempted to discern some
general relationships between regulation and diversity:
• Will the real market (as opposed to a theoretical idealised market) deliver adequate levels
of diversity?
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• What regulations, if any, are necessary to ensure that this diversity can be achieved?
The statistical analysis found that the overall indicator of privatisation and liberalisation ap-
peared to have little if any eﬀect on the diversity of OECD electricity systems. However, when
these indicators were considered individually the ‘privatisation’ indicator seemed to lead to an
increase in diversity. In other words, the technological diversity of the generating mix is in-
creased most by transferring the ownership of the power system assets from public to private
hands. This, more than the unbundling of generation and transmission assets, and more than
the creation of a liberalised trading pool, is the component of ‘overall liberalisation’ that leads
to an increase in the diversity of the generation mix.
The fact that privatisation, rather than increasing competition, seems to be the best predictor of
increasing diversity reveals something about the underlying mechanism. If liberalisation had been
the driver of increased diversity, this would have suggested that there would be a competitive
pressure to diversify a company’s generation portfolio. The fact that there is no signiﬁcant
correlation between liberalisation and diversity implies that no such driver exists, or that it is
counterbalanced by some other mechanism. Once such mechanism is suggested by Roques et al.
(2008):
A perfect market should motivate individual investment decisions leading to the so-
cially optimal fuel mix, but the conditions for this to hold are strong. . . In particular,
herd behaviour (in which investors observe others’ decisions, and assume they are
based on superior information that justiﬁes imitating their choices) may encourage
investment in one or two dominant technologies. . .
The Roques et al. (2008) paper argues that whilst market liberalisation would hypothetically lead
to an optimally diverse generation mix, this relies on the assumption of perfect foresight and
perfectly rational price and risk behaviour. Since these conditions are never met, the observed
lack of correlation between diversity and liberalisation is unsurprising.
It has been argued that one beneﬁt of promoting a strong renewables sector is that it delivers the
additional beneﬁt of increasing the diversity of the overall system. The analysis of the evidence
conducted for this thesis does indeed show that the addition of new renewable generation to
the grid has the immediate eﬀect of increasing diversity. This eﬀect, however, is reduced very
quickly, suggesting that any diversity gains for adding a new form of generation are lost as other
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plant is then retired. These results, therefore, are somewhat ambivalent about the hypothesis
that adding renewables to the system increases system resilience by means of increasing diversity.
There is some evidence, however, that the use of policy intervention can have more of a lasting
positive eﬀect on the diversity of the system.
The policy interventions proposed in the EMR have the potential to aﬀect electricity system
diversity in diﬀerent ways, and there remains some uncertainty about whether the resulting
system following a policy intervention would emerge as being more or less diverse. Both Capacity
Tenders and Capacity Mechanisms may prove to be too technology-speciﬁc and, as a result,
dissuade a variety of technologies from being developed. A carbon price ﬂoor could increase
diversity by reducing the proportion of gas-ﬁred plant (Ofgem, 2010), or it could favour nuclear,
in which case diversity could remain fairly stable (Redpoint, 2010). The Redpoint report also
argues that FiTs may be the option that results in greater diversity.
It seems clear that the net eﬀect on diversity of any of the proposed policy mechanisms is
uncertain, and depends on the speciﬁcs of how those interventions are targeted. The ﬁndings of
this research seem to show that diversity is encouraged by privatising a system, and that this
beneﬁt can be maintained under appropriate policy regimes, but that the best regime is, as yet,
uncertain.
10.3 Demand and Prices
Both energy intensity and price are indicators of society’s exposure to and reliance on the elec-
tricity system. The amount of electricity consumed to generate a country’s wealth reﬂects how
much economic loss would occur as a result of an outage. It is by no means a perfect indicator —
some tasks may require a small, but critical, amount of electricity in order to function. The per
capita GDP indicator reﬂects individuals’ dependence on electrical services, and their exposure
to system failure.
As with a number of other countries, the UK’s economic energy intensity has been decreasing
for a number of years. The OECD’s per-capita electricity intensity showed an increasing trend
in nearly all cases. The UK showed strong growth over this time period, although it peaked in
2005 and showed a considerable drop in 2009.
The price of electricity to both industry and households has increased since 1980, and has seen a
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particularly steep rise since the beginning of the 21st century. The UK’s economic productivity
is protected to some extent against this rise since the per-GDP electricity consumption has
decreased. For households, this is not the case: the high prices, combined with the increasing
dependence on electricity, makes consumers more vulnerable both to prices spices and physical
supply shortages.
The statistical analysis found no eﬀect of overall liberalisation on the intensity with which elec-
tricity is used. Whilst there are diﬀerences between countries that chose or do not choose to
introduce a liberalised pool or to privatise, this diﬀerence does not appear to be a causal one.
Similarly, no eﬀect of overall liberalisation was seen on prices. Two possible explanations for
this were considered: whilst there is evidence from the literature that the eﬃciency of operations
did increase in the power sector as a result of privatisation and liberalisation (Newbery, 2001),
the resulting savings are not necessarily passed on to consumers; second, countries with a state-
owned power sector have are more likely to subsidise the price of electricity (Bacon, 1995), so the
price reported would not reﬂect the true price of the commodity. By shifting some of the burden
of electricity from consumers to taxpayers, this may inﬂate the perceived eﬃciency of state-
owned operations, and correspondingly depress the perceived savings resulting from increased
competition.
The expansion of the renewables sector was associated with a decrease in per-GDP and per-capita
electricity consumption. There is the possibility of confounding here, as the more developed
countries tend both to promote renewables and are expanding their service sector. The electricity
price indicator is also associated negatively with electricity intensity, meaning that as prices go up
the demand for electricity reduces. Finally, it can be shown that as the proportion of renewables
on the system increases, so the price of electricity goes up. In this case, then, ‘price’ can be seen
as a resilience indicator in its own right, but it is also the mediator by which renewables expansion
reduces demand. Renewable generation increases prices, which in turn reduce demand.
The price paid by consumers for this renewables expansion does not appear to be shared equally
between domestic and industrial consumers. The analysis revealed that for an increase of 10%
in the proportion of renewable generation on the system, industrial consumers saw, on average,
a 1c per kWh increase in their electricity price. For the same 10% increase, however, residential
customers saw a 3-5c per kWh increase. This, combined with the contrast between the decreasing
per-GDP and increasing per-capita consumption, means that domestic consumers are particularly
susceptible to prices associated with an increase in renewable generation.
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The EMR places a large focus on the price of electricity for consumers: “Competition in retail
energy markets is an important means of securing consumer interests. It is vital that retail
energy markets work to keep energy prices as low as possible, consistent with the need for
investment to meet climate change and energy security objectives (DECC, 2010a)”. However,
Nick Molho (WWF) pointed out that “the one key area that, unfortunately, is not currently
addressed by the electricity market reform is the potential for reducing energy demand in the
long term” (ECCC, 2011). Indeed, there is a focus on Demand-Side Response (DSR), whose role
the government sees as having “strong potential to assist system balancing and reduce costs”,
but none of the propose policy measures address overall demand reduction. It has been shown in
the international community, however, that an expansion of DSR is associated with an long-term
demand reduction as populations become more aware, and in some cases incentivised, to enact
lifestyle changes.
Low prices are the overall objective of eﬀective competition, as they have been in nearly every
energy policy document to date. The report claims that the UK sees some of Europe’s lowest
electricity prices, but as has been argued this may have less to do with liberalisation than has
been assumed. As margins shrink, such prices are likely to be pushed up; as the EMR observes:
“individual bill numbers in any given year are less insightful because they will be aﬀected by
other issues in the sector, such as the capacity margin in that particular year which will also aﬀect
wholesale prices”. Indeed, the statistical analysis of this thesis revealed an association between
price and margin. There is therefore an inherent tension when it comes to electricity prices.
High prices provide the incentive to build new capacity; a drop in prices dissuades investors, and
a drop in margin pushes up prices. This balance is imperfect, however, resulting in long periods
of excessively-large, or excessively-small amounts of generation on the system.
The stability of the electricity price will in future years be, at least in part, reliant on a stable
carbon price. The EU Emissions Trading Scheme was introduced in 2005. In the ﬁrst three
years of trading (Phase I) the monthly prices of equivalent CO2 emissions went from a start
of AC7/tCO2e to a maximum of AC27/tCO2e. By the time Phase I was coming to an end, the
carbon price under the EU ETS was virtually zero (Figure 10.1). Prices recovered following the
reallocation in Phase II, but again dropped to a relatively stable position just under AC15/tCO2e.
Incentives for investors and the demands of consumer are in conﬂict. Where government can
intervene, however, is in the volatility of forward power prices. As Figure 10.1 illustrates, the
carbon price has been extremely volatile. The carbon price ﬂoor would reduce the downside
risk for low-carbon investors and, if designed appropriately, could begin to reimburse consumers
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when the EU ETS price became suﬃciently high.
Figure 10.1: EU ETS monthly prices
Similarly, a form of capacity payment breaks, to some extent, the link between forward power
prices and generator investment decisions. The FiT, as opposed to the RO, is seen by Government
as a means to reduce price uncertainty to investors, whilst maintaining “exposure to the short-
term electricity price signal, incentivising eﬃcient operational decisions by generators”.
The analysis conducted for this thesis shows that renewable generation can have a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the price of electricity, adversely aﬀecting electricity consumers. Mitigating this eﬀect
without in turn dissuading further investment in new generation remains a pressing challenge
for government.
10.4 Energy Independence
The Import Dependence Indicator (IDI) reﬂects the amount of fuel required for generating elec-
tricity in a given country, and the proportion of that fuel that has to be imported. It reﬂects
the exposure of a country’s electricity system to fuel sources outside its regulatory control. The
statistical analysis found no link between either liberalisation or privatisation on the IDI. The
fact that there is no overall eﬀect across the OECD countries does not mean that privatisation
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and liberalisation had no impact in the UK. The decline of the UK coal mining industry has
been more rapid than the closure of coal-ﬁred power plant. As a result, of the fuel commodities
required for the UK’s electricity production, coal was the most signiﬁcant contributor to the
UK’s increasing import dependence. Initially, this increase in dependence on imported fuels was
mitigated to some extent by the ‘dash for gas’ that followed privatisation. The contribution of
gas to the IDI was at ﬁrst neutral, as production from the North Sea was suﬃcient to meet the
demand from new CCGT plant; once these gas supplies began to decline from 2000 onwards,
however, the continued expansion of gas generation drove up the UK’s import dependence.
Many countries have moved from coal to increasing gas dependence. However, the UK gas system
was designed to exploit reserves in the UK continental shelf. As a result, Britain has relatively low
gas storage levels and a limited number of import routes. Reliance on imported fuel introduces
new uncertainties into the electricity sector and, while these are hard to quantify, many argue
that the prudent approach is to diversify import routes and to increase the level of gas storage
– two strategies that the UK is pursuing. Longer-term policies that seek to diversify investment
away from gas-ﬁred plant into nuclear power and renewables are also very clearly motivated by
concerns related to diversity of supply as well as by climate policy drivers. In short, Britain
faces not a fuel gap per se, but rather a potential, though by no means unmanageable, ‘import
risk’. In the short term, increasing reliance on imported fuel is inevitable. The main challenge
for policymakers is to ensure that the ensuing uncertainties are managed eﬀectively.
One of the key themes that runs through a number of these policy documents is the notion that
an expansion of the renewables sector will not only deliver the country’s low-carbon objective, but
will also increase the security of supply by reducing dependence on imported fuels. In a sense this
seems indisputable, but as the Renewable Energy Strategy (DECC, 2010c) notes, an increase
in non-dispatchable generators such as wind turbines on the system requires a corresponding
increase in back-up capacity. This generation needs to be “from ﬂexible fossil-fuel power stations
that are able to switch generation on and oﬀ quickly and cheaply (eg CCGTs)”. As the report
concludes, the UK’s “electricity security of supply will remain dependent on secure gas supplies”.
Regarding electricity, we consider one possible outcome is that investment in renew-
ables continues at the current or a somewhat increased pace but is insuﬃcient to
meet the 2020 targets. The capacity gap which emerges after 2015 is likely to be
ﬁlled by new CCGTs. Such an outcome would increase the dependence on imported
gas (Ofgem, 2010).
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A large proportion of UK electricity is produced in gas-ﬁred power stations, therefore
the security of gas supply has an eﬀect on the security of electricity supply. Since
the 1990s the UK has moved from being self-suﬃcient in gas to being increasingly
dependent on imports. Over the next decade it will be important to maintain diverse
sources of gas supply as well as adequate gas storage infrastructure (DECC, 2010b).
The Energy Market Assessment (EMA) (DECC, 2010b) raises the important point that in terms
of the security of the UK’s gas generation, it is not only the absolute levels that should be of
concern, but also the diversity of import routes. The report goes on to conclude that “the risks
of the gas market being unable to meet demand are very low”. Analysis of the OECD data
reveals that whilst the UK’s dependence on foreign gas has increased considerably (Figure 10.2,
so too has the diversity of sources from which that gas is obtained (Figure 10.3).
Figure 10.2: UK Import Dependence Indicator for
Gas
Figure 10.3: UK Gas Import Diversity (SWI)
This seems to concur with the EMA that the risk of a supply disruption large enough to aﬀect
electricity supplies is substantially reduced by the large increase in gas import diversity the UK
has undergone.
“The UK government (DECC, 2010a) has proposed the unilateral introduction of a carbon price
ﬂoor via a new carbon tax supplementary to the EU-ETS carbon price, largely in response to
power companies and others arguing that the current EU-ETS price is too low” (Blyth and
Bunn, 2011). A unilateral move by the UK to support carbon prices could have a number of
impacts on the proﬁle of the UK electricity system. The HoC report on the EMR, for instance,
notes that whilst the transfer of power via the UK’s interconnectors has been fairly balanced, a
cross-border price diﬀerential would lead to an imbalance.
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As the amount of electrical interconnection between the UK and continental Europe increases,
issues may arise relating to the interaction of diﬀerent regulatory regimes between diﬀerent
countries. A paper by Cepeda and Finon (2011) explores the eﬀect of unilaterally introducing a
capacity payment when an interconnected neighbour does not do the same. The authors argue
that heterogeneous policies intended to ensure capacity adequacy may lead to unintended side
eﬀects: distorting the normal functioning of the markets, and thereby impacting on the reliability
of supply. This is by no means a reason not to implement such a policy; it does however once
again highlight the complexity of electricity system function and the limited experience that
system operators have had in addressing the sorts of security concerns that they may now face.
11
Conclusions
11.1 Key ﬁndings of the research
The ﬁndings of this research can be split into ﬁve sections:
• The suitability and usefulness of the concept of ‘resilience’ for describing electricity systems
• The underlying characteristics that contribute to the resilience of such a system
• How the resilience of the UK and OECD electricity systems has changed over time
• The role that privatisation, liberalisation and the expansion of renewable energy has played
in these trends
• What this means for UK electricity policy changes being proposed and already underway
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Applying resilience thinking to electricity systems
The ﬁrst part of this research concerned the concept of resilience itself. Arising from the ecological
sciences to describe how natural systems cope when exposed to shocks, the concept has since been
adopted more widely in the academic and policy literature. More recently it has been used in
the energy literature to describe the behaviour of increasingly complex energy systems. In some
cases the term seems to be synonymous with ‘energy security’, whereas in others it is a subset
of a wider ‘security’ concept. The ﬁrst goal for this research was to understand whether such a
concept is useful and necessary given the existing literature on energy security, and whether its
use oﬀered any new insights on the way electricity systems should be designed and operated.
Choosing to talk about ‘resilience’ has, in some disciplines such as ecology, reﬂected a desire to
move away from an approach to system management that focuses on optimisation and eﬃciency.
To drive a system to operate at maximum eﬃciency is to academics such as Buzz Holling (1973)
and Brian Walker a folly — a misguided failure to recognise that we do not understand these
systems well enough, and that the future is simply too uncertain (Walker, 2008). For some
authors the reason that resilience is useful is that it provides a way of thinking about a system
that allows for a degree of uncertainty or ignorance on our part about system behaviour (Stirling,
1994).
The notion that the risks an electricity system faces can be known and quantiﬁed has been shown
to be incorrect by numerous examples around the world of network failures, fuel disruptions
and unplanned outages aﬀecting a large number of generating assets simultaneously. As fuel
sources, generation technologies and consumption patterns become more complicated and the
grid becomes more overloaded, the potential for unforseen events increases. Designing systems in
such a way that they can be expected to cope with unforeseen events is clearly desirable. Some
conceptualisations of energy security already refer to such ‘unknown unknowns’, but within the
resilience literature this is a far more prominent theme.
A second approach to conceptualising resilience that has bearing on electricity systems is to
see it in tension with the concept of eﬃciency. Walker (2008) argued, for example, that the
goal should be to keep a system in “an acceptable state, albeit not the maximum productivity
state, but a resilient state no matter what happens”. Charles Redman (2008) took a similar
view, arguing that striving for eﬃciency was only sensible if the system was not going to change.
Where systems are more dynamic and less predictable, excessive eﬃciency-seeking can lead to
fragility and vulnerability.
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The transformation the electricity system has undergone over the past thirty years is marked. The
most signiﬁcant change over this time has been the decentralisation of planning and operation
from the public sector to a privately-owned liberalised system with competing generation plants
and electricity suppliers. The demand proﬁles on the system are in constant ﬂux, the generators
each have diﬀerent designs and operational characteristics, and the generation mix is determined
by the decisions of private investors. Whilst the regulator and system operator retain some
control over how the system is run, the level of central control has greatly reduced over this
period.
More recently, system margins have become more tight (arguably one of the goals of exposing
the electricity system the the eﬃciencies of the competitive market), and the need for new
capacity to be added to the system has become more pressing. This whilst also adhering to
strict environmental constraints and without making the resulting energy services unaﬀordable
for consumers. Furthermore, UK domestic fuel sources are in decline, and the need for imports
has been increasing. Under such change and uncertainty, the concept of ‘resilience’ provides a
focus for considering whether the electricity system has the necessary characteristics to cope with
unforeseen changes and adapt to the changes being undertaken.
Characteristics of a resilient electricity system
Based on a review of the resilience literature, a number of aspects of resilience of relevance to
electricity systems were identiﬁed in this research:
• Storage levels in the form of coal stocks and strategic gas storage provides a buﬀer against
physical supply disruption, as well as some protection against spikes in the price of fuel on
the market.
• Grid load has been shown to be predictive of cascading failures within the electricity system.
The more stressed the system becomes, the more likely it is that an underlying, unobserved
fault on the network occurs and aﬀects neighbouring components.
• Learning and training of the human operators of a system is crucial if they are to react
positively to unforeseen events. It is also important to translate the experience of these
unforeseen events into Standard Operating Procedures so that a more measured response
can be made when such events reoccur.
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• Flexibility of plant usage can provide protection against shocks in a number of ways. Being
able to change the running proﬁle at short notice provides balancing services to the system
operator. Fuel switching can allow units to cope with fuel disruptions; the ability to co-ﬁre
coal plants with varying proportions of biomass could be one such strategy.
• Decentralisation is not necessarily desirable from a resilience perspective. The advantages of
restricting the impact of a single large plant failure is clear, but the increased complexity
of operating such decentralised systems can add uncertainty around system behaviour.
Further, if grid rules designed to protect maintenance staﬀ do not allow such plant to
continue operating in the result of a blackout, their potential advantage for system resilience
cannot be realised.
• Indigenous supplies of fuel are often cited as necessary for secure system operation. There is
certainly an argument that domestic supplies reduce reliance on uncertain supplies outside
of national borders. However, this still involves concentrating a signiﬁcant part of the
fuel system in a relatively small region, both geographically and politically. Having large
amounts of indigenous production can therefore be in tension with having a diversity of
fuel sources.
• Import diversity therefore should also be seen as important for system resilience. By
diversifying the fuels being imported and the routes by which that fuel is delivered, the
probability of any single disruption adversely impacting the whole system is reduced.
The above resilience characteristics were seen as important for resilient electricity system oper-
ation. However, some of these were not quantiﬁable, and others did not have suﬃcient levels of
data reported over a large enough period of time in order investigate their behaviour statisti-
cally. The following measures were chosen for further investigation therefore not because they
necessarily best described a resilient system, but because they had been monitored in multi-
ple countries and over a suﬃcient length of time to discern their behaviour under diﬀerent and
changing regulatory arrangements:
• The system margin needs to be suﬃcient for a system to cope with unplanned outages or
unexpected demand increases.
• The diversity of the system needs to be suﬃcient so that no single fuel supply disruption or
design failure is likely to have a large impact on the ability of the system to deliver energy
services to consumers.
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• The energy intensity of a society or economy is an indicator of how dependent it is on the
energy supply being maintained.
• The price of electricity should be incorporated into any full understanding of ‘resilience’.
Physical unavailability may be avoidable, but if the price of receiving electricity services
is prohibitive for sections of society, this society is not resilient to shocks arising from the
electricity system.
• Import dependence, a measure of the proportion of fuel needed to generate electricity as
compared with the proportion of fuel that can be supplied indigenously, gives an indication
of the reliance of an electricity system on external fuel supplies.
Resilience trends
The indicators outlined above were analysed to understand the role that privatisation, liberali-
sation and the move towards low-carbon electricity generation have had on resilience. Analysis
of the underlying trend across the OECD countries showed that the academic and policy interest
in electricity system resilience is not unwarranted. Derated margins have been declining steadily
since the 1980s, and this behaviour is particularly marked in the UK. Import dependence, which
measures both the electricity system’s need for fuel and the amount of that fuel that needs to
be imported, has been increasing continuously in the UK since the early 1980s. This has been
driven by a decline in the domestic coal industry, and the ‘dash for gas’ which was subsequently
followed by a decline in indigenous gas production. This trend has not, however, been uniform
across the OECD countries.
The demand for electricity as measured by per-capita consumption has been increasing in nearly
all OECD countries, making people increasingly dependent on and therefore vulnerable to elec-
tricity systems. Only a subset of economies that have reduced the contribution their industrial
sectors in a move towards the service sector have seen a reduction in the electricity intensity of
their economic productivity. Compounding the impact of the increasing reliance on electricity
systems is the increase in prices that consumers are having to pay for electricity. This has been
steadily increasing across the OECD countries, but the rate of increase has been climbing.
The only measured resilience indicator that has been improving over this period is generator
diversity. This is true across the OECD countries, except in those countries which have large
levels of hydroelectric generation, but the change in the UK has been particularly strong. This
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has primarily been driven by the increase in gas-fueled generators, however, so it is not a trend
that will necessarily continue in the future.
Resilience, then, as measured by these indicators seems to have been declining in the UK and
in the OECD. At the same time, a large proportion of these countries have both undergone
some level of liberalisation and privatisation, and have expanded their renewables sectors with
varying decrees of policy support. Whether, and to what degree, these trends are related is
not immediately obvious, however, and was the subject of this research – to identify the extent
to which the changes in resilience seen over this period can be attributed to changes in energy
policy.
Eﬀect of policy change
As to the reasons for these observed changes across the OECD, this research attempted to
understand the underlying cause, and in particular the role of two factors:
• The privatisation and liberalisation of the electricity sector
• The expansion of the renewables sector and policies to facilitate that expansion
Contrary to expectations, no evidence was found to suggest either that privatisation or liberalisa-
tion had caused a reduction in margins, or that margins were particularly high in those countries
that chose to transfer these systems from public hands. More important, it seems, has been the
subsequent growth in the renewables sector. Even after accounting for the variability associated
with non-dispatchable plant such as wind and solar, the eﬀective capacity margin is improved
by their inclusion. This eﬀect is particularly strong where a Feed-in Tariﬀ (FIT) mechanism
was used to bring about the change. It may be that those countries that opted for this form
of intervention were more supportive overall of their renewables sector, or it may be that the
mechanism itself is more eﬀective at delivering renewable capacity without displacing existing
plant.
The eﬀect of privatisation and liberalisation was not to reduce prices, as perhaps its original
proponents might have expected. On top of a background of increasing prices across the OECD,
there is some evidence that prices in fact increased more in the liberalised countries and par-
ticularly those that vertically unbundled the electricity supply chain. This suggests that any
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eﬃciency gains that may have been made in the operation of the electricity plant was not passed
through in the form of lower electricity bills and that vertical unbundling seems not to have
reduced prices as might have been expected from the associated reduction in market power. Al-
though no eﬀect was observed on the intensity of electricity consumption, this additional price
increase alone would make consumers less able to secure their required energy services and less
resilient to further price increases.
The role of renewables here is mixed: the expansion of the renewables sector seems to increase
the price that consumers pay for electricity. A 1% increase in the proportion of renewables on
the system translates into a 5% price increase. Conversely, those countries that are expanding
their renewables sector have seen either a drop, or a reduced growth, in their energy intensity.
This may be because renewables expansion is larger in countries with a growing service sector,
but it is also likely that the increase in price also has a subsequent depressive eﬀect on electricity
demand.
The increase in import dependence in parts of the OECD cannot be explained in general by
privatisation or liberalisation as there is no evidence of an overall eﬀect here. This is not to
say that the UK’s own increasing import dependence is not attributable to such causes. The
statistical analysis only reveals that this has not been an eﬀect that has applied consistently
across the observed countries. Renewable generation, however, can be shown to be protective
against increases in import dependence, which means that a continued expansion of the sector
should be an eﬀective way to further reduce the demand on imported fuels.
Diversity, which was the only resilience indicator to show a consistently positive trend in the UK
and across the OECD countries, was positively aﬀected by both privatisation and liberalisation.
There is some evidence to suggest the diversity of investors arising from liberalisation drove
the increased diversity of generating technologies. However, this eﬀect was smaller than may
have been expected. Rather, it was privatisation that seems to have driven generation diversity,
resulting from the incentive on private operators to diversify their own portfolios, partly perhaps
by the acquisition of existing plant, but also in the choice of new-build generating technologies.
As more electricity operators choose to include renewable electricity as part of their diversiﬁed
portfolios, the evidence suggests that such technologies have the initial eﬀect of improving overall
system diversity. This eﬀect is not necessarily sustained and depends on the change to the plant
mix as older stations are retired. Nevertheless, the overall eﬀect on system diversity of both
privatisation and the subsequent investment in renewables is to improve the diversity of the
11 CONCLUSIONS 310
generation mix.
11.2 What we have learned: implications for future policy
At the time of writing the UK’s ‘electricity experiment’ has been underway for just over twenty
years. From the time the privatisation programme was conceived, to the most recent policy con-
sultations on electricity market reform, the beneﬁts and the risks associated with de-nationalising
the power sector have been long debated. This scrutiny is by no means restricted to electricity,
but there are certain characteristics of so-called ‘critical infrastructures’, and power systems in
particular, that have given some commentators particular cause for concern. Electricity has been
a vital component of modern societies for decades, and this dependence on a well-functioning
power system appears to be increasing further.
The ﬁndings of this research do not present a clear narrative for the role that privatisation and
liberalisation have had in changing the resilience of the electricity system. Apart from diversity,
liberalisation has had surprisingly little eﬀect on resilience. Although low margins are now
a concern for a number of countries’ electricity systems, one of the rationales for privatising
these systems was to allow seemingly excessive margins to be reduced. That privatisation and
liberalisation seem not to have contributed to a decline in margins suggests that the goal was not
achieved for these reasons. Further, the ‘gold plating’ under nationalisation was thought to be
driving high prices, but if there is any eﬀect on prices to be discerned from the data it does not
support this hypothesis. Rather, the impact of privatisation and liberalisation seems secondary
to the other many changes that these energy systems were undergoing.
Perhaps the lesson here is that privatisation had less eﬀect on changing the electricity system
than had been anticipated, and that it is extremely diﬃcult to anticipate how policy changes
are going to aﬀect the operation of a complex entity such as an electricity system. A particular
challenge for the government of a country with a privatised electricity system is it can never fully
understand the associated risks. Such systems are constantly evolving, both in their physical
component and in the way that we as consumers use them. The lessons from ‘resilience’ thinking
tell us that such uncertainty will never be eliminated. We can use more nuanced indicators
than the LOLP to measure system security – measures that take account of our uncertainty
or ignorance about the current system and its future evolution. However, policies must be
implemented in such a way that allows for ﬂexibility as we continue to learn more about how
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the system and its associated institutions work. Such ﬂexibility can easily lead to regulatory
uncertainty and consequently investment delays. Resolving this tension between ﬂexibility and
consistency is likely to be key to implementing policies that achieve their stated aims whilst not
only maintaining, but enhancing the security and resilience of the electricity system.
If privatisation has had a less than dramatic eﬀect on the resilience of the electricity system, the
introduction of large-scale renewables projects has been more signiﬁcant. The largely positive
impact of such expansion on the resilience of these systems should be encouraging to policymak-
ers, but the evidence also suggests that these beneﬁts can be transient if not managed through
appropriate policies. The next phase of policy changes, and in particular those being made
under the banner of the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) are intended to give strong signals
to companies to invest in new renewable and low carbon technologies. The choice of a Feed-in
Tariﬀ seems a sensible approach given the positive eﬀect that such schemes have had both on
incentivising renewables investment, and maintaining system margins in the process.
However, the potential for such expansion to increase prices needs to be carefully monitored by
future governments if society is not to become increasingly reliant on unaﬀordable energy services.
A system as large and as complex as the electricity system is inherently unpredictable for all
parties: for consumers, investors and for government. The EMR is intended, in part, to give
investors conﬁdence in the future revenue streams arising from their investment, and conﬁdence
that future regulatory changes will not lead them to regret those investment decisions. Such
reforms will not, however, change the underlying uncertainty inherent to such systems. The
challenge for government is to ensure that the risk is not simply passed on to consumers. The
resilience of the electricity system needs to be secured, but it must not be done in a way that
results in a society dependent on energy services it is increasingly unable to aﬀord.
11.3 Possible future extensions
The possible extensions to this research come in three parts. First, the measurement of those
indicators which were chosen as representative of the resilience concept could in some cases be
improved:
• The relationship between capacity credit and renewables penetration is part of ongoing
research in literature and will, once deﬁned, diﬀer from region to region depending on the
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pre-existing generation mix, local climate and the geographical dispersion of renewable
generators. This research used a formula to calculate the capacity credit as a function
of renewable penetration, but ignored these subtleties. Further, whereas the Voorspools
and D’haeseleer (2006) analysis is concerned with wind, this analysis assumes that it is
reasonable to extended the formula to cover solar, wave and tidal generation. In further
work, the validity of this simpliﬁcation could be tested and the impact of policy change on
the derated margin could be reanalysed to ensure that the conclusions remain sound.
• The use of the Shannon-Wiener Index (SWI) as a measure of diversity is limited because
it only accounts for the number and proportion of generating technologies. As a result
it ignores disparity, which is a measure of the ‘diﬀerence’ between diﬀerent generating
technologies (Skea, 2010). The concept remains qualitative at this stage, but captures
the intuitive notion that, for example, two types of nuclear power stations, such as a
Advanced Gas-cooled Reactor (AGR) and a Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) are diﬀerent
technologies, but not as diﬀerent, say, as an AGR and a wind farm. Work to deﬁne disparity
more quantitatively is ongoing, and when such a concept is suﬃciently deﬁned, a more
complete measure of diversity that includes disparity would ideally be used in place of the
SWI.
Second, a signiﬁcant limitation of this research in its current form is the transition from the many
and varied aspects of system resilience identiﬁed in Chapter 3 to the more restricted quantitative
indicators explored in the subsequent chapters. The approach taken to this research was to
conduct a thorough statistical analysis. Some quantitative indicators lacked suﬃcient data to be
included, but were nonetheless measurable in principle:
• Import diversity can be treated using the same SWI metric as generation diversity. A more
diverse number and range of fuel import routes would protect a system against individual
disturbances. With an improved data set this measure could be incorporated to give a
more complete picture of resilience trends.
• Grid load, and other measures of network stress are important for understanding how likely
it is that small-scale disturbances on a system will cascade into large-scale blackouts. No
systematic data was available on trends in system loading over time and across multiple
countries, but in principle this could be performed. This would give a more appropriate
weighting to the importance of the grid for the resilient functioning of an electricity system.
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Other characteristics of resilience may not be quantiﬁable, but are nevertheless important for
maintaining a resilient system. In particular, the way in which actors communicate with, and
learn from, each other across the system has been shown to be important in coping resiliently
with failures in human systems such as factories and hospitals (Leveson et al., 2006). The ability
of such actors in the electricity system may well have changed during the transition from a
centralised nationalised system to the liberalised one we have now. Assessing the impact of such
a change may not be a quantiﬁable exercise, but in order to understand how people actually
respond to disturbances could provide an important insight to the resilient operation of the
electricity system.
Finally, there is scope for improving the detail aﬀorded to the measures of privatisation and
liberalisation. Neither of these is a single policy mechanism carried out in a uniform way across
multiple countries. Rather, the process of transferring control of the electricity system has been
unique to each country, both in timing and extent, and in the forms of regulation that have been
implemented. The policies that are currently under discussion in the UK and in Europe may have
some precedents, but their eﬀects will be uncertain. By having a more detailed understanding
about the particular mechanisms by which privatisation, liberalisation and regulation have or
have not worked, a more robust appreciation of the likely impact of future policy changes on
system resilience can be developed.
Bibliography
Adger, W. (2000) Social and ecological resilience: are they related? Progress in Human Geogra-
phy, 24(3), 347–364.
AERE (1994) An Assessment of renewable energy for the UK. London: Atomic Energy Research
Establishment: Energy Technology Support Unit.
Allen, C., Gunderson, L. and Johnson, A. (2005) The use of discontinuities and functional groups
to assess relative resilience in complex systems. Ecosystems, 8(8), 958–966.
Allison, P. (2005) Fixed eﬀects regression methods for longitudinal data using SAS. SAS Pub-
lishing.
Angeriz, A. and Arestis, P. (2008) Assessing inﬂation targeting through intervention analysis.
Oxf.Econ.Pap., 60(2), 293–317.
Ash, J. and Newth, D. (2007) Optimizing complex networks for resilience against cascading
failure. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 380, 673–683.
Awerbuch, S. (2006) Portfolio-based electricity generation planning: Policy implications for re-
newables and energy security. Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, 11(3),
693–710.
Awerbuch, S. and Berger, M. (2003) Applying portfolio theory to EU electricity planning and
policy-making. IEA/EET Working Paper.
Azar, C., Miljo¨departementet, S. and Miljo¨v˚ardsberedningen, S. (2002) Decoupling: Past trends
and prospects for the future. Ministry of the Environment.
314
BIBLIOGRAPHY 315
Bacon, R. W. (1995) Privatization and reform in the global electricity supply industry. Annual
Review of Energy and the Environment, 20, 119–143.
Beddington, J., Free, C. and Lawton, J. (1976) Concepts of stability and resilience in predator-
prey models. The Journal of Animal Ecology, 45(3), 791–816.
Benes, I. (2007) Energy security and critical infrastructure resilience. CITYPLAN, Prague.
Bengtsson, J., Angelstam, P., Elmqvist, T., Emanuelsson, U., Folke, C., Ihse, M., Moberg, F.
and Nystrom, M. (2003) Reserves, resilience and dynamic landscapes. Ambio, 32(6), 389–396.
Berkes, F. (2007) Understanding uncertainty and reducing vulnerability: lessons from resilience
thinking. Natural Hazards, 41(2), 283–295.
BERR (2006) Revised electricity supply emergency code: revised January 2005. London: Depart-
ment for Business Enterprise & Regulatory Reform.
BERR (2007a) The future of nuclear power: analysis of consultation responses. HM Government.
BERR (2007b) Energy Markets Outlook - October 2007. The Stationery Oﬃce.
BERR (2008a) Meeting the energy challenge: a white paper on nuclear power. The Stationery
Oﬃce.
BERR (2008b) Energy Markets Outlook - December 2008. The Stationery Oﬃce.
Blyth, W. and Bunn, D. (2011) Coevolution of policy, market and technical price risks in the eu
ets. Energy Policy, In Press, Corrected Proof, –.
Blyth, W. and Lefevre, N. (2004) Energy security and climate change policy interactions: an
assessment framework. IEA.
Box, G. and Tiao, G. (1975) Intervention analysis with applications to economic and environ-
mental problems. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 70(349), 70–79.
Box, G. and Tiao, G. C. (1965) A change in level of a non-stationary time series.
Boyle, G. (ed.) (2008) Renewable electricity and the grid: the challenge of variability. Earthscan.
Bradley, D. and Grainger, A. (2004) Social resilience as a controlling inﬂuence on desertiﬁcation
in senegal. Land Degradation & Development, 15(5), 451–470.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 316
Brand, C., Tran, M. and Anable, J. (2010) The UK transport carbon model: An integrated life
cycle approach to explore low carbon futures. Energy Policy, In Press, Corrected Proof.
Brinckerhoﬀ, P. (2007) The future of nuclear power. Power Engineer, pp. 32–35.
British Energy (2007) British energy news: Life extension of hinkley point b and hunterston b
power stations.
British Energy (2008) British energy news: British energy’s new nuclear build meetings attracts
over 250 people (22nd july 2008).
Bruce, J., Krukowski, Z., Al-Khairy, G., Russell, E. and Park, K. (2001) Systematic review of the
deﬁnition and measurement of anastomotic leak after gastrointestinal surgery. British Journal
of Surgery, 88(9), 1157–1168.
de Bruijne, M. and van Eeten, M. (2007) Systems that should have failed: Critical infrastructure
protection in an institutionally fragmented environment. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis
Management, 15, 18–29.
BWEA (2007) The winds of change. Power Engineer, p. 5.
Campbell, B., Sayer, J., Frost, P., Vermeulen, S., Prez, M., Cunningham, A. and Prabhu, R.
(2001) Assessing the performance of natural resource systems. Conservation Ecology, 2, 22.
Carpenter, S., Walker, B., Anderies, J. and Abel, N. (2001) From metaphor to measurement:
Resilience of what to what? Ecosystems, 4(8), 765–781.
Carreras, B. (2002) Critical points and transitions in an electric power transmission model for
cascading failure blackouts. Chaos An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 12(4),
985.
Carreras, B., Newman, D., Dobson, I. and Poole, A. (2000) Initial evidence for self-organized
criticality in electric power system blackouts. System Sciences, 2000.Proceedings of the 33rd
Annual Hawaii International Conference on, p. 6.
Carreras, B., Lynch, V., Newman, D. and Dobson, I. (2003) Blackout mitigation assessment in
power transmission systems. System Sciences, 2003.Proceedings of the 36th Annual Hawaii
International Conference on, p. 10.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 317
Carreras, B. A., Newman, D. E., Dobson, I. and Poole, A. (2004) Evidence for self-organized
criticality in a time series of electric power system blackouts. IEEE Transactions on Circuits
and Systems – I: Regular Papers, 51(9), 1733–1740.
Cepeda, M. and Finon, D. (2011) Generation capacity adequacy in interdependent electricity
markets. Energy Policy, 39(6), 3128 – 3143.
Chaudry, M., Ekins, P., Ramachandran, K., Shakoor, A., Skea, J., Strbac, G., Wang, X. and
Whitaker, J. (2009) Building a Resilient UK Energy System. UKERC.
Clar, S., Drossel, B., Schenk, K. and Schwabl, F. (1999) Self-organized criticality in forest-ﬁre
models. Physica A, 266(1), 153–159.
Clarke, M. (2004) Cochrane collaboration - systematic reviews and the cochrane collaboration.
Collins, C. and Gross, R. (2008) Options for the mitigation of short term electricity supply
shortages in the UK. BERR Consultation Report.
Collins, C., Gross, R. and Heptonstall, P. (2009) Is there an ’energy gap’? Proceedings of ICE
– Energy, 161(4), 145–157.
Commission of the European Communities (2008) 20/20 by 2020 europe’s climate change oppor-
tunity - brussels, 23.1.2008 com(2008) 30 ﬁnal. European Commission.
Cust, J. (2008) Intermediate indicators: lessons for their use in measurement, reporting and
eﬀective policy implementation. Cambridge: Electricity Policy Research Group.
Dalziell, E. and McManus, S. (2004) Resilience, vulnerability, and adaptive capacity: implications
for system performance. In International Forum for Engineering Decision Making (IFED), pp.
4–6. Citeseer.
DECC (2009a) UK energy sector indicators. Department for Energy and Climate Change.
DECC (2009b) Delivering secure low carbon electricity: A call for evidence. The Stationery
Oﬃce.
DECC (2009c) The UK Low Carbon Transition Plan. The Stationery Oﬃce.
DECC (2010a) Electricity Market Reform - Consultation Document. The Stationery Oﬃce.
DECC (2010b) Energy Market Assessment. The Stationery Oﬃce.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 318
DECC (2010c) The UK Renewable Energy Strategy. The Stationery Oﬃce.
DECC (2011) HC 742 Electricity Market Reform: Memorandum submitted by the Department
of Energy and Climate Change. Online: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201011/cmselect/cmenergy/writev/742/emr1.htm, Accessed: 05/06/2011.
Department of Energy (1977) Energy policy review. London: HMSO.
Department of Minerals and Energy (2008) National Response To South Africa’s Electricity
Shortage. Department of Minerals and Energy, South Africa.
Dixit, A. and Pindyck, R. (1994) Investment under uncertainty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press.
Dixon-Woods, M., Fitzpatrick, R. and Roberts, K. (2001) Including qualitative research in sys-
tematic reviews: opportunities and problems. Journal of evaluation in clinical practice, 7(2),
125–133.
Dobson, I., Newman, D., Carreras, B. and Lynch, V. (2002) An initial complex systems analysis
of the risks of blackouts in power transmission systems.
Dobson, I., Carreras, B. A., Lynch, V. E. and Newman, D. E. (2007) Complex systems analysis
of series of blackouts: Cascading failure, critical points, and self-organization. Chaos: An
Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science, 17(2), 026103.
Drossel, B. (1996) Self-organized criticality and synchronization in a forest-ﬁre model. Physical
Review Letters, 76, 936–939.
DTI (1995) The prospects for nuclear power in the UK. HMSO.
DTI (1997) The Energy Report. The Stationery Oﬃce.
DTI (1998) Conclusions of the review of energy sources for power generation and Government
response to fourth and ﬁfth reports of the Trade and Industry Committee. London: Stationery
Oﬃce.
DTI (2003) Energy white paper 2003: our energy future - creating a low carbon economy. The
Stationery Oﬃce.
DTI (2006a) The Energy Challenge - Energy Review 2006. The Stationery Oﬃce.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 319
DTI (2006b) Consultation on resilience of overhead power line networks: an energy review con-
sultation. DTI.
DTI (2007) Meeting the energy challenge: a white paper on energy. The Stationery Oﬃce.
Dyer, J. and McGuinness, T. (1996) Resilience: Analysis of the concept. Archives of Psychiatric
Nursing, 10(5), 276–282.
ECCC (2011) House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee: Electricity Market
Reform. The Stationery Oﬃce.
EDF Energy (2007) The future of nuclear power: a summary of EDF Energy’s submission to the
government consultation. EDF Energy.
Eijﬃnger, S. (2008) Crisis management in the european union. Centre for Economic Policy
Research: Policy Insight, 27.
EirGrid (2008) East-West Interconnector Home. EirGrid.
Epstein, S. (2006) Unexampled events, resilience, and pra. Proceding of the Second Resilience
engineering Symposium, p. 105 115.
ESMAP (2005) Implementing power rationing in a sensible way: lessons learned and interna-
tional best practices. Energy Sector Management Assistance Program.
Farrell, A. E., Zerriﬃ, H. and Dowlatabadi, H. (2004) Energy infrastructure and security. Annual
Review of Environment and Resources, 29(1), 421–469.
Folke, C. (2006) Resilience: The emergence of a perspective for social-ecological systems analyses.
Global Environmental Change-Human and Policy Dimensions, 16(3), 253–267.
Ford, A. (1999) Cycles in competitive electricity markets: a simulation study of the western
united states. Energy Policy, 27(11), 637–658.
Greenpeace (2008a) Nuclear blow to uk climate policy. Greenpeace.
Greenpeace (2008b) The case against nuclear power. Greenpeace.
Gross, R., Heptonstall, P., Anderson, D., Green, T., Leach, M. and Skea, J. (2006) The costs
and impacts of intermittency. UKERC.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 320
Gross, R., Heptonstall, P. and Blyth, W. (2007a) Investment in electricity generation: the role
of costs, incentives and risks. UK Energy Research Centre.
Gross, R., Heptonstall, P., Leach, M., Anderson, D., Green, T. and Skea, J. (2007b) Renewables
and the grid: understanding intermittency. Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers,
Energy, 160(1), 31–41.
Grubb, M., Butler, L. and Twomey, P. (2006) Diversity and security in uk electricity generation:
The inﬂuence of low-carbon objectives. Energy Policy, 34(18), 4050–4062.
Gunderson, L. (2000) Ecological resilience - in theory and application. Annual Review of Ecology
and Systematics, 31, 425–439.
Harvey, A. (1996) Intervention analysis with control groups. International Statistical Review /
Revue Internationale de Statistique, 64(3), 313–328.
Hauer, K., Lamb, S., Jorstad, E., Todd, C. and Becker, C. (2006) Systematic review of deﬁnitions
and methods of measuring falls in randomised controlled fall prevention trials. Age and Ageing,
35(1), 5–10.
Helm, D. (2002) Energy policy: security of supply, sustainability and competition. Energy Policy,
30(3), 173 – 184.
Helm, D. (2004) Energy, the State, and the Market: British Energy Policy since 1979 - Revised
Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Helm, D. (2005) The assessment: The new energy paradigm. Oxf Rev Econ Policy, 21(1), 1–18.
Henney, A. (2001) The illusory politics and imaginary economics of neta. Power UK, 85, 16–26.
Hezri, A. A. and Dovers, S. R. (2006) Sustainability indicators, policy and governance: Issues
for ecological economics. Ecological Economics, 60(1), 86 – 99.
HM Treasury (2010) Carbon price ﬂoor: support and certainty for low-carbon investment. HM
Treasury.
Holling, C. (1973) Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annual Review of Ecology and
Systematics, 4, 1–23.
Holling, C. (1996) Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience. In Engineering within eco-
logical contraints (Ed. P. Schulze), pp. 31–44. Washington, D.C.: National Academy.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 321
Holling, C. and Gunderson, L. (2002) Resilience and adaptive cycles. In Panarchy: Understanding
Transformations in Human and Natural Systems, pp. 25–62. Island Press.
House of Lords (2008) Energy Bill (Bill 52 07/08). The Stationery Oﬃce.
Hughes, N. (2003) The use of scenario planning in sustainable energy policy.
Hui, R., Dobson, I. and Carreras, B. (2008) Long-term eﬀect of the n-1 criterion on cascading
line outages in an evolving power transmission grid. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on,
23(3), 1217–1225.
IEA (1998) Energy statistics of OECD countries 1995-96. London: HMSO.
IEA (2005a) Electricity/Heat in United Kingdom in 2005. Online.
IEA (2005b) Saving Electricity in a Hurry. International Energy Agency.
IEA (2005c) Lessons from Liberalised Electricity Markets. Paris: OECD/IEA.
IEA (2005d) Learning from the blackouts- transmission system security in competitive electricity
markets. OECD/IEA.
IEA (2007) Energy Security and Climate Policy - Assessing Interactions. International Energy
Agency.
IEA (2008) Electricity. Online: http://www.iea.org/subjectqueries/keyresult.asp?
KEYWORD_ID=4102, Accessed: 05/06/11.
Ilex Consulting (2002) Quantifying the system costs of additional renewables in 2020. DTI.
Jansen, J., van Arkel, W. and Boots, M. (2004) Designing Indicators of Long-term Energy Supply
Security. Energy research Centre of the Netherlands ECN; ECN Knowledge Agency distr.
Kay, J. A. and Thompson, D. J. (1986) Privatisation: A policy in search of a rationale. The
Economic Journal, 96(381), pp. 18–32.
Kirschen, D. and Strbac, G. (2004) Why investments do not prevent blackouts. The Electricity
Journal, 17(2), 29–36.
Kirschen, D., Jayaweera, D., Nedic, D. and Allan, R. (2004) A probabilistic indicator of system
stress. Power Systems, IEEE Transactions on, 19, 1650–1657.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 322
Lachs, W. and Sutanto, D. (1992) Battery storage plant within large load centres. Power Systems,
IEEE Transactions on, 7, 762–767.
Lal, R. (1993) Tillage eﬀects on soil degradation, soil resilience, soil quality, and sustainability.
Soil and Tillage Research, 27(1-4), 1–8.
Laughton, M. (2008) Variable Renewables and the Grid: An Overview. In Renewable electricity
and the grid: the challenge of variability (Ed. G. Boyle), chapter 1, pp. 1–30. Earthscan.
Leu, G. and Namatame, A. (2009) Evolving failure resilience in scale-free networks. Intelligent
and Evolutionary Systems, p. 49.
Leveson, N., Hollnagel, E. and Woods, D. (2006) Resilience Engineering: concepts and precepts.
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
Lewis-Beck, M., Bryman, A. and Liao, T. (2004) The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science Re-
search Methods, Volume 2. California: Sage.
Lodge, T. (2008) Wind chill: why wind energy will not ﬁll the UK’s energy gap. Centre for Policy
Studies.
Logica (2006) Mind the Gap: The black hole at the heart of the UK’s energy supply. LogicaCMG.
Lovins, A. and Lovins, L. (1981) Energy policies for resilience and national security, volume
Contract: DCPA01-79-C-0317, FEMA Work Unit 4351-C. Friends of the Earth.
Maier, H., Lence, B., Tolson, B. and Foschi, R. (2001) First-order reliability method for estimat-
ing reliability, vulnerability, and resilience. Water Resources Research, 37(3), 779–790.
Medema, W., McIntosh, B. and Jeﬀrey, P. (2008) From premise to practice: a critical assessment
of integrated water resources management and adaptive management approaches in the water
sector. Ecology and Society, 13(2), 29.
Mitchell, C. and Connor, P. (2004) Renewable energy policy in the uk 1990-2003. Energy Policy,
32(17), 1935–1947.
Morita, T., Tsuneto, S. and Shima, Y. (2002) Deﬁnition of sedation for symptom relief: A sys-
tematic literature review and a proposal of operational criteria. Journal of Pain and Symptom
Management, 24(4), 447–453.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 323
Mulrow, C. (1994) Systematic reviews: Rationale for systematic reviews. BMJ, 309(6954),
597–599.
National Grid (2007) Ten Year Statement 2007. National Grid.
National Grid (2008a) Seven Year Statement 2008. National Grid.
National Grid (2008b) Interconectors: Netherlands - BritNed link. Online: http://www.
nationalgrid.com/uk/Interconnectors/Netherlands/, Accessed: 05/06/11.
National Grid (2009a) Transmission Performance Report. National Grid.
National Grid (2009b) Winter Outlook Report 2009/10. National Grid.
National Grid (2009c) Frequency Control by Demand Management (FCDM). Online: http:
//www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Balancing/services/frequencyresponse/
fcdm/, Accessed:05/06/11.
Nedic, D., Dobson, I. and Kirschen, D. (2006) Criticality in a cascading failure blackout model.
International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, 28, 627–633.
Neuhoﬀ, K. and De Vries, L. (2004) Insuﬃcient incentives for investment in electricity genera-
tions. Utilities Policy, 12(4), 253–267.
Newbery, D. (2001) ‘Regulating electricity to ensure eﬃcient competition’, paper presented at the
CEPR/ESRC Workshop on The Political Economy of Regulation, London, 1 November 2001.
CEPR/ESRC.
Newbery, D. (2006) Electricity liberalization in Britain and the evolution of market design. In
Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective (Eds F.P.Sioshansi and W. Pfaﬀen-
berger), pp. 109–144. Oxford: Elsevier.
Newbery, D. M. (2002) Problems of liberalising the electricity industry. European Economic
Review, 46(4-5), 919–927.
Newbery, D. M. G. (2004) Privatising Network Industries, volume No. 1132. CESifo Working
Paper Series No. 1132.
de Nooij, M., Koopmans, C. and Bijvoet, C. (2007) The value of supply security: The costs
of power interruptions: Economic input for damage reduction and investment in networks.
Energy Economics, 29(2), 277–295.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 324
de Nooij, M., Lieshout, R. and Koopmans, C. (2008) Optimal blackouts: Empirical results on
reducing the social cost of electricity outages through eﬃcient regional rationing. Energy
Economics, In Press, Corrected Proof.
OECD (2001) OECD environmental indicators: towards sustainable development. Paris: OECD.
OECD (2009) Indicators of regulation in energy, transport and communications (etcr). Online.
OECD (2010) OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics. OECD.
Ofgem (2010) Project Discovery - Options for delivering secure and sustainable energy supplies.
Ofgem.
Oh, H., Rizo, C., Enkin, M. and Jadad, A. (2005) What is ehealth: a systematic review of
published deﬁnitions. Journal of medical Internet research, 7(1), e1.
Olz, S., Sims, R. and Kirchner, N. (2007) Contribution of renewables to energy security: IEA
information paper. OECD/IEA.
Owen, A. (2004) Oil supply insecurity: control versus damage costs. Energy Policy, 32, 1879–
1882.
Oxera (2007) Energy market competition in the EU and G7: preliminary 2006 rankings. OXERA.
Papa, L., Hoelle, R. and Idris, A. (2005) Systematic review of deﬁnitions for drowning incidents.
Resuscitation, 65(3), 255–264.
Parsons Brinckerhoﬀ (2010) Powering the Nation Update 2010. Parsons Brinckerhoﬀ.
Patterson, W. (2007) Keeping the Lights on: Towards Sustainable Electricity. Earthscan.
Pimm, S. (1991) The balance of nature?: ecological issues in the conservation of species and
communities. University of Chicago Press.
PIU (2002) The energy review 2002. Cabinet Oﬃce.
Rabe-Hesketh, S. and Skrondal, A. (2008)Multilevel and longitudinal modeling using Stata. Stata
Corp.
Redman, C. (2008) Fostering epiphanies: adaptive cycles and knowledge for sustainability. In
Resilience 2008.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 325
Redpoint (2007) Dynamics of GB Electricity Generation Investment: Prices, Security of Supply,
CO2 Emissions and Policy Options. London: Redpoint Energy Limited.
Redpoint (2010) Electricity Market Reform: Analysis of policy options. Redpoint.
ResAlliance (2009a) Resilience alliance: Key concepts.
ResAlliance (2009b) Assessing and managing resilience in social-ecological systems: A practi-
tioner’s workbook.
Rinaldi, S. (2004) Modeling and simulating critical infrastructures and their interdependencies.
In System Sciences, 2004. Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference
on, p. 8.
Rinaldi, S., Peerenboom, J. and Kelly, T. (2001) Identifying, understanding, and analyzing
critical infrastructure interdependencies. Control Systems Magazine, IEEE, 21(6), 11–25.
Roques, F., Newbery, D. and Nuttall, W. (2005) Investment incentives and electricity market
design: the British experience. Review of Network Economics, 4(2), 93–128.
Roques, F., Newbery, D. and Nuttall, W. (2006) Generation adequacy and investment incentives
in Britain: from the Pool to NETA. Cambridge Working Papers in Economics.
Roques, F. A., Newbery, D. M. and Nuttall, W. J. (2008) Fuel mix diversiﬁcation incentives in
liberalized electricity markets: A mean-variance portfolio theory approach. Energy Economics,
30(4), 1831 – 1849.
Scott, A. and Watson, J. (2006) Mind the ’gap’: Sussex energy academics question the basis for
the new energy review. Sussex Energy Group.
Select Committee on EU (2002) Energy supply: how secure are we? House of Lords.
Sinden, G. (2005) Wind Power and the UK Wind Resource. Oxford: Environmental Change
Institute.
Sinden, G. (2006) Characteristics of the uk wind resource: Long-term patterns and relationship
to electricity demand. Energy Policy (in press).
Skea, J. (2010) Valuing diversity in energy supply. Energy Policy, 38(7), 3608 – 3621.
Smithers, R. and Adam, D. (2007) Fouled fuel: Tests reveal rogue ingredient.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 326
Sorrell, S. (2007) Improving the evidence base for energy policy: The role of systematic reviews.
Energy Policy, 35(3), 1858–1871.
Stirling, A. (1994) Diversity and ignorance in electricity supply investment addressing the solu-
tion rather than the problem. Energy Policy, 22(3), 195–216.
Stirling, A. (1998) On the economics and analysis of diversity. Science Policy Research Unit
(SPRU), Electronic Working Papers Series, Paper.
Strbac, G. and Jenkins, N. (2001) Network security of the future uk electricity system: report to
PIU. UMIST.
Surrey, J. (1996) The British Electricity Experiment. London: Earthscan.
Taleb, N. N. (2007) The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. London: Penguin
Books.
Thomas, S. and Hall, D. (2003) Blackouts: do liberalisation and privatisation increase the risk.
PSIRU, University of Greenwich.
Todinov, M. (2005) Reliability and Risk Models: Setting Reliability Requirements. Chichester,
U.K.: Wiley.
UKERC (2006) The Costs and Impacts of Intermittency. London: UKERC.
Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G. (1988) Privatization: An Economic Analysis. London, MIT Press.
Visudhiphan, P., Skantze, P. and Ilic, M. (2001) Dynamic investment in electricity markets and
its impact on system reliability. In Proceedings of the Market Design Conference, pp. 91–110.
Voorspools, K. R. and D’haeseleer, W. D. (2006) An analytical formula for the capacity credit
of wind power. Renewable Energy, 31(1), 45 – 54.
Waide, J. (1988) Forest ecosystem stability: Revision of the resistance-resilience modeling re-
lation to observable macroscopic properties of ecosystems. Forest Hydrology and Ecology at
Coweeta, Ecological Studies66, Springer-Verlag, pp. 383–405.
Walker, B. (2008) Probing the boundaries of resilience science and practice. In Resilience 2008.
Walker, B. and Meyers, J. A. (2004) Thresholds in ecological and social-ecological systems: a
developing database. Ecology and Society, 9(2).
BIBLIOGRAPHY 327
Walker, B. and Salt, D. (2006) Resilience Thinking: Sustaining Ecosystems and People in a
Changing World. Washington, D.C., USA.: Island Press.
Walker, B., Holling, C., Carpenter, S. and Kinzig, A. (2004) Resilience, adaptability and trans-
formability in social-ecological systems. Ecology and Society, 9(2), 5.
Westman, W. and O’Leary, J. (1986) Measures of resilience - the response of coastal sage scrub
to ﬁre. Vegetatio, 65(3), 179–189.
White, A. (2006) Financing new nuclear generation. Climate Change Capital.
Woo, C. K., Lloyd, D. and Tishler, A. (2003) Electricity market reform failures: UK, Norway,
Alberta and California. Energy Policy, 31(11), 1103–1115.
WWF (2006) Energy gap is a nuclear myth. WWF.
Zhang, Y. and Chowdhury, A. (2009) Reliability assessment of wind integration in operating and
planning of generation systems. In Power Energy Society General Meeting, 2009. PES ’09.
IEEE, pp. 1–7.
A
Sources Used in Literature Review
A.1 Energy Journals
A.1.1 Energy
1. Worldwide energy
2. Energy user news
3. Energy journal: International Association of Energy Economists., The
4. Natural gas monthly: Energy Information Administration, Oﬃce of Oil and Gas, U.S.
Dept. of Energy.
5. Independent energy
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14. Chemistry and technology of fuels and oils (online)
15. Communications in soil science and plant analysis (online)
16. Eurasian soil science (online)
17. European journal of soil biology (online)
18. European journal of soil science (online)
19. Journal of plant nutrition and soil science (online)
20. Journal of soils and sediments (online)
21. Journal of the American Oil Chemists’ Society (online)
22. Plant and soil (historical archive) (online)
23. Plant and soil (online)
24. Sciences of soils (historical archive) (online)
25. Sciences of soils (online)
26. Soil and sediment contamination (online)
27. Soil and tillage research (online).
28. Soil biology and biochemistry (online)
29. Soil dynamics and earthquake engineering (online)
30. Soil mechanics and foundation engineering (online)
31. Soil science (online).
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32. Soil Science Society of America journal (online)
33. Soil technology (online).
34. Soil use and management (online)
35. Water, air and soil pollution (online)
36. Water, air and soil pollution: focus (online).
37. World oil (online)
A.1.7 Coal
1. Coal Mining Industry Yearbook
2. Organic compounds from coal utilisation
3. Coal preparation (online)
4. International journal of coal geology (online).
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# Author Title Periodical Pub Year
1 Kahn,E. The Compatibility of Wind and
Solar Technology with Conven-
tional Energy Systems
Annual Review
of Energy
1979
2 Lovins,A.B. Soft Energy Technologies Annual Review
of Energy
1978
3 Brooks,H; Hollan-
der,J.M.
United States Energy Alterna-
tives to 2010 and Beyond: The
Conaes Study
Annual Review
of Energy
1979
4 Shupe,J.W.; Wein-
gart,J.M.
Emerging Energy Technologies in
an Island Environment: Hawaii
Annual Review
of Energy
1980
5 Fesharaki,F.;
Schiltz,W.
Natural Gas Supply and Demand
Planning in the Asia-Paciﬁc Re-
gion
Annual Review
of Energy
1985
6 Goldemberg,J.;
Johansson,T.B.;
Reddy,A.K.N.;
Williams,R.H.
An End-Use Oriented Global En-
ergy Strategy
Annual Review
of Energy
1985
7 Schock,R.N.;
Fulkerson,W.;
Brown,M.L.;
San Martin,R.L.;
Greene,D.L.; Ed-
monds,J.
How much is Energy Research
& Development Worth as Insur-
ance?
Annual Review
of Energy and
the Environment
1999
8 Farrell,A.E.;
Zerriﬃ,H.;
Dowlatabadi,H.
Energy Infrastructure and Secu-
rity
Annual Review
of Environment
and Resources
2004
9 Amin,S.M.;
Gellings,C.W.
The North American power de-
livery system: Balancing market
restructuring and environmental
economics with infrastructure se-
curity
Energy 2006
10 Shackley,S.;
Green,K.
A conceptual framework for
exploring transitions to decar-
bonised energy systems in the
United Kingdom
Energy 2007
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11 Stirling,A. Limits to the value of external
costs
Energy Policy 1997
12 Helm,D. Energy policy: security of supply,
sustainability and competition
Energy Policy 2002
13 Stern,J. UK gas security: time to get seri-
ous
Energy Policy 2004
14 Owen,A.D. Oil supply insecurity: control ver-
sus damage costs
Energy Policy 2004
15 Watanabe,C.;
Kishioka,M.; Car-
vajal,C.A.
IT substitution for energy leads
to a resilient structure for a sur-
vival strategy of Japan’s electric
power industry
Energy Policy 2005
16 Li,X. Diversiﬁcation and localization of
energy systems for sustainable de-
velopment and energy security
Energy Policy 2005
17 Grubb,M.; But-
ler,L.; Twomey,P.
Diversity and security in UK elec-
tricity generation: The inﬂuence
of low-carbon objectives
Energy Policy 2006
18 Greenberg,M.;
Mantell,N.;
Lahr,M.; Felder,F.;
Zimmerman,R.
Short and intermediate economic
impacts of a terrorist-initiated
loss of electric power: Case study
of New Jersey
Energy Policy 2007
19 McCarthy,R.W.;
Ogden,J.M.; Sper-
ling,D.
Assessing reliability in energy
supply systems
Energy Policy 2007
20 Verma,S.K. Energy geopolitics and IranPak-
istanIndia gas pipeline
Energy Policy 2007
21 Amin,M. Balancing market priorities with
security issues
Power and En-
ergy Magazine,
IEEE
2004
22 Schainker, R.; Dou-
glas, J.; Kropp, T.;
Electric utility responses to grid
security issues
Power and En-
ergy Magazine,
IEEE
2006
23 Kirschen, D.S.;
Jayaweera, D.;
Nedic, D.P.; Allan,
R.N.
A probabilistic indicator of sys-
tem stress
Power Sys-
tems, IEEE
Transactions on
2004
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24 Salmeron, J.;
Wood, K.; Baldick,
R.
Analysis of electric grid security
under terrorist threat
Power Sys-
tems, IEEE
Transactions on
2004
25 Lachs,W.R. A new horizon for system protec-
tion schemes
Power Sys-
tems, IEEE
Transactions on
2003
26 Lachs,W.R. Controlling grid integrity after
power system emergencies
Power Sys-
tems, IEEE
Transactions on
2002
27 Lachs, W.R.; Su-
tanto, D.; Logo-
thetis, D.N.
Power system control in the next
century
Power Sys-
tems, IEEE
Transactions on
1996
28 Lachs, W.R.; Su-
tanto, D.
Battery storage plant within large
load centres
Power Sys-
tems, IEEE
Transactions on
1992
29
Lachs, W.R.; Su-
tanto, D.
Voltage instability in intercon-
nected power systems: a simula-
tion approach
Power Sys-
tems, IEEE
Transactions on
1992
30 Nedic,D.P.;
Dobson,I.;
Kirschen,D.S.
Criticality in a cascading failure
blackout model
International
Journal of Elec-
trical Power &
Energy Systems
2006
31 Scott,D.S. Template For Sustainability International
Journal of Hy-
drogen Energy
2004
32 Scott,D.S. The Tyranny Of Surprise International
Journal of Hy-
drogen Energy
2004
33 Scott,D.S. For Better Or Worse? International
Journal of Hy-
drogen Energy
2004
34 Cropper,M.A.J.;
Geiger,S.; Jol-
lie,D.M.
Fuel cells: a survey of current de-
velopments
Journal of Power
Sources
2004
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35 Bickle,L.W. Spin-Ins Retain Intellectual Cap-
ital, Promote Growth
Natural Gas (Wiley)
1995
36 Smead,R.G. This Winter to Be Test for Gas
Industry
Natural Gas &
Electricity
2003
37 Smead,R.G. Energy Infrastructure Security
Has Evolved Since September 11
Natural Gas &
Electricity
2004
38 Wills-Dudich,L. The Gas Industry And Hurricane
Katrina: The Untold Story
Pipeline & Gas
Journal
2006
39 Smeets,E.M.W.;
Faaij,A.P.C.;
Lewandowski,I.M.;
Turkenburg,W.C.
A bottom-up assessment and re-
view of global bio-energy poten-
tials to 2050
Progress in En-
ergy and Com-
bustion Science
2007
40 Agnolucci,P. Factors inﬂuencing the likelihood
of regulatory changes in renew-
able electricity policies
Renewable and
Sustainable En-
ergy Reviews
2006
41 Mulugetta,Y. Human capacity and institutional
development towards a sustain-
able energy future in Ethiopia
Renewable and
Sustainable En-
ergy Reviews
2007
42 Mala,K.;
Schlpfer,A.;
Pryor,T.
Solar photovoltaic (PV) on atolls:
Sustainable development of rural
and remote communities in Kiri-
bati
Renewable and
Sustainable En-
ergy Reviews
2007
43 Omer,A.M. Energy, environment and sustain-
able development
Renewable and
Sustainable En-
ergy Reviews
2007
C
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# Title Periodical Pub Year Resilience Type
1 Resilience in Cognitive Develop-
ment
Ethos 1975 Human
2 Measuring the Inertia and Re-
silience of Ecosystems
Bioscience 1978 Ecological
3 The Eﬀect of Management Poli-
cies on the Stability and Re-
silience of British Grey Seal Pop-
ulations
The Journal of Ap-
plied Ecology
1978 Ecological
4 Ecological Resilience of Ben-
thic Insects Subjected to Power
Peaking Cycles in the Clearwa-
ter River, Idaho
Dissertation Ab-
stracts Interna-
tional Part B:
Science and Engi-
neering
1980 Ecological
5 Energy-Flow, Nutrient Cycling,
and Ecosystem Resilience
Ecology 1980 Ecological
6 Resilience and inertia in model
ecosystems: tests of some hy-
potheses
1982 Ecological
7 Passage time, resilience, and
structure of compartmental
models
Mathematical bio-
sciences
1983 Biological
8 Design of resilient processing
plantsVI. The eﬀect of right-
half-plane zeros on dynamic re-
silience
Chemical Engineer-
ing Science
1985 Dynamic;
Process
Control;
Chemical
Engineering
9 A programming model for anal-
ysis of the reliability, resilience
and vulnerability of a water sup-
ply reservoir
Water Resources
Research
1986 Water; Eco-
logical
10 Resilience: Concepts and Mea-
sures
NASA 1986 Ecological
11 Union Activity and Economic
Resilience
C.E.P.R. Discus-
sion Papers
1986 Economic
12 Design of resilient processing
plants-IX. Eﬀect of model uncer-
tainty on dynamic resilience
Chemical Engineer-
ing Science
1987 Dynamic;
Process
Control;
Chemical
Engineering
13 Network Resilience Siam Journal on
Algebraic and Dis-
crete Methods
1987 Network
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14 The genetics of resistance and
resilience to Haemonchus con-
tortus infection in young merino
sheep
International Jour-
nal for Parasitology
1987 Biological
15 Forest Ecosystem Stability:
Revision of the Resistance-
Resilience Modeling Relation
to Observable Macroscopic
Properties of Ecosystems
Forest Hydrology
and Ecology at
Coweeta, Ecolog-
ical Studies66,
Springer-Verlag
1988 Ecological
16 Eﬀects of nutrient recycling and
food-chain length on resilience
American Natural-
ist
1989 Food Web;
Ecological
17 Resilience and local stability
in a nutrient-limited resource-
consumer system
Bulletin of Mathe-
matical Biology
1989 Ecological
18 Disturbance regimes, resilience,
and recovery of animal com-
munities and habitats in lotic
ecosystems
Environmental
management
1990 Ecological
19 Network resilience - A measure
of network fault tolerance
IEEE Transactions
on Computers
1990 Network
20 Resilience and development:
contributions from the study of
children who overcome adversity
Development and
psychopathology
1990 Human
21 Network resilience of star
graphs: a comparative analysis
Proceedings of the
19th annual confer-
ence on Computer
Science
1991 Network
22 Analysis and synthesis problems
for network resilience
Mathematical
and Computer
Modelling
1993 Network
23 Resilience of corals to hurri-
canes: a simulation model
Coral Reefs 1993 Ecological
24 Tillage eﬀects on soil degrada-
tion, soil resilience, soil quality,
and sustainability
Soil and Tillage Re-
search
1993 Soil; Ecologi-
cal
25 From Risk to Resilience: A Jour-
ney with Heart for Our Children,
Our Future
1994 Human
26 Predictive Indices of Ecosystem
Resilience in Models of North
Temperate Lakes
Ecology 1994 Ecological
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27 Resistance and resilience in a
directly regenerating rainforest:
Nicaraguan trees of the Vochysi-
aceae after Hurricane Joan
Forest Ecology and
Management
1994 Ecological
28 A Guide to Promoting Re-
silience in Children: Strengthen-
ing the Human Spirit = Guia de
Promocion de la Resiliencia en
los Ninos para Fortalecer el Es-
piritu Humano
1995 Human
29 Experimental Trampling of Veg-
etation. II. Predictors of Resis-
tance and Resilience
The Journal of Ap-
plied Ecology
1995 Ecological
30 Measuring resilience in stochas-
tic systems
Ecological Mono-
graphs
1995 Ecological
31 Resilience and the Co-evolution
of Ecosystems and Institutions
1995 Ecological
32 Testing predictions of the resis-
tance and resilience of vegeta-
tion subjected to extreme events
Functional Ecology 1995 Ecological
33 Achieving Despite the Odds: A
Study of Resilience among a
Group of African American High
School Seniors
The Journal of Ne-
gro Education
1996 Human
34 Approximate reliability and
resilience indices of over-year
reservoirs fed by AR(1) Gamma
and normal ﬂows
Hydrological
Sciences Jour-
nal/Journal des
Sciences Hy-
drologiques
1996 Water
35 Feasibility and implications of
breeding sheep for resilience to
nematode challenge
International Jour-
nal for Parasitology
1996 Biological
36 Resilience: Analysis of the con-
cept
Archives of Psychi-
atric Nursing
1996 Psychological
37 The concept of family resilience:
Crisis and challenge
Family process 1996 Family
38 Toward a deﬁnition of family
resilience: Integrating life-span
and family perspectives
Family process 1996 Family
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39 Alternatives to resilience for
measuring the responses of eco-
logical systems to perturbations
Ecology 1997 Ecological
40 Biodiversity, resilience and the
control of ecological-economic
systems: The case of ﬁre-driven
rangelands
Ecological Eco-
nomics
1997 Ecological;
Economic
41 Responsiveness and resilience of
high Arctic ecosystems to envi-
ronmental change
Opera Botanica 1997 Ecological
42 The trait and process of re-
silience
Journal of ad-
vanced nursing
1997 Human
43 Toward a middle-range theory of
resilience
ANS.Advances in
nursing science
1997 Human
44 Adverse life events and resilience Journal of the
American Academy
of Child and Ado-
lescent Psychiatry
1998 Psychological
45 Concept development of re-
silience
Journal of Korean
Academy of Nurs-
ing
1998 Human
46 DNA strand biases and the mu-
tational resilience of genes
Mutation research 1998 Biological;
Genetic
47 Flood Insurance as a Manage-
ment Strategy for UK Coastal
Resilience
The Geographical
Journal
1998 Economic;
Social;
Coastal
48 Perceived social support as a
protective factor in manifest and
emotional resilience
Dissertation Ab-
stracts Interna-
tional: Section
B: The Physi-
cal Sciences and
Engineering
1998 Human
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49 Resilience and vulnerability:
coastal dynamics or Dutch
dikes?
Geographical Jour-
nal
1998 Coastal; Eco-
logical
50 Optimization of resilience and
stress distribution in porcelain
veneers for the treatment of
crown-fractured incisors
The Interna-
tional journal of
periodontics &
restorative den-
tistry
1999 Dental
51 Plant attribute diversity, re-
silience, and ecosystem function:
The nature and signiﬁcance of
dominant and minor species
Ecosystems 1999 Ecological
52 Research on Resilience and Its
Implications for Tobacco Pre-
vention
Nicotine and To-
bacco Research
1999 Human
53 Resilience among Urban African
American Male Adolescents: A
Study of the Protective Ef-
fects of Sociopolitical Control on
Their Mental Health
American Journal
of Community Psy-
chology
1999 Human
54 Resilience and Success among
Deaf High School Students:
Three Case Studies
American Annals
of the Deaf
1999 Human
55 Resilience concepts and ﬁndings:
implications for family therapy
Journal of Family
Therapy
1999 Psychological
56 Using resistance and resilience
measurements for ’ﬁtness’ tests
in ecosystem health
Journal of environ-
mental manage-
ment
1999 Ecoogical
57 Adversity, resilience and young
people: the protective value of
positive school and spare time
experiences
Children & Society 2000 Human
58 Building Resilience in Literacy
Learners
2000 Educational
59 Ecological resilience–in theory
and application
Annual Review of
Ecology and Sys-
tematics
2000 Ecological
60 Lives through time: an ideo-
graphic approach to the study of
resilience
Bulletin of the
Menninger Clinic
2000 Human; So-
cial
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61 Modelling Loss of Resilience in
Agroecosystems: Rangelands in
Botswana
Environmental
& Resource Eco-
nomics
2000 Ecological;
Economic
62 Social and ecological resilience:
are they related?
Progress in Human
Geography
2000 Social; Eco-
logical
63 Testing the limits of social re-
silience in ant colonies
Behavioral Ecology
and Sociobiology
2000 Social; Eco-
logical
64 The construct of resilience: A
critical evaluation and guidelines
for future work
Child development 2000 Human
65 The construct of resilience: im-
plications for interventions and
social policies
Development and
psychopathology
2000 Social
66 A contribution to the knowledge
of resilience of forest ecosys-
tems at higher altitudes of the
Moravian-Silesian Beskids
Ekologia
(Bratislava)/Ecology
(Bratislava)
2001 Ecological
67 Challenges to the Deﬁnition of
Resilience
Conference of the
American Psycho-
logical Association,
San Francisco, CA
2001 Psychological
68 Conceptualizing resilience in
women older than 85: over-
coming adversity from illness or
loss
Journal of geronto-
logical nursing
2001 Human
69 First-order reliability method
for estimating reliability, vulner-
ability, and resilience
Water Resources
Research
2001 Water; Eco-
logical
70 From Metaphor to Measure-
ment: Resilience of What to
What?
Ecosystems 2001 Ecological
71 Loss and human resilience Applied and Pre-
ventive Psychology
2001 Psychological
72 Modelling the resilience of Aus-
tralian savanna systems to graz-
ing impacts
Environment inter-
national
2001 Ecological
73 Resilience and social work prac-
tice: Three case studies
Families in Society-
the Journal of Con-
temporary Human
Services
2001 Human
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74 Resistance and Resilience of
Alpine Lake Fauna to Fish In-
troductions
Ecological Mono-
graphs
2001 Ecological
75 Scale, ecosystem resilience and
ﬁre in shortgrass steppe
2001 Ecological
76 Spatial Resilience of Coral Reefs Ecosystems 2001 Ecological;
Spatial
77 Species Traits, Species Richness
and the Resilience of Wetlands
after Disturbance
Journal of Aquatic
Plant Management
2001 Ecological
78 Disturbance and resilience in soil
animal communities
European Journal
of Soil Biology
2002 Ecological
79 Ecosystem adaptation: Do
ecosystems maximize resilience?
Ecology 2002 Ecological
80 Ecosystem health: is resilience
an accurate and sensitive index
in a salt marsh
Proceedings of Eco-
logical Society of
America 87th An-
nual Meeting
2002 Ecological
81 Keeping ecological resilience
aﬂoat in cross-scale turbulence:
an indigenous social movement
navigates change in Indonesia
2002 Ecological
82 Mental health promotion
through resilience and resiliency
education
International jour-
nal of emergency
mental health
2002 Human
83 Migration, remittances, liveli-
hood trajectories, and social re-
silience
Ambio 2002 Social
84 Pollution and recovery of Lake
Orta (Italy): Resilience at work?
Aquatic Ecosystem
Health & Manage-
ment
2002 Ecological
85 Promoting resilience in children
and young people
Developing Prac-
tice
2002 Human
86 Resilience and Sustainable De-
velopment: Building Adaptive
Capacityin a World of Transfor-
mations
Ambio 2002 Ecological
C Resilience Usage in the Wider Literature 353
# Title Periodical Pub Year Resilience Type
87 Resilience in aquatic ecosystems
- hysteresis, homeostasis, and
health
Aquatic Ecosystem
Health & Manage-
ment
2002 Ecological
88 Resilience in Families and Com-
munities: Latin American Con-
tributions from the Psychology
of Liberation
Family Journal 2002 Collective;
Social
89 Resilience management in
social-ecological systems: a
working hypothesis for a partic-
ipatory approach
Conservation Ecol-
ogy
2002 Ecological
90 Satellite Evidence of Decreas-
ing Resilience in Mediterranean
Plant Communities after Recur-
rent Wildﬁres
Ecology 2002 Ecological
91 Building Farm Resilience: The
Prospects and Challenges of Or-
ganic Farming
Journal of Sustain-
able Agriculture
2003 Ecological
92 Childhood stunting in relation
to adolescent living environment
and resilience: a follow up study
in Lahore
Pakistan.J Ayub
Med Coll (Abbot-
tabad)
2003 Human
93 Development of a new resilience
scale: the Connor-Davidson Re-
silience Scale (CD-RISC)
Depression and
anxiety
2003 Psychological
94 Environmental determinants of
resistance and resilience to coral
bleaching: implications for ma-
rine protected area management
Conserv.Biol 2003 Ecological
95 Mobile link organisms and
ecosystem functioning: Impli-
cations for ecosystem resilience
and management
Ecosystems 2003 Ecological
96 Navigating social-ecological sys-
tems: Building resilience for
complexity and change
2003 Social; Eco-
logical
97 Psychological and social aspects
of resilience: a synthesis of risks
and resources
Dialogues in Clini-
cal Neuroscience
2003 Psychological;
Social
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98 Resilience and Adaptive Capac-
ity: Key Components of Sus-
tainable Social-Ecological Sys-
tems
Newsletter of the
International Hu-
man Dimensions
Programme on
Global Environ-
mental Change
(IHDP)
2003 Social; Eco-
logical
99 Resilience and successful aging.
Comparison among low and high
income older adults
Journal of geronto-
logical nursing
2003 Human
100 Resilience in pre-contact Paciﬁc
Northwest social ecological sys-
tems
Conservation Ecol-
ogy
2003 Social; Eco-
logical
101 Resilience of ecosystems to dis-
turbances
2003 Ecological
102 Resilience of Epilithic Algal As-
semblages in Atmospherically
and Experimentally Acidiﬁed
Boreal Lakes
Ambio 2003 Ecological
103 Resilience to natural hazards:
How useful is this concept?
Global Environ-
mental Change
Part B: Environ-
mental Hazards
2003 Natural Dis-
asters
104 Resilience: a concept for the
psychological approach of hu-
man behaviour
Annals of General
Hospital Psychia-
try
2003 Human
105 Resistance, resilience, and
patchiness of invertebrate as-
semblages in native tussock and
pasture streams in New Zealand
after a hydrological disturbance
Canadian Journal
of Fisheries and
Aquatic Sciences
2003 Ecological
106 Risk and Resilience in the Life
Course: Implications for Inter-
ventions and Social Policies
Journal of Youth
Studies
2003 Human
107 The quest for resilience Harvard business
review
2003 Business
108 The Value of Resilience as a
Concept for Practice in Residen-
tial Settings
Scottish Journal of
Residential Child
Care
2003 Human
C Resilience Usage in the Wider Literature 355
# Title Periodical Pub Year Resilience Type
109 Building resilience and a
supportive environment:
Child-centred approaches to
HIV/AIDS (CCATH)
Int Conf AIDS 2004 Human
110 Concept development of family
resilience: a study of Korean
families with a chronically ill
child
Journal of clinical
nursing
2004 Family
111 Ecological resilience in urban
ecosystems: Linking urban pat-
terns to human and ecological
functions
Urban Ecosystems 2004 Ecological
112 Experimental Deﬁnition of Re-
silience for State-and-Transition
Models
Society for Range
Management Meet-
ing Abstracts
2004 Ecological
113 Institutional responses to devel-
opment pressures: Resilience of
social-ecological systems in Hi-
machal Pradesh, India
International Jour-
nal of Sustainable
Development and
World Ecology
2004 Social; Eco-
logical
114 Network Resilience through
Multi-Topology Routing
University of
Wurzburg, Insti-
tute of Computer
Science, Tech.Rep
2004 Network
115 Psychobiological Mechanisms
of Resilience and Vulnerability:
Implications for Successful
Adaptation to Extreme Stress
American Journal
of Psychiatry
2004 Human
116 Psychological resilience and pos-
itive emotional granularity: Ex-
amining the beneﬁts of positive
emotions on coping and health
Journal of person-
ality
2004 Psychological
117 Psychological Resilience and the
Well-Being of Widowed Women
Ageing Interna-
tional
2004 Psychological
118 Pupil resilience in the classroom:
a teacher’s framework
Emotional and Be-
havioural Diﬃcul-
ties
2004 Human
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119 Resilience and ﬂood risk man-
agement
Water Policy 2004 Natural Dis-
asters
120 Resilience in a Community Sam-
ple of Children of Alcoholics:
Its Prevalence and Relation
to Internalizing Symptomatol-
ogy and Positive Aﬀect
Journal of Applied
Developmental
Psychology
2004 Human
121 Resilience, Adaptability and
Transformability in Social-
ecological Systems
Ecology and Soci-
ety
2004 Social; Eco-
logical
122 The contribution of direct and
indirect ﬂows to the resilience of
element cycles
Acta Oecologica 2004 Ecological
123 The Cost of Restoration as a
Way of Deﬁning Resilience: a
Viability Approach Applied to a
Model of Lake Eutrophication
Ecology and Soci-
ety
2004 Ecological
124 Adolescent resilience: a frame-
work for understanding healthy
development in the face of risk
Annual Review of
Public Health
2005 Human
125 An Exploratory Framework for
the Empirical Measurement of
Resilience
Ecosystems 2005 Ecological
126 APA’s Resilience Initiative Professional Psy-
chology: Research
and Practice
2005 Psychological
127 Conceptual clariﬁcations in the
study of resilience
American Psychol-
ogist
2005 Psychological
128 Environmental Variability in the
Florida Keys: Impacts on Coral
Reef Resilience and Health
American Geo-
physical Union,
Fall Meeting 2005,
abstract# OS23B-
04
2005 Ecological
129 Evaluation, analysis, and en-
hancement of error resilience
for reliable compression of VLSI
test data
IEEE Transactions
on Instrumentation
and Measurement
2005 Electronic
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130 Fauna of Yosemite National
Park lakes has low resistance but
high resilience to ﬁsh introduc-
tions
Ecological Applica-
tions
2005 Ecological
131 Interpreting and Correcting
Cross-scale Mismatches in Re-
silience Analysis: a Procedure
and Examples from Australia’s
Rangelands
Ecology and Soci-
ety
2005 Ecological
132 Notes on Lifelong Resilience:
Perceptual and Personality Fac-
tors Implicit in the Creation of a
Particular Adaptive Style
Psychoanalytic
Psychology
2005 Psychological
133 Promoting community resilience
in disasters: the role for schools,
youth, and families
2005 Human
134 Psychological well-being, re-
silience, and social support
expectancy: Junior high school
students facing high school
entrance examinations
Japanese Journal
of Educational
Psychology
2005 Psychological
135 Resilience as a Component of
Ecological Health: Lessons From
Stream Ecosystems
American Geo-
physical Union,
Spring Meeting
2005, abstract#
NB23A-03
2005 Ecological
136 Resilience of the Dominant Hu-
man Fecal Microbiota upon
Short-Course Antibiotic Chal-
lenge
Journal of clinical
microbiology
2005 Biological
137 Resilience: Going from Con-
ventional to Adaptive Freshwa-
ter Management for Human and
Ecosystem Compatibility
2005 Ecological
138 Social-ecological resilience to
coastal disasters
Science 2005 Social; Eco-
logical
139 Stress, Aging, and Resilience:
Can Accrued Wear and Tear Be
Slowed?
Canadian Psychol-
ogy
2005 Human
140 Stress-resilience, illness, and
coping: a person-focused investi-
gation of young women athletes
Journal of Behav-
ioral Medicine
2005 Human
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141 Supply chain resilience - Anal-
ysis of a distribution network
model under changing scenarios
2005 Supply Chain
142 The phenomenon of resilience in
crisis care mental health clini-
cians
International Jour-
nal of Mental
Health Nursing
2005 Psychological
143 The Use of Discontinuities and
Functional Groups to Assess
Relative Resilience in Complex
Systems
Ecosystems 2005 Ecological
144 Understanding and Fostering
Family Resilience
Family Journal
Counseling and
Therapy for Cou-
ples and Families
2005 Family
145 Vulnerability or Resilience? De-
velopment in a Network Per-
spective
2005 Network
146 A comparison of transportation
network resilience under simu-
lated system optimum and user
equilibrium conditions
Proceedings of the
37th conference on
Winter simulation
2006 Network
147 A multiple-levels-of-analysis
perspective on resilience: impli-
cations for the developing brain,
neural plasticity, and preventive
interventions
Annals of the New
York Academy of
Sciences
2006 Human
148 Access and resilience: Analyz-
ing the construction of social re-
silience to the threat of water
scarcity
Ecology and Soci-
ety
2006 Ecological;
Social
149 Biodiversity, ecosystem func-
tion, and resilience: ten guiding
principles for commodity pro-
duction landscapes
Frontiers in Ecol-
ogy and the Envi-
ronment
2006 Ecological
150 Building Resilience and Adapta-
tion to Manage Arctic Change
Ambio 2006 Ecological
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151 Can forest management based
on natural disturbances main-
tain ecological resilience?
Canadian Journal
of Forest Research-
Revue Canadienne
De Recherche
Forestiere
2006 Ecological
152 Conceptualizing and Measuring
Economic Resilience
2006 Economic
153 Developing an Agenda for
Translational Studies of Re-
silience and Vulnerability
Following Trauma Exposure
Annals of the New
York Academy of
Sciences
2006 Human
154 Exploring Resilience in Social-
ecological Systems: Compara-
tive Studies and Theory Devel-
opment
2006 Ecological;
Social
155 Firm size diversity, functional
richness, and resilience
Environment and
Development Eco-
nomics
2006 Ecological
156 Implications of resilience con-
cepts for scientiﬁc understand-
ing
Annals of the New
York Academy of
Sciences
2006 Human
157 Knowledge, learning and the
evolution of conservation prac-
tice for social-ecological system
resilience
Human Ecology 2006 Social; Eco-
logical
158 On the Concept of Resilience
(Preliminary Paper #356)
2006 Physical; Bi-
ological; Per-
sonality; So-
cial; Cultural
159 Overview of the Resilience Con-
cept
100th Anniver-
sary Earthquake
Conference
2006 Seismic; Nat-
ural Disasters
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# Title Periodical Pub Year Resilience Type
160 Population and community re-
silience in multitrophic commu-
nities
Ecology 2006 Ecological
161 Psychological ”resilience” and
its correlates in chronic pain:
Findings from a national com-
munity sample
Pain 2006 Psychological
162 Resilience and sustainable devel-
opment
Environment and
Development Eco-
nomics
2006 Ecological
163 Resilience as an attribute of
the developmental system: com-
ments on the papers of Profes-
sors Masten & Wachs
Annals of the New
York Academy of
Sciences
2006 Human
164 Resilience Engineering: New di-
rections for measuring and main-
taining safety in complex sys-
tems
2006 Engineering
165 Resilience is associated with bet-
ter recovery in Chinese people
diagnosed with coronary heart
disease
Psychology &
Health
2006 Personal;
Psychological
166 Resilience Under Military Oper-
ational Stress: Can Leaders In-
ﬂuence Hardiness?
Military Psychol-
ogy
2006 Psychological
167 Resilience: determinants, mea-
surement, and treatment re-
sponsiveness
CNS spectrums 2006 Human
168 The Mekong Program on Water,
Environment and Resilience (M-
POWER)
Mountain Research
and Development
2006 Human; Eco-
logical
169 Cultural understandings of re-
silience: roots for wings in
the development of aﬀective re-
sources for resilience
Child and adoles-
cent psychiatric
clinics of North
America
2007 Human
170 Data mining of resilience indica-
tors
IIE Transactions 2007 Economic
C Resilience Usage in the Wider Literature 361
# Title Periodical Pub Year Resilience Type
171 Genetically informative designs
in the study of resilience in de-
velopmental psychopathology
Child and adoles-
cent psychiatric
clinics of North
America
2007 Psychological
172 Is attachment style a source of
resilience against health inequal-
ities at work?
Social Science &
Medicine
2007 Human
173 Mountain hazards and the re-
silience of social-ecological sys-
tems: lessons learned in India
and Canada
Natural Hazards 2007 Social; Eco-
logical
174 Resilience and transitions from
dementia caregiving
The journals of
gerontology.Series
B, Psychological
sciences and social
sciences
2007 Human
175 Resilience in landscape exploita-
tion systems
Ecological Mod-
elling
2007 Ecological
176 Resilience: research evidence
and conceptual considerations
for posttraumatic stress disorder
Depression and
anxiety
2007 Psychological
177 Resistance and resilience of zinc
tolerant nitrifying communities
is unaﬀected in long-term zinc
contaminated soils
Soil Biology and
Biochemistry
2007 Biological
178 Understanding uncertainty and
reducing vulnerability: lessons
from resilience thinking
Natural Hazards 2007 Natural
Disasters;
Human; En-
vironmental
